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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation explores the question of how to position ethos in rhetorical theory and 
practice by looking, mainly, at three areas: classical Chinese rhetoric, Web design, and the 
construction of corporate images in America after 9/11. In traditional Western rhetoric, ethos 
is perceived to be the appeal of one's personal character, with a vocabulary heavily steeped 
in individualism and self-representation. In the dissertation I argue for an alternative 
understanding of ethos, pointing out that ethos is essentially an invocation of cultural forces, 
with which rhetors not only identify themselves but also, through such identification, achieve 
their rhetorical purposes. The central point is that ethos is collect!vist, not individualist. 
The dissertation has four chapters. Chapter One provides an overview of classical 
Chinese rhetoric (CCR), with a focus on some of its important features, such as rhetoric as 
harmonic, rhetoric as paradoxical (Yin and Yang), and rhetoric as multiaccentual, and the 
challenges CCR poses to the conception of ethos in traditional Western rhetoric. Chapter 
Two explores how ethos comes to embody a social projection of one's self image and why it 
is intertwined with the power of kingship in early Chinese society. The conclusion is that 
logos, as understood in the Western tradition, does not play as an important role as ethos does 
in classical Chinese rhetoric, which is driven by an ethocentric tradition as opposed to the 
logocentrism in the West. 
Chapter Three first discusses how ethos is projected differently in visual arts and 
design between Western and Eastern (mainly Chinese) cultures, and then moves on to 
explore how such differences between the two are reflected in online text and design through 
an in-depth analysis of samples from various Web sites. Chapter Four discusses in theory 
ix 
how postmodern corporate imagery should be approached as an entity constructed within the 
spectrum of codes of appeals that are culturally defined. Foucault's poststructuralism is 
drawn upon to demonstrate that such imagery is not substantiated by what may be called a 
corporate soul or self, but rather by the expectations of a society. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation explores the question of how to position ethos in rhetorical theory 
and practice by looking, mainly, at three areas: classical Chinese rhetoric, Web 
design, and the construction of corporate images in America after 9/11. In 
traditional Western rhetoric, ethos is perceived to be the appeal of one's personal 
character, with a vocabulary heavily steeped in individualism and self-
representation. In the dissertation I am arguing for an alternative understanding of 
ethos, pointing out that it is essentially an invocation of cultural forces, with which 
rhetors not only identify themselves but also, through such identification, achieve 
their rhetorical purposes. The central point is that ethos is collect!vist, not 
individualist. 
In this introduction, I will first give some background about Western ethos 
and its grounding in the Western conception of self. Then, I will point out the 
problematic aspects of such ethos by focusing on how texts in ancient China take 
individuality out of the picture yet still maintain the appeal of ethos, thus raising the 
question of how to redefine ethos. Lastly, I will provide an outline of the dissertation 
with general themes and details of what I try to accomplish in each particular 
chapter. 
Background of Western Ethos 
Aristotle sees rhetorical persuasion as threefold, coming from logos, the appeal of 
logical reasoning, pathos, the appeal of emotional invocation, and ethos, the appeal 
of one's personal character. Of the three, says Aristotle, character "may almost be 
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called the most effective means of persuasion" (BH154)/ He explains, "Persuasion is 
achieved by the speaker's personal character when the speech is so spoken as to 
make us think him credible. We believe good men more fully and more readily than 
others: this is true generally whatever the question is, and absolutely true where 
exact certainty is impossible and opinions are divided" (BH 153). Ethos, it thus can 
be said, refers to a rhetorical strategy that "emphasized the role a speaker's character 
plays in persuasion" (fames Baumlin xii). 
However, traditional Western rhetoric seems to lack a consensus in terms of 
how to define that role, which is sometimes seen as relating to "the problematic 
identification of a speaker with/in his or her speech" (Baumlin xi). Indeed, there 
have been two conflicting versions of ethos in the history of rhetorical theory: One is 
Platonic, regarding ethos as an individual quality of a rhetor, independent of 
rhetorical manipulations; the other is artistic, treating ethos as something that can be 
created, and manipulated, through means of good sense, good will, and good use of 
language, as proposed by Aristotle in his RWonc. 
Strictly speaking, Plato himself never uses the word ethos, and his anti-
rhetoric stance may well give the impression that he is also anti-ethos. However, his 
emphasis on "true rhetoric" and the truthfulness of human character presented in 
that rhetoric suggests that he is just as concerned about how to identify one's self in 
a speech/ writing as his sophist rivals, if not more than them. Thus, "by inference," 
says James Baumlin, one might still figure out "a Platonic definition" of ethos (xiii). 
To understand what counts as a Platonic ethos, we may need to first look at 
the Platonic or transcendent truth. Plato insists that such truth has nothing to do 
^ BH refers to TTze Tradition, a collection of readings edited by Bizzell and Herzberg. 
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with the worldly (rhetoric included); however, he believes that humans were 
somehow in contact with it before their birth, "when [their] souls were with the 
Divine" (BH 55). The question is, How can humans possibly seek truth when they 
exist in the flesh? Plato offers his dialectic, "the whole process of rational analysis by 
which the soul was led into the knowledge of Ideas" (Hunt 64). Obviously, this is 
where the issue of character plays out, for one must be truthful to oneself in order to 
discover or express truth, an assertion made by Plato in both the Gorgwzs and the 
PfwWrws. Of course, in his eyes, only the philosopher, not the rhetorician, has the 
moral rectitude to be truthful. 
It is important to note that Plato's ethos, the truthfulness of human character, 
is also an embodiment of soul knowledge. As Baumlin points out, since dialectic 
"seeks to discover and express the truth of the soul, then ethos describes the inner 
harmony among language, character, and truth—in Platonic fashion, ethos defines 
the space where language and truth meet or are made incarnate within the 
individual" (xiii). This is to say that the Platonic ethos is essentially incamationist, in 
the sense that it projects truth by relating to what is deep within the individual: the 
soul. 
We may never be able to determine what exactly Plato means by the "soul" in 
modem terms, but we can reasonably assume it is about some kind of immortal 
essence an individual self possesses within. If the Platonic ethos is individualistic, 
if s because it is premised, fundamentally, on the notion of an essentialist self in 
Western ideology, presupposing the existence of an eternal, static identity within the 
individual that can endure the vicissitudes of time and space (Baumlin xvii-xviii). In 
other words, ethos (the character of self and embodiment of truth) stands by itself, to 
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be revealed through language, not to be created in language: Rhetoric has little role 
to play. 
Without doubt, Aristotle departs to a great extent from his mentor in defining 
ethos. Though he includes the aspect of moral character in ethos, his pragmatism 
gives rhetoric a much more significant role in connecting human character to the 
epistemic function of language. Aristotle argues that persuasion through ethos 
ought to be achieved by "what the speaker says, not by what people think of his 
character before he begins to speak" (BH 153). That is, the orator must construct his 
material (artistic proofs) to "make his own character look right" so as to "inspire 
trust in his audience" (BH 160; 161). In contrast to Plato who insists that the 
speaker's character must be upright for its own sake, Aristotle seems to say that it is 
sufficient to win an audience simply by making "ourselves thought to be sensible 
and morally good" (BH 161). To put it bluntly, the Aristotelian ethos can be faked. 
In sum, the Western tradition of rhetoric has been marked by a tension 
between the Platonic and the Aristotelian in terms of how to identify ethos. The 
Platonic ethos assumes the moral character of a speaker to be something innate, 
outside the confines of language and society, while the Aristotelian ethos reflects a 
rather pragmatic approach in discourse, stressing the need for a rhetorical 
reconstruction of human character. Or, we may say, the Platonic ethos entertains a 
philosophical essence, separable from the "flattery" of rhetoric; the Aristotelian 
ethos, on the other hand, incorporates with the rhetorical, which in turn adds to, and 
even creates, the trustworthiness of a rhetor. 
5 
Questions Raised 
However, as Baumlin suggests, throughout the history of rhetorical theory, the 
Platonic ethos appears to have had the upper hand over the Aristotelian (even 
though Aristotle himself is considered the framer of Western rhetoric), due to a 
logocentric tradition in ideology that "embraces [...] the philosophical model of 
selfhood over the [...] rhetorical model" (xviii). He writes: 
Western culture, in other words, has largely identified itself with the 
tradition beginning with Plato and Isocrates and developed by Augustine, 
Aquinas, Descartes, Kant—all of whom treat the self as a moral, 
metaphysical, and ultimately, theological category (rather than as a function 
or effect of verbal behavior). (zW.) 
Further, what appears problematic to me (and also relevant to my dissertation) is 
that, even though Aristotle's ethos is said to be "quintessentially a linguistic 
phenomenon" (xxiii), it never gives up in its own categories the notion of selfhood 
or individualization—how to represent the character of an individual is still the 
central concern of the Aristotelian ethos. If the Platonic ethos is the projection of self 
through philosophy, then the Aristotelian ethos is largely the projection of self 
through rhetoric. That is, discourse has now become an instrument in such 
projection. So, no matter how we look at the Western ethos, it has always been seen 
as "the appeal of speakers or writers to their own credibility and character" (Covino 
& Jolliffe 52), be it the Platonic or Aristotelian. I would add that the image of a Greek 
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rhetor standing above the crowd and single-handedly inciting his audience into 
actions might also have its imprint on the Western perception of ethos. 
By contrast, in classical Chinese rhetoric there is no such concern as to the 
relation between human character and discourse. This doesn't mean that ethos has 
nothing to bear on Chinese rhetoric but only suggests that it takes on a different 
definition, with its sources (of credibility) shifted from self to non-self, or, to put it 
specifically, from the individual to the collective, communal, and cultural, as I will 
argue later in this section. It appears that Western ethos is anything but universal 
when perceived from an Eastern perspective, especially from the following three 
aspects of classical Chinese rhetoric: function of rhetoric, epistemology, and 
"bamboo hypertext/' 
1. Function of rhetoric 
Instead of striving for individual welfare as seen in Greek rhetoric, classical Chinese 
rhetoric emphasizes the need for maintaining social harmony (Scollan & Scollan 
142), with its discourse production essentially depersonalized. If s hard to imagine 
an ancient Chinese rhetor (swz'-ke) standing above the crowd engaging in some kind 
of public speech or debate—not because the notion of democracy failed to prevail, 
but because such practice was simply out of character with the cultural themes of 
humility, collectivism, and adherence to social rituals. 
As I will argue later (in chapter 1), harmonic rhetoric in ancient China should 
not be interpreted simplistically as avoiding conflicts or submitting to authority; 
rather, it is about how to position one's self in the world (society and nature) 
through the medium of language. To achieve harmony is ultimately to seek unity 
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between man and the Dao, a cosmic moral order of being in ancient Chinese 
ideology. Rhetorically, this would mean the denial of an individual appeal on the 
part of the rhetor, who would have to appeal to culturally and historically 
established authority, such as ancestral lineage and the sage-kings like Yao, Shun, 
and Yu, for the purpose of establishing ethos. The ancestral lineage would give the 
rhetor some kind of legitimacy in positioning himself in a social hierarchy. The sage-
kings were thought to "maintain a divine afflatus" (Schwartz 26) and therefore have 
the power to perceive the Dao. So, the appeal to such authority is essentially the 
appeal to the Dao, through which the rhetor builds up his rhetorical power. 
2. Epistemology 
Unlike Western rhetoric, which is predominantly logocentrically oriented, classical 
Chinese rhetoric never embraces the ideal of language as "an enterprise to represent 
or depict or describe an external reality independent of man and society" (Hans 
Lenk 6). Its primary epistemological function is to make distinctions of the world 
perceived to be an ontological Yin-Yang duality, rather than to express the certainty 
of transcendent truth as advocated by Plato and other Western thinkers. For a 
Westerner, language and reality can be separable; for a Chinese, language and 
reality are one, in the sense that we have to use language to make distinctions 
between Yin and Yang, good and bad, right and wrong, etc. Thaf s why Confucius is 
so obsessed with the "rectification of names" (z&fM# #%»#), because he knows very 
well that such rectification can lead to the rectification of moral behavior. Within the 
Confucian (Daoist as well) system of ideology, discourse constitutes social reality. 
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Now we can see that the epistemology underlying CCR is turning the 
Platonic ethos upside down. Because it never concerns itself with "an object-
marking account of the way words relate to the world" (Hansen 71), truth has been a 
non-issue in CCR, and the individual self, seen as an embodiment of truth in a 
Platonic definition, would thus carry little weight in presenting a rhetor^s ethos. To 
put it another way, Chinese ethos does not have to serve as some kind of connection 
between the truthfulness of discourse and the truthfulness of human character. 
We can also see that traditional Chines epistemology implies a denial of 
human agency as presupposed in a Platonic definition of ethos. For Plato, the 
objective discovery and representation of truth must be done by (or incarnated 
within) an individual self, but because truth is a non-issue in ancient Chinese 
thought, the concern for human agency to exercise such objectivity is thus out of 
question. Indeed, I would say that discourse production in ancient China is "agent-
less" in the sense that the speech-act itself has never been assumed to be something 
individual—not just because discourse is essentially depersonalized for the sake of 
maintaining social harmony, as mentioned earlier, but also because there has been a 
wide-spread recognition of language's structuring impact on man's behavior. For 
Lao Zi, the "name" (i.e., language) is "the mother of ten thousand things" (1); for 
Confucius and his followers like Xun Zi, morality comes out of naming, not the 
other way around. All this would pose further challenges to the Western definition 
of ethos: If discourse practice is "agent-less," then where do we locate a rhetor's 
ethos? 
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3. Bamboo hypertext 
Classical Chinese rhetoric can be metaphorically described as "bamboo hypertext" 
in that it shares many textual features that are normally associated with modem 
electronic hypertext, which, according to Jay Bolter, is "the interactive 
interconnection of a set of symbolic elements" (27). The reason I choose the term 
"bamboo hypertext" also has to do with the physical features of classical Chinese 
texts, as all of them were written (or occasionally carved) on strings of bamboo 
strips. I will illustrate in length in chapter 1 how classical Chinese rhetoric fits all 
those descriptions about hypertext: namely, non-linear, open-ended, collective, 
multi-accentual, interactive, and networked. In the following, I will mainly discuss 
how the "bamboo hypertext" phenomenon in CCR raises questions to the Western 
definition of ethos in terms of authorship. 
Almost all the Chinese classics we've seen today, like Lao Zi's Doo De /zng 
and Confucius' Amzkcfs were created as a collection of short essays, paragraphs, or 
sentences written and rewritten by the disciples, or disciples of the disciples, of Lao 
Zi and Confucius over a span of decades or even centuries. While the texts bore the 
name of Lao Zi or Confucius, as its official author as a token of respect from those 
disciples, as Mark Lewis suggests (53), the master himself may never have 
contributed a single written word to the collection (though it is popularly believed 
that those quotations by Lao Zi or Confucius had the master's imprint one way or 
another). 
Consequently, after the texts had passed through numerous hands, they 
would invariably become inconsistent or self-contradictory in both meaning and 
purpose due to the absence of individual authorship (or control). In addition, many 
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disciples would use the master as a source of authority to create their own texts (or 
agenda, using today's political terminology) with degrees of deviation and variance 
from the predecessors depending on the then ideological climate and scholarly 
trends. The readers also took an active role in interacting with the texts, and very 
often they were even part of an ongoing process of textual transformation. So, if s 
not surprising to see that a classic Chinese work credited to a historic figure could 
have numerous "adulterated" versions. The "problem," of course, comes from a 
collective authorship responsible for the production of "bamboo hypertext." 
What is significant about "bamboo hypertext" is that its authorship seems to 
break away from all of the "self-structure" (Marshall Alcom 3) associated with a 
Western ethos: character, personality, person(a), voice, image, and, above all, the 
self, none of which matters that much in classical Chinese rhetoric. Because of the 
collective authorship that transcends time and space, a CCR text is typically defined 
by motion rather than by "momentary location" (Moulthrop 303). That is to say, it 
aims to dissolve itself, which would mean it also dissolves the kind of stableness, 
however relative, that a self-structure must have in order to establish ethos (Alcom 
3-35). 
Alcom says, "A theory of ethos needs to be grounded in a relatively clear, but 
also a relatively complex, understanding of the self" (4), but does this theory also 
apply to classical Chinese rhetoric? I would doubt it, for the reason that its collective 
authorship projects self-effacement rather than self-representation as commonly 
seen in Western culture and rhetoric. I wouldn't say there is no such thing as ethos 
in "bamboo hypertext," because a Chinese rhetorical text, like its Western 
counterpart, must establish certain trust or credibility in order to effect persuasion. 
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Indeed, Confucius' "%zw cz fz ^z dzgM," which can be translated as "rhetoric oriented 
towards trust," may exactly point out how important ethos is in Chinese rhetoric. 
But the difference is, a Western ethos is created to gain trust for the rhetor as an 
individual, whereas a Chinese ethos has a broader purpose of telling or, to use 
Lewis' words, "writing the masters" (53) instead of one's self. 
In this section, I have discussed the three aspects of classical Chinese rhetoric 
to illustrate how a Chinese ethos can differ from a Western one, therefore raising 
questions as to the Western definition of ethos based on the identification of a 
speaker/writer within a discourse. The "function of rhetoric" part points out an 
important characteristic of classical Chinese rhetoric, depersonalization, which 
suggests that a Chinese rhetor must invoke culturally established authority, and 
ultimately the Dao, to create ethos. The "epistemology" part explains how truth is a 
non-issue in CCR; therefore, the individual self, which is supposed to be an 
embodiment of truth in the Platonic sense, would carry no weight in generating 
ethos in classical Chinese rhetoric. And the "bamboo hypertext" part demonstrates 
at the discourse production level how a fluid, collective authorship in CCR defies 
the stableness of a self-structure considered to be necessary in formulating a 
Western ethos. 
All the three aspects of classical Chinese rhetoric will be further explored in 
chapters to follow, and in greater detail and length. 
Methods 
The dissertation is meant to investigate in theory the possibility of redefining ethos, 
using categories that distinguish between Chinese and Western rhetoric, such as the 
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above mentioned three aspects; critical analysis of classical texts will be the key to 
explicating how ethos is perceived and established in the context of history, culture, 
and rhetorical theory. It will also explore in detail how persuasion can be effected 
when ethos is projected as an invocation of cultural forces rather than as an appeal 
to one's own character and trust—by examining critically some primary texts 
produced in the Autumn and Spring and Warring States periods (722-481 B.C.; 
403-221 B.C.), when Chinese rhetoric had reached its full bloom both in terms of 
theory and practice. I will utilize the existing English versions of Chinese texts 
whenever possible for the purpose of translation, except on two occasions: 1) when 
the English translation is not available, and 2) when the rendition itself does not 
fully express the original. 
Since my target audience is meant to be Western readers, if s necessary for me 
to establish my own ethos by identifying with some Western theorists, such as 
Coffman, Burke, and Foucault. The rhetorical theory in ancient China bears some 
striking similarity to poststructuralism in the West. I think if s also feasible to do 
some comparative discussions on this topic: for example, between the authorship of 
"bamboo hypertext and Foucaulf s "author function." This way, I might have the 
benefit of easing resistance from some Western readers. 
In order to show that the idea of collective ethos has a broader application, 
beyond the cultural boundary of Chinese, or even Eastern, rhetoric, I will devote 
chapter 3 to discussing online ethos with a purpose to explore the possibility of 
cultural convergences in terms of ethos projection in addition to the question of 
Eastem-versus-Westem differences in Web design, and chapter 4 is dedicated o 
demonstrating the applicability of collective ethos in business communication 
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practices based on research on the construction of corporate images in America after 
9/11. 
Outline of the Dissertation 
The dissertation will focus on exploring in theory one of the three persuasive 
strategies in Western rhetoric—ethos—drawing on my research in classical Chinese 
rhetoric and some comparisons with Western poststructuralist discourse theory. The 
claims I wish to make are: 1) ethos is a collective cultural force, not an individual 
quality based on the rhetor's self and character; 2) ethos is shifting, not static, and is 
always shaped (and reshaped) and defined (and redefined) by audience and context 
and, to a larger extent, by culture, community, and history; 
and 3) ethos and logos are the same in classical Chinese rhetoric. 
The purpose of the dissertation is not to discuss what Chinese ethos is, but 
rather to redefine, conceptually, the notion of ethos. Some ancient Chinese thinkers, 
like Lao Zi and Confucius, and Western postmodern theorists Foucault 
(poststructuralism), Goffman (performance theory), and Kenneth Burke (rhetoric as 
identification) will provide a theoretical framework for my discussions. The 
dissertation will be divided into four chapters, as outlined in the following: 
Chapter One: Overview. Some of the important features of classical Chinese 
rhetoric (CCR) are discussed, and so are the challenges CCR poses to the traditional 
conception of ethos in Western rhetoric. An overview of Western ethos is provided 
in the form of an appendix at the end of the chapter. 
Chapter Two: Face and Heaven. This chapter will explore how ethos comes 
to embody a social projection of one's self image and why it is intertwined with the 
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power of kingship in early Chinese society. The conclusion is that logos, as 
understood in the Western tradition, does not play as an important role as ethos 
does in classical Chinese rhetoric, which is driven by an ethocentric tradition as 
opposed to the logocentrism in the West. 
Chapter Three: Ethos Online. This chapter first discusses how ethos is 
projected differently in visual arts and design between Western and Eastern (mainly 
Chinese) cultures, and then moves on to explore how such differences between the 
two are reflected in online text and design through an in-depth analysis of samples 
from various Web sites. 
Chapter Four: Corporate Image as Collective Ethos. This chapter will discuss 
in theory how postmodern corporate imagery should be approached as an entity 
constructed within the spectrum of codes of appeals that are culturally defined. 
Foucaulf s poststructuralism is drawn upon to demonstrate that such imagery is not 
substantiated by what may be called a corporate soul or self, but rather by the 
expectations of a society. 
The dissertation is structured using an article format, which means that each 
chapter can be read as an independent article. For that reason, some content may 
appear repeated across chapters for the sake of keeping in place the textual integrity 
of each chapter. 
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CHAPTER 1 
CLASSICAL RHETORIC IN CHINA: AN OVERVIEW 
The Tao that can be told is not the eternal Tao. 
The name that can be named is not the eternal name. 
The nameless is the beginning of heaven and earth. 
The name is the mother of ten thousand things. 
Good men do not argue. 
Those who argue are not good. 
Those who know are not learned. 
The learned do not know. 
— Lao Zi (5707^80? B.C.) 
This chapter is meant to provide an overview about classical Chinese rhetoric 
(CCR), but I realize, immediately, that I'm launching an almost impossible task for 
myself: The overwhelming richness of classical Chinese rhetoric and its underlying 
philosophical tradition can never be adequately summarized within the limits of a 
few pages, just as there is no way to do so with the rhetorical tradition in the West. 
So, I would like to begin this chapter with an apology—for the deliberate 
selectiveness in presenting an overview about CCR and for the inevitable distortion 
of CCR that comes with such selectiveness. 
To be selective means that I won't cover everything in classical Chinese 
rhetoric; it also means that I will purposely highlight some aspects of CCR that I 
deem relevant to issues I will further explore in the dissertation: that is, issues 
regarding ethos as the collective cultural constitution of rhetorical appeal as opposed 
to something of a personal quality on the part of a rhetor. I am writing the chapter 
with two goals in mind: first, to provide a very brief introduction of classical Chinese 
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rhetoric with emphasis on its non-Western aspects; second, to discuss some of the 
questions raised when rhetorical theorists are attempting to conceptualize those 
non-Western aspects. I intend not to be conclusive. Indeed, what is concluded in this 
chapter will be explored further in other chapters and, of course, with more rigor. 
The chapter will be followed by an appendix, which will review ethos and its 
conceptual metamorphoses in the history of Western rhetoric. 
The Definition 
Surprisingly enough, there is still no exact Chinese equivalent for the term rhetoric, 
which has been traditionally translated as %zw-cz (which means, literally, the 
study of language embellishing)/ While I cannot say that %z«-cz is totally out of 
character with the Western definition of rhetoric (which does have something to do 
with language polishing), it seems to have missed most of what we perceive to be 
rhetoric, particularly its functions in persuading an audience, initiating social change, 
signaling one's community membership, etc. 
To me, the lack of a Chinese equivalent for "rhetoric" indicates, primarily, 
that there is a difference between Western and Chinese rhetorical traditions: What is 
distinctive about Western rhetoric and its cultural setting may not be directly 
translated into the Chinese language (or vice versa). But it also points to the fact that 
rhetoric itself has never been an independent subject of knowledge in China (at least 
until early last century): Philosophers, thinkers, politicians, and literary elites have 
practiced rhetoric all the time and even from time to time discussed theoretical 
issues surrounding rhetoric, yet nobody has systematically studied and categorized 
i "Xzucz Xwz" is also the title of Aristotle's Rkefonc in Chinese version. 
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it the way Westerners (e.g., Aristotle) have done in the past. Robert Oliver has an 
explanation that I think is worth quoting in full: 
To state the matter most simply, in the West rhetoric has been considered so 
important that it has had to be explored and delineated separately, as a 
special 6eld of knowledge about human relations. In the East, rhetoric has 
been considered so important that it could not be separated from the 
remainder of human knowledge. Asian thinkers have consistently seen 
rhetoric as being inseparably interconnected with problems of ethics, 
psychology, politics, and social relations. (360) 
Well, if it has been the Chinese tradition not to separate rhetoric from other studies 
of knowledge and experience, then it shouldn't be hard to conceive why in that 
tradition people haven't had a specific technical term, equivalent to Western 
"rhetoric," to make that distinction. George Kennedy has also observed that 
"rhetoric was not a distinct discipline in ancient China" (143). Following Graham, he 
points out that "the traditional Chinese arts were six: ceremony, music, archery, 
charioteering, writing, and mathematics" in comparison to "the seven liberal arts of 
West: grammar, rhetoric, dialectic, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music" 
(ibid.). 
In the summer of 1996, when I was in Beijing University attending an 
international conference on culture and communication, I was most struck by a new 
Chinese term for "rhetoric": (the study of persuasion). The term is 
probably close enough to what has been traditionally defined as rhetoric in the 
West, but it just sounds "outlandish" to a Chinese ear. Yes, the Chinese do engage in 
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all kinds of persuasive activities just as Westerners or people from other cultures do, 
but they have just never heard of something called zwe. The example again 
suggests direct translation doesn't work well cross-culturally, but it also reveals, in 
my view, a flaw in the current scholarship in China: that is, the attempt to 
conceptualize rhetoric in Western terms. 
For example, during that conference a keynote speaker (Gong Wen-Xiang) 
even declared that rhetoric in China doesn't have cultural roots. The reason? 
Because of the dominance of Confucianism in Chinese culture and ideology, the 
mainstream "tended to despise the skill of persuasion," favoring instead the use of 
"exemplary moral conduct" as a persuasive mode to influence other people's social 
behavior/ But I think that scholar from Beijing University has probably committed 
two errors. One is that he separates moral conduct from language behavior as if an 
individual were able to act morally, outside the structuring confines of discourse. 
The other is that he sees rhetoric largely in terms of how Western rhetoricians have 
defined it as if Chinese rhetoric, if it counts as rhetoric, had to match the Western 
conception of rhetoric. One of his arguments is that Aristotle's ethos, a rhetorical 
strategy drawing on the appeal of a speaker/writer's own personal character, does 
not exist in the traditional type of persuasive communication in China; therefore, it 
follows that rhetoric itself is not indigenous to Chinese culture. In his mind, rhetoric 
must involve such persuasive skills as logos, ethos, pathos, etc.; otherwise, it is not 
rhetoric. 
^ See abstract of Gong Wenxiang's "A Comparative Study of Aristotle's 'Ethos' and the Confucian 
'Correctness of Names': The Role of Ethics in Persuasive Communication." Paper presented at the 
International Conference on Communication and Culture, Beijing, August 14,1996. 
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I wouldn't say that Gong is completely wrong, but the fact that he sees 
rhetoric strictly in terms of persuasion is very problematic. "Rhetoric refers to 
human behavior and communication seen as embodying strategies for affecting 
situations/' says Joseph Gusheld, when explaining Kenneth Burke's conception of 
social action as rhetorical (6). In Burkean terms, the relevance of rhetoric to social 
action is not simply that rhetoric is a useful tool that people can use to persuade an 
audience to act in order to initiate certain social change; rather, social action itself, 
imbued with symbols, is seen as realized in and through rhetoric: An individual's 
behavior is always driven by the motivation of affecting situations, and, for that 
purpose, he or she must be persuasional to other individuals as well as to him- or 
herself. That is to say, social action itself, including moral conduct, is essentially 
rhetorical. 
With this in mind, we may be able to say that some of the classical texts in 
China, like Lao Zi's Doo De /mg and Confucius's Awzkcfs, with their seemingly anti-
rhetorical stance, can still be read as texts on rhetoric or related to rhetoric as their 
main function "consists in erecting, initiating, motivating, and insinuating actions 
and action-oriented attitudes, not in describing a transcendent world independent of 
actions and consciousness, or in transmitting representations and opinions about 
this world in itself. Thus, while Lao Zi says that "Good men do not argue," in 
contrast to Quintilian's "good man speaking well,"* we still have many reasons to 
^ See Hans Lenk's "Introduction: If Aristotle Had Spoken and Wittgenstein Known Chinese...." In 
EpzskmoZogz'caZ issues zw CZassz'caZ PMosopfzy ed. by Hans Lenk & Gregor Paul (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 1993), 6. 
^ See Quintilian's Institutes of Oratary" in TTze Rfzeforz'caZ Tradztzom ed. by Patricia Bizzell & 
Bruce Herzberg (Boston: Bedford Books of St. Martin's Press, 1990). 
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read his Dao De jzzzg as "first and foremost a work of rhetoric."^ Indeed, George 
Kennedy believes that ancient China had "a body of rhetorical texts unmatched 
even in Greece and Rome" (142). 
There are also scholars in China who link (or confuse?) rhetoric with 
linguistics. For example, Chen Wang-Dao, who is generally reputed as the pioneer 
of modem Chinese rhetoric, identifies %zw-cz %zze as a study of language "existing 
somewhere between linguistics and literature" (Ozz RTzeforzc 250). And his followers, 
who are representing the mainstream thought on rhetoric in China, contend that 
rhetoric is "a branch of linguistics" since it is essentially a study of language at the 
linguistic level, though they recognize that rhetoric also relates to "literature, 
aesthetics, psychology, logic, writing, public speech, etc." (Zong Ting-Hu 4). But 
there are some variations between those scholars as to what branch of linguistics 
rhetoric is. Zhang Gong, the author of Modem C/zzzzese R/zetorzc (1963), holds that 
successful rhetoric lies in the proper use of vocabulary, sound, and grammar (16) 
while Chen Zong-Ming (1997) places rhetoric squarely under the category of 
"pragmatics" as he sees naming, arguing, persuading, and so on, as practical 
applications of language in a given social context. 
The confusion of rhetoric with linguistics indicates Western influence on 
current Chinese rhetorical scholarship, but seemingly in the wrong way. One 
obvious reason is that rhetoric as an independent discipline is relatively new in 
China. According to Hu Yu-Shu (1990), a systematic study of rhetoric and rhetorical 
history started only after the 1950s (i): The scholarship is still at the stage of how to 
conceptualize and define the boundaries of its discipline. Another reason is that 
s See Kristophee Kowal"s "Reading Lao-tzu as Rhetoric" in Rkeofonc; Concepts, De/initions, and 
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those who study rhetoric may have mixed it with linguistics in the first place. For 
example, in Chen Wang-Dao's landmark work, Xzw-Cz Xue fa-Fa» (Essentials of 
Rhetoric) (1932), the second chapter clearly shows the influence of Western linguists, 
such as Ferdinand de Saussure (Zong Ting Hu 19). It appears that Chen's insistence 
on language being the basis of rhetorical study has been a well established position 
in current scholarship in China (Zong Ting-Hu 19-20). 
This linguistic bent is said to "enhance the scientific rigor of rhetorical study" 
(Zong Ting-Hu 20), but I think it also suggests a lack of understanding about 
Western rhetoric, as evidenced by the fact that current rhetorical study in China 
focuses primarily on refining or tuning language expressions (at the technical level). 
I wouldn't say Western rhetoric has no imprint on modem Chinese scholarship. 
Chen's statement that "writing and speaking must serve the purpose of reaching 
readers and hearers and must center around the task of influencing them" (8) is 
clearly Aristotelian, and his "adjustment theory" (i.e., adapting messages to purpose 
and context) demonstrates his affiliation to the Greco-Roman rhetoric despite the 
fact that his followers insist that Chen is the first to advance such a theory in the field 
of rhetoric (Zong Ting-Hu 21). However, because of Chen's own bias toward 
linguistics and literature, his "adjustment theory" has never been developed in full 
bloom by himself, and later by his followers. 
In sum, current Chinese rhetoric, as a discipline, is still at the stage of 
categorizing itself: Is it the study of language polishing (xiu-ci xue)? the study of 
persuasion (shuo-fu xue)? or the study of linguistics (yu-yan xue)? This indicates that 
the Western conception of rhetoric cannot be directly translated into the Chinese 
Bowndan'gs ed. by William Covino & David Jolliffe (Boston: AUyn and Bacon, 1995), 364. 
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language, or, when translated, it is often confused with linguistics. Realizing this 
problem, some scholars have attempted to divide rhetoric into two categories: 
rhetoric for the purpose of comprehension (i.e., audience oriented) and rhetoric for 
the purpose of expression (i.e., author oriented). My impression is that rhetoric for 
the purpose of comprehension is very much under-developed in China whereas 
rhetoric for the purpose of expression is very much over-developed. 
Rhetoric in Ancient China 
While many theorists in contemporary China have trouble defining what rhetoric is, 
there was no shortage of terms in classical Chinese that can be said to be 
conceptually comparable to the notion of "rhetoric" as perceived in the Western 
tradition. According to Lu Xing, "the ancient Chinese appear to have had their own 
well-developed sense of rhetoric, revealed morphologically throughout primary 
Chinese texts in the following frequently used terms: yon (language, speech); cz 
(mode of speech, artistic expressions); jwm (advising, persuasion); skwz 
(persuasion)/skoM (explanation); mmg (naming); and (distinction, disputation, 
argumentation" (3-4). If language is the window of a culture, then those rhetorical 
terms identified by Lu may be a good indication of rhetoric in China dating back to 
a historic period called pre-Qin (722-221 B.C.), which parallels the Greco-Roman 
period in the West. 
Lu tries to prove in her RWorzc m A»cig?zf C/zzmz (1998) that rhetoric is not 
"the sole property and invention of the West" (1), arguing for the need to explore 
the non-Western tradition of rhetoric such as developed in pre-Qin China. However, 
she faces a dilemma in how to conceptualize classical Chinese rhetoric: On the one 
hand, she stresses "understanding Chinese rhetoric on its own terms" (71); on the 
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other, she takes pains to draw similarities between Greek rhetoric and classical 
Chinese rhetoric in an effort to "legitimate" CCR based on terms acceptable to 
Western students. Railing at "the unfortunate fact that Chinese rhetoric [...] is 
perceived as radically Other," the author contends that the ancient Chinese grasped 
"logic and rational thinking" just as those ancient Greeks did (33, 32). And she even 
identifies a few key words in CCR that "may be more closely related to Zogos" in 
Greek rhetoric (92). I wouldn't say that Lu is trying to turn Chinese rhetoric into 
logocentric, but the way she insists that CCR had its share of "interest" in logic or 
logos seems to indicate the author cannot rid herself of Western standards when 
conceptualizing ancient Chinese rhetoric despite the fact that she also argues, 
strongly, against Western "misconceptions." 
We may recall the claim made by Gong Wen-Xiang, the speaker at the Beijing 
Conference (1996), that rhetoric has no cultural roots in China because its tradition 
did not entertain persuasive skills such as ethos. Gong's mistake is that he defines 
rhetoric largely through the eyes of Western theorists. It appears then that Lu Xing 
is making a similar mistake, even though she has a different conclusion in mind: 
namely, to use Western rhetorical concepts, such as logic and logos, to prove the 
existence of rhetoric in ancient China. 
I won't elaborate at this point how logic or logos plays out (or doesn't play 
out) in classical Chinese rhetoric, but I would say that there is really no need to 
prove, or disprove, that there existed a rhetorical tradition in ancient China. If, as 
Gusfield says, in Burkean terms, rhetoric is "human behavior and communication 
seen as embodying strategies for affecting situations," we can reasonably assume it 
exists everywhere—as far as human civilization goes—like poetry, architecture, or 
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even. food. It would be utterly ludicrous to launch a "scholarly" inquiry into whether 
or not ancient China or Greece had its own poetry, architecture, or food; rather, a 
sensible question should be: What was it like? Or how did it differ other cultural 
traditions? Likewise, it would be meaningless to deny or confirm the existence of 
classical Chinese rhetoric, as Gong and Lu have tried to do; rather, a meaningful 
inquiry should center around the nature of CCR, focusing on such questions as 
"how it differed from other traditions, such as the Greco-Roman rhetoric," "how it 
was represented in classical texts," "how it was practiced," etc., etc. 
Plenty of scholarship in recent years has explored the differences between 
traditional Chinese and Western rhetoric, notably, Lu Xing's R/zgfonc m Anczgfzf 
Cfmwz, as mentioned above, and Scollan and Scollan's intercwZfwmZ CommwmcafzoM 
(1995). The latter points out that Chinese culture was dominated by the Confucian 
discourse system as opposed to the Utilitarian discourse system in Western cultures. 
"Discourse system" is a rather complex concept, involving ideology, socialization, 
forms of discourse, and social organization (170-71). From the communication's 
perspective, the Confucian discourse system may be summarized as focusing on 
human relationship (e.g., building consensus) in contrast to the Utilitarian discourse 
system being goal-oriented (e.g., seeking effectiveness). The authors also write: 
. . .  o n e  m a j o r  d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  A n c i e n t  C h i n e s e  a n d  A n c i e n t  G r e e k  
rhetoric was on [the] dimension of group harmony versus individual 
welfare. Ancient Chinese rhetoric emphasized the means by which one 
could phrase one's position without causing any feeling of disruption or 
disharmony. Ancient Greek rhetoric, on the other hand, emphasized the 
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means of winning one's point through skillful argument, short of, says 
Aristotle, the use of torture. (142) 
Scollan and Scollan's remark, which seems to reflect a popularly held view of ancient 
Chinese rhetoric by Western scholars (e.g., Oliver, Kennedy) is not without dispute. 
Lu Xing argues that the notion of "harmonious rhetoric" tends to overgeneralize, 
without regard to the "complex and varied nature of Chinese culture," not to 
mention the fact that the pre-Qin period witnessed "intense conflicts between and 
within ancient Chinese states and philosophical schools" (29). She even questions 
whether there is such a thing as rhetorical harmony, if it "is achieved by submission 
to authority,... at the expense of truth and individuality" (30). 
Here I find myself siding with those Western scholars. For one thing, "truth" 
or "individuality" had never become an issue in traditional Chinese thought (which 
Til explain later). For another, harmonic rhetoric should not be interpreted, literally, 
as avoiding conflicts or submitting to authority; rather, it is about how to position 
one's self in the world (society and nature) through the medium of language. To 
achieve harmony is ultimately to seek unity between man and the Dao (also spelled 
as "Tao," meaning the Way or Principle), a cosmic moral order of being in ancient 
Chinese ideology / Socially speaking, this would mean promoting communal 
collectivism and de-emphasizing personal achievements in society (which is to say, 
"Don't stand out!"). In the philosophical sense, it is about situating human existence 
in "the stream of the universe," in which, Lao Zi says, mankind should humble itself 
"as a little child" (28). 
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Rhetorically, the notion of harmony would have several implications. First, it 
is the call for humility, discouraging arguments that tend to "enhance the welfare of 
the individual speaker or listener" (Olive 361). Second, it is the stance of holism, 
emphasizing the necessity in communication not only of seeing a particular tree but 
of seeing the forest as well that surrounds the tree, to put it in a Chinese way. The 
"high-context system," as described by Edward Hall (Beyond CwZfwre 85-128) of 
Chinese and other non-Western cultures, explains to some extent how this holistic 
approach works in communicative situations: i.e., to utilize and rely on the context 
to convey messages, which are generally less explicit, less elaborated, compared to 
some low-context cultures in the West. Third, rhetoric aimed at achieving harmony 
implies the denial of an individual appeal on the part of the rhetor, celebrating 
instead the role of authority culturally and historically established, such as the sage-
kings, like Yao, Shun, and Yu/ The sage-kings were thought to have the power to 
perceive the Dao, capable of carrying out the "Mandate of Heaven" (fwm-mm#) and 
governing with virtue "all that is under Heaven" (f%zn-%ia). Thus, the appeal to such 
authority was essentially the appeal to the Dao, the cosmic orders, from which the 
ancient writer/speaker drew the ultimate source of rhetorical power. 
That rhetoric was depersonalized in ancient China contrasts sharply with the 
Western rhetorical tradition, in which the individual status of a rhetor has been 
given much more prominence in effecting persuasion. The personal character, says 
Aristotle, "may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion he 
possesses" (BH 154). Hence, questions may be posed as to how to define ethos, the 
* According to Daoism, the Dao is "the source of all being and governor of all life, human and 
natural, and the basic, undivided unity in which all the contradictions and distinctions of existence 
are ultimately resolved" (see Sources of Chinese Tradz'fzon, 49-50). 
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rhetorical means that builds upon, and up, one's moral character to sway an 
audience: If the role of an individual does not count that much in the function of 
rhetoric, as in the case of classical Chinese rhetoric, then where is the ethos? Put 
differently, how do we identify ethos when the personal appeal is absent? Shall we 
dismiss it as non-existent? or shall we relate it to some outside forces beyond the 
individual such as culture, tradition, and community? I will address these questions 
later on and, in greater detail and length, in the dissertation. At this point, I just wish 
to say that classical Chinese rhetoric has its own version of ethos, different from 
what has been defined by Aristotle. 
Discourse Patterns, Face, and Treatment of Self 
It has long been observed that Chinese culture, among other Eastern cultures, 
prefers to use inductive discourse patterns (delaying the topic to the end) whereas 
Westerners opt for deductive discourse patterns (introducing the topic light at the 
beginning), which, according to Scollan and Scollan, indicates "differences in the 
cultural structuring of situations and participant roles" (83). What determines the 
cultural structuring of situations and participant roles, the Scollans argue, is the use 
of "face" strategies, which can be categorized either as "involvement" (asserting 
one's position) or "independence" (withholding from such assertion). The so-called 
face strategy originates from the Chinese concept of face, the "image of self 
delineated in terms of approved social attributes" (Erving Goffman, Wmzcfàm RifwaZ 
5). In sociological terms, it has to do with one's assumptions of interpersonal 
relationships; in rhetoric, it is about presentations of such assumptions: for instance, 
how to incorporate the perceived acceptance or rejection of one's role in a speech 
^ Legendary figures in Chinese history (2357-2205 B.C.). 
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event. Scollan and Scollan relate the inductive discourse to the face strategy of 
independence and the deductive to the face strategy of involvement. 
I would like to point out that the Scollans are countering their own argument 
about "cultural structuring'' when they dismiss the "false east-west dichotomy" in 
discourse patterns (82), insisting that Chinese and Westerners would use the same 
face strategies in rhetoric given the same context. To them, what really matters is 
not culture, but "power" and "distance" (between participants of a communication), 
which can determine how people employ face/rhetorical strategies: For example, a 
person in higher power tends toward involvement strategies, therefore being 
deductive in discourse, and strangers would resort to independence strategies when 
communicating with each other, therefore being rhetorically inductive. What Scollan 
and Scollan try to say is that face/rhetorical strategies based on their 
power/ distance model can apply everywhere, cutting across cultural boundaries. In 
their words, "what is significant in intercultural communication is not the difference 
in culture; it is the difference in that particular rhetorical strategy" (162). But 
somehow they stop short of explaining why, in general, Westerners prefer 
involvement strategies and Chinese prefer independence strategies despite the fact 
that power and distance exist in both cultures, shaping communicative situations 
and participant roles. 
In my view, the face strategies are not just about power and distance; they 
are also concerned with self-representation—how to identify one's self-image or 
face (which is indeed ethos as I will argue later) in discourse through what Goffman 
calls "the definition of the situation" (PreseMfofzoM of SeZf 6). As I understand it, 
Goffman's "definition of situation" can occur in the immediate context in which a 
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communicator finds him- or herself, but it can also occur in the broader context of 
culture to which an individual has had a lifetime exposure. Thus, it makes sense to 
see a person in higher power act aggressively in communication, using involvement 
strategies (as defined by the immediate situation), but it also makes sense to see that 
,same person abstain from such aggressiveness, using independence strategies (as 
defined by the extended situation of culture) simply because of the ideological belief 
in collectivism or the way he or she was brought up. So, culture does count in 
formulating face strategies—in that it impacts the way an individual projects his or 
her self in society. 
Needless to say, Chinese and Western cultures do not share the same 
approach to the self, which is to be reflected in their differed ways of constructing 
and presenting faces rhetorically. Given the notion of harmony, it is quite 
conceivable that the Chinese face is indeed a "faceless" face, in the sense that the 
participant of a communication tends to efface his or her own individual appeal, 
striving to restrain self-imposition in a speech/ text. This is particularly true in 
classical Chinese rhetoric, in which the writer/ speaker often went an extra mile to 
strike the reader/listener as humble and to make sure that discourse, points out 
Oliver, "adhered to approved patterns" (361). By contrast, the ultimate "I" in 
Western thought often dictates a full-blown augmentation of self-image in the 
attempt to expand one's personal character (ethos) as a rhetorical appeal. 
I might add that the term face has a highly individualistic connotation to 
Westerners, and that what I mean by "faceless" is not that Chinese people don't 
have a face (Does this sound weird?), but that their face is not so much 
individualized, grounded solely in the notion of self by Western standards. Because 
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of this difference, it should come as no surprise that Chinese people and Westerners 
may end up using different face strategies given the same rhetorical setting (power 
and distance): While it is the norm for somebody in the West in higher power to use 
involvement face strategies to assert his or her position straightforward, the 
Chinese counterpart may simply feel uncomfortable to impose him- or herself, 
choosing instead independence face strategies, which are characterized in discourse 
as implicit, indirect hedging, as well as inductive. Again, my point is that culture 
does count—it affects our attitudes towards the self and therefore face/rhetorical 
strategies that project it (self) into a communication act. 
To be fair, Scollan and Scollan do distinguish between the Chinese and the 
Western concept of self, which, according to the authors, may result in varied "face 
needs" in intercultural communication: "a person from a highly individualistic 
culture would pay more attention to his or her personal face needs, whereas a 
person from a more collective culture would always have the face of others 
foremost in his or her mind" (134). So, Scollan and Scollan do recognize that cultural 
differences about the self have their impact on the way people communicate. 
Unfortunately, they fail to further the connection between face needs and face 
strategies but, instead, let themselves get carried away by the "universals" of power 
and distance in an attempt to shift from intercultural communication to 
inter discourse communication to better suit their discourse analysis needs. 
The reason I have had a lengthy, and probably excessive, discussion on 
discourse patterns and face strategies is because I think it is necessary to know these 
patterns and strategies intimate, to a large extent, cultural conceptions of self and 
related issues such as individuality, image, and face. The rhetorical difference is, so to 
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speak, a matter of how to treat the self in discourse within the framework of a 
culture. So, it makes sense to see that inductive (or, in my words, laid-back) 
discourse is a preferred rhetorical strategy in Chinese culture because of an age-old 
tradition that depersonalizes rhetoric for the purpose of achieving collect!vist 
harmony. Of course, I wouldn't say the notion of self had no place in classical 
Chinese rhetoric, but just that self-representation in terms of fitting into "accepted 
social ends" was far more important than self-fulfillment based on an individualistic 
language (de Bary, et al. 114). To a Confucian, like Xun Zi (313-238 B.C), the greatest 
of all principles was to abide by /z (i.e., established social rituals and behavior codes), 
which, as Chen and Wang point out, could be the sole standard of "judging good or 
bad rhetoric" (44). 
Without doubt, the Western conception of self/ which is distinct from the 
Chinese, has led to a different, and more individualized, approach to rhetoric, 
resulting in much stress placed on the personal appeal of a rhetor as a way to solicit 
trust and induce persuasion. Quintilian's "good man speaking well," which is 
conventionally interpreted as stressing moral leadership in rhetoric (Bizzell and 
Herzberg 35), is a good example to show how much emphasis has been put on the 
self in Western rhetoric. That is to say, it is the individual who makes a difference 
between good and bad rhetoric. No wonder Western rhetoric would appear self-
assertive to those from Chinese and other Eastern cultures, who are more or less 
accustomed to harmonic rhetoric. 
G According to George Mead, a social theorist, the Western conception of self falls into two 
categories: One assumes a social process as "logically prior to the individuals and their individual 
experiencing"; the other assumes individuals and individual experiencing as "logically prior to the 
social process" (see his Mind, SeZf and Society: 222-3). But no matter what, there is still much more 
emphasis on the individual in comparison to classical Chinese thought, which often saw 
individuality as incompatible with social order. 
As a footnote, that Western and Chinese culture treat the individual self 
differently can also be felt in other branches of language arts besides rhetoric. For 
instance, Andrew Plaks has observed that the word "hero" in the Western narrative 
tradition may not have its conceptual equivalent in the Chinese. While "the Western 
narrative tradition has tended to see in human character a more or less substantial 
entity, [...] the central human figures in the Chinese tradition are generally 
something less than heroes, if not full-fledged anti-heroes" (340). And he notices, in 
the classical Chinese novel, "a certain ambivalence that hovers over them [human 
figures], an uncertainty that keeps them from presenting or even tending towards 
an unequivocal self-image" (ibid.). Like rhetoric, traditional Chinese narrative de-
emphasizes self-representation on the individual basis. 
Speaking the Unspeakable 
Since the individual appeal has been taken out of the picture in traditional Chinese 
rhetoric, then can we say that good rhetoric doesn't depend on "good men"? I 
would answer "Yes." Indeed, Lao Zi's "Good men do not argue" (81), which is often 
seen as anti-rhetorical at first glance, may say just that. At least we can see that Lao 
Zi separates the role of an individual from rhetoric even though this individual is a 
"good man." 
The problem is the next line, "Those who argue are not good" (81). Does this 
mean that rhetoric comes out of bad people? Not necessarily so, according to Chen 
and Wang, who argue that what Lao Zi really objects to is the "untruthful" in 
rhetoric, citing the fifth century literary/rhetorical theorist Liu Si (92-3). They 
especially point out that, since Lao Zi himself says, "Beautiful words command 
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respect from others,"* it would be impossible for the Old Master (Lao Zi's Chinese 
meaning) to ignore the positive social function of rhetoric. I agree. But I do not 
agree with the authors when they stretch their argument to imply the beautiful to 
be something added or polished as opposed to the truthful seen as genuine, natural, 
and in harmony with the Dao. For one thing, the beautiful and the truthful do not 
necessarily contradict each other (Remember the English romantic poet John Keats' 
"Beauty is truth, truth beauty"?). For another, given the Daoist ideal of 
(roughly translated as "non-doing"), it is highly unlikely that Lao Zi, and his 
disciples, would cherish anything that is added or polished in speech in order to win 
respect from an audience. 
Ww-wez is nothing nihilistic, in my view. On the surface, the term can be 
interpreted as doing or saying what comes naturally, to use Fish's words/" with the 
suggestion that one should not be overwhelmed by "the materialist quest for 
power, dominance, authority, and wealth" (Jacobus 18). Deep down, it is meant to 
answer the ever-lasting (or ever-haunting?) question of how to define virtue. 
Thomas Merton writes: 
If one is in harmony with Tao—the cosmic Tao, "Great Tao"—the answer 
[to the question of "what ought to be done"] will make itself clear when 
the time comes to act, for then one will act not according to the human 
and self-conscious mode of deliberation, but according to the divine and 
spontaneous mode of wu wei, which is the mode of action of Tao itself, 
and is therefore the source of all good. 
^ My translation. In Feng and English's version of Too Te Cking, it is "Sweet words can buy honor" 
(62), which I don't think is close to the original. 
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The other way, the way of conscious striving, even though it may 
claim to be a way of virtue, is fundamentally a way of self-
aggrandizement, and it is consequently bound to come into conflict with 
Tao. Hence it is self-destructive,. . . (24) 
We can probably draw two conclusions from Merton's argument: One is that ww-w# 
is virtue, "the source of all good" because it accords with "the mode of action of 
Tao"; the other is that ww-wez as virtue is essentially a way of self-renunciation in 
that the other way, the way of "self-aggrandizement," in the sense of "conscious 
striving," poses conflict with the Dao. This seems to say that Daoism (Taoism) is 
recommending no action taken in order to cultivate virtue, since any action would 
by definition constitute a "conscious striving." 
Again, I would argue against approaching ww-wez too literally. Lao Zi is not a 
nihilist; rather, what he means by ww-w# is more or less like saying: Let everything 
in this world take its own course, and virtue will thus prevail. He teaches his 
followers: "Not exalting the gifted prevents quarreling. Not collecting treasures 
prevents stealing" (3). For Lao Zi, the gifted and treasures are just part of nature. 
They cause moral consequences only when you make a conscious striving to exalt 
them or collect them. Hence, virtue exists in doing nothing—ww-wez. In the 
philosophical sense, doing nothing is essentially to let the ultimate Dao prevail. But 
since now the Dao takes care of everything, doing nothing is indeed doing 
everything—and anything. That is why Lao Zi says, "If nothing is done, then all will 
be well" (3). Likewise, he advises those in power to rule by not governing: "Tao 
abides in non-action, [yet] nothing is left undone. If kings and lords observed this, 
The title of one of Stanley Fish's books is called "Doing What Comes Naturally/' 
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[the] ten thousand things would develop naturally" (37). What a paradox! But 
underlying the paradox is Lao Zi's deep concern about a mundane creature called 
"man/' who might "mess up" with the eternal, heavenly, sublime, all-embracing, 
and all-encompassing thing named the Dao. 
Now the natural question is, What is the Dao? Lao Zi states, right from the 
beginning of Dao De /mg, "The Tao that can be told is not the eternal Tao. The name 
that can be named is not the eternal name" (1). That is to say, there is no way to tell 
what the Dao is—the eternal is beyond words. And he even contradicts himself by 
declaring, "When the great Tao is forgotten, [k]indness and morality arise" (18). 
Western readers may find themselves immediately questioning the "logic" of Dao 
De /mg: If the eternal Dao cannot be told in words and should indeed be forgotten in 
order for virtue to thrive, then why does the Old Master keep "nagging" about the 
Dao and the ways that lead to it throughout the book? 
One convenient answer is that Lao Zi is against conscious striving in 
conceptualizing the Dao: It exists in the forgotten, in the unspoken; as soon as one 
makes a deliberate, intellectual attempt to tell or to name what the Dao is, it slips 
away. As Zhang Long-Xi points out, "the totality of the ùzo is kept intact only in 
knowing silence" (29). Then, does this mean that Lao Zi advocates the "intuitive" 
approach to the Dao, as suggested by Herrlee Creel (106) and some other 
Westerners? Maybe. But I'd rather think that Lao Zi is saying there is no 
conventional way to conceptualize the Dao, because the infinite (i.e., the Dao) cannot 
be defined by the finite—the conventional language. In that sense, the eternal Dao 
has to remain untold. Paradoxically, while Dao De /mg may strike readers for its 
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sublimity, what it "dwells on," says Schwartz, "is the impermanent, finite nature of 
all the determinate realities of which one can speak" (197). 
The paradox persists—because the supposedly ineffable Dao still has its 
effable name by the word "Dao," therefore becoming finite, and constrained within 
the limitations of language conventionality. Many Chinese scholars have tried to use 
the "one-and-many" concept to solve the puzzle: The Dao as One is transcendent, 
but the "daos" as many are phenomenal and therefore namable and effable (e.g., 
Chen Zong-Ming 142-5). This largely proves unsatisfactory (at least to me), and 
probably even unnecessary, especially since Lao Zi does not distinguish between the 
"Dao" and "daos." I think what Dao De /mg deals with is basically an epistemological 
issue posed about language, which can be summarized as "speaking the 
unspeakable," a paradox that characterizes not only Daoism but also other major 
schools of thought in ancient China. 
"Speaking the unspeakable" is sometimes thought of as recognizing the 
"inadequacy and even futility of writing" (Zhang Long-Xi 28) because, the reasoning 
goes, the finite (language) simply cannot match with the infinite (the Dao), but I 
choose to believe it is indeed about how to comprehend the incomprehensible by 
making distinctions through the medium of language. We know something is good 
because we also know, through distinction, things that are not good. Thaf s why we 
can speak of the good. Likewise, we know something is the Dao, which is 
incomprehensible and unspeakable, because we also know, through distinction, 
things that are the non-Dao, which are comprehensible and speakable. Thaf s why 
we are able to speak of the unspeakable (Does this sound Denidean?). Keep in 
mind, however, that the unspeakable must remain unspeakable throughout: If it 
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becomes speakable, then the distinction is gone, which means everything would 
thus become unspeakable. But, according to Chad Hansen, eliminating such a 
distinction is exactly what Lao Zi wants to achieve in his Dao De Jmg, since 
Conventional moral terms and distinctions are introduced, [...] only 
because of breakdowns in the natural order of things The Confucian 
distinctions [between morally good and evil, etc.] do not really alleviate 
the breakdowns but in a perverse way perpetuate them. The preferred 
policy would be to abandon the distinctions and words entirely and 
eliminate all learning (which is mere skill in word manipulation) and 
return to "natural" behavior. (71) 
Hence, Lao Zi says, as quoted by Hansen: 
When knowledge and wisdom appeared, 
There emerged great hypocrisy. 
When the six family relationships are not in harmony, 
There will be advocacy of filial piety and deep love for children. 
When a country is in disorder, there will be praise of loyal ministers. 
Abandon sageliness and discard wisdom; 
Then the people will benefit a hundredfold. 
Abandon humanity and discard righteousness; 
Then the people will return to filial piety and deep love. 
Abandon skill and discard profit; 
Then there will be no thieves or robbers, (ibid.) 
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Apart from Lao Zi's concern about returning to natural behaviour, which is to 
eliminate distinctions in language, we can draw two implications from the "speaking 
the unspeakable" paradox. One is that Lao Zi, as well as other ancient Chinese 
philosophers, appreciates the epistemic power of language, which is also evidenced 
in his statement that "The name [i.e., language] is the mother of ten thousand 
things" (1). The other is that the paradox tells us one important difference between 
Chinese and Western epistemology. Hansen points out, "The Taoist [indeed the 
Chinese, in my view] version is based on a distinction-making rather than an object-
marking account of the way words relate to the world" (ibid.). The latter account 
(object-marking) typifies the Western ideal of perceiving the world in itself, and I 
have no interest here in commenting its merits. What I want to say is, rather, that 
distinction, which is bàz» in Chinese, was such an important feature in classical 
Chinese rhetoric that it had become almost identical with its definition." 
Because distinction-making has played a crucial role in ancient Chinese 
thought, if s not difficult to understand why CCR is typically full of paradoxes or, in 
Western terms, anti-logics, in that the rhetor would rely heavily on the portrayal of 
opposites to make an argument, which in some way is very much like Protagorean 
rhetoric in Greece. In addition, because of the influence of the Yin-Yang ideology, 
which sees the world as an ontological duality that is constantly changing, evolving, 
and reversing, the texts of CCR often appear to modem readers as fluid and 
unstable in terms of purpose and meaning. Deng Xi Zi, a rhetorician of the Warring 
States period (463-222 B.C.), has a motto about rhetoric that is strongly suggestive 
" George Kennedy says, "In classical Chinese, the word pz'en [bian], literally 'to till apart/ thus 'to 
distinguish,' 'to argue/ or 'argument/ (many Chinese words can be used both as a noun and a verb) is 
probably the closest approximation to 'rhetoric' as understood in Greece" (143). 
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of Protagorean rhetoric: "Both (sides) can make sense. An argument is endless in 
itself."^ Deng's words epitomize, in some way, ancient Chinese's attitude towards 
rhetoric. Consequently, CCR texts are often "marred" by inconsistencies and self-
contradictions, as seen in almost all the classics.^ (Traditional Chinese hermeneutics, 
known as kao zben and %%% g%, is largely a debate about what the author tried to say 
in the text, which could be interpreted contraiily due to text's "slippery" nature.) 
Dao De /mg is a famous example of Yin-Yang anti-logic, in which Lao Zi 
argues knowledge paves the path to supreme wisdom. However, he also says 
knowledge can cause the loss of virtue. For him, the eternal Dao^ lies in the 
nameless, free from knowledge; yet, in order to reach that level, one must have 
knowledge first and then go beyond. Lao Zi's self-contradiction about knowledge 
can be best summarized by his own words: "Those who know are not learned. The 
learned do not know" (81). If you're learned, how can you not know? On the other 
hand, if you know, then what blocks your way to being learned? The debate goes 
on and on. 
Lao Zi's follower, Zhuang Zi, widely known as "the first intellectual" in pre-
Qin China, is even more notorious for heavily relying on the Yin-Yang anti-logics to 
teach the Daoist wisdom. Take a look at the excerpt about "self and other" from his 
book the ZWmgzz: 
^ My translation. Like Protagoras, Deng left behind a few fragments, but his "dual feasibility" 
motto on rhetorical practice was widely quoted in Chinese classics. 
^ I'm referring to those written during or before the Spring-Autumn and Warring States times 
(770-464; 463-222 B.C.). 
^ Another term for Dao is "Way," which is regarded as the underlying principle that governs all 
beings and non-beings in the universe. So, in a way, it is similar to the absolute truth in the Western 
sense, but there is an epistemological difference: In the West, truth in the absolute sense can be 
ultimately approached through reason and discourse; in ancient China, it is beyond reason and 
discourse. Indeed, Chinese philosophy cares little about seeking the absolute; it is more pragmatic, 
concerned with social behavior and ethics. 
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Everything is its own self; everything is something else's other. Things do 
not know that they are other things's other; they only know that they are 
themselves. Thus, it is said, the other arises out of the self, just as the self 
arises out of the other. This is the theory that self and other give rise to 
each other. Besides, where there is life, there is death; and where there is 
death, there is life. Where there is impossibility, there is possibility; where 
there is possibility, there is impossibility. It is because there is wrong, 
there is right.... Thereupon the self is also the other; the other is also the 
self. According to the other, there is one kind of right and wrong. 
According to the self, there is another kind of right and wrong. But really 
are there such distinctions as the self and the other, or are there no such 
distinctions?^ 
There is probably no need for me to interpret Zhuang Zi's "meaning" here, but 
readers can clearly sense the analogical reasonings between the lines. The statement 
that "the self is also the other; the other is also the self' reflects the Yin-Yang 
principle that could be formalized as "A is B and B is A/' as opposed to the analytical 
thinking of "A is A and B is B" that is prevailing in Western culture. The Z/zwaMgzz, 
and Dao De fmg as well, is one of those classics that have been impacting Chinese 
(and Eastern) culture for over two millennia, so there is no reason to believe that a 
^ The translation is from Sources of Chinese Traffic» (68-69), compiled by Wm. Theodore de Bary 
et al. New York: Columbia University Press. 1960. 
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rhetoric that does not rely on methodical or logical argumentation cannot appeal to 
an audience/* 
Now lef s go back to where we started in this section, to Lao Zi's "Good men 
do not argue. Those who argue are not good/' Does this mean the Old Master is 
anti-rhetorical? Probably, but an appropriate answer would be "Yes" and "No." 
'Bamboo Hypertext" 
Probably nobody would question that hypertext was first invented in Western 
industrial countries with the advancement of modem computer technology. 
Historians of writing may not agree on the exact date hypertext was bom, but it 
seems the general consensus that it somewhere started in the 1960s, when Ted 
Nelson invented the term "hypertext." A few years ago, when I was in China doing 
research on classical Chinese rhetoric, somehow I developed a different idea about 
where and when hypertext was started. And I feel compelled to say hypertext was 
first invented in China, not in the modem age but, surprisingly enough, over two 
thousand years ago. 
As Jay Bolter defines it, hypertext is "the interactive interconnection of a set 
of symbolic elements" (27). But we may also describe it as a networked 
discourse system with its own characteristics, such as multiaccentualism and 
interaction, which indicates a collective act of discourse creation in Cyberspace 
between many writers/readers. As a result of this collectivism, a hypertext is 
typically non-linear and open-ended. Rhetorically speaking, die feature of non-
linearity points to the suspension of logic. Structurally, it means the text lacks unity. 
^ Unlike the West, which separates rhetoric from philosophy, in ancient China rhetoric and 
philosophy are one, inseparable. The Chinese classics are philosophical masterpieces. They are 
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Because it is network of many "come-and-go" texts, a hypertext is typically seen as 
fragmented and non-sequential. Hypertext s open-endedness also implies a two-
level meaning: at the rhetorical level, it suggests the text in Cyberspace is 
fluid—perpetually shifting and unstable; at the structural level, it means the text 
resists closure and therefore has no end. 
The reason I believe hypertext was first bom in ancient China is because 
classical Chinese rhetoric fits all those descriptions about hypertext: non-linear, 
open-ended, collective, multiaccentual, interactive, and, above all, networked. 
Unlike Western logocentric rhetoric, classical Chinese rhetoric appeared 
predominantly non-linear. There are probably several reasons for this. One is that 
analytical thinking had never conquered the Chinese mind in ancient times. Another 
is that the Yin-Yang philosophy, which sees the world as a cosmological duality, had 
its grip on rhetoric. Still, there is one more reason to account for classical Chinese 
rhetoric's non-linearity: i.e., the production and circulation process of scholarly 
works. 
Almost all the Chinese classics we've seen today, like Confucius' AWecfs and 
the ZAawmgzz, can be described as "multiaccentual" as they were generally a 
collection of short essays, paragraphs, and sentences written and rewritten by the 
disciples, or disciples of the disciples, of Confucius and Zhuang Zi over a span of 
decades or even centuries. While the texts bore the name of Confucius or Zhuang 
Zi, as its official author as a token of respect from those disciples, as Mark Lewis 
suggests (53), the master himself may never have contributed a single written word 
to the collection (though it is popularly believed that those quotations by Confucius 
also rhetorical masterpieces. 
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or Zhuang Zi had the master^s imprint one way or another).^ The result was, after 
the texts had passed through numerous hands, they would invariably become 
inconsistent or self-contradictory in both meaning and purpose (i.e., non-linear 
rhetorically): Different disciples would use the master as a source of ethos to create 
their own texts (or agenda, using today's political terminology) with degrees of 
deviation and variance from the predecessors depending on the then social climate 
and scholarly trends. 
So, we can say Confucius' AmzZysf and the Zkwmgzz were indeed a mixture of 
fragmented texts created through a collective authorship that transcended both time 
and space.^ This helps explain why those classical texts are essentially 
multiaccentual. Like modem hypertext, a typical classical Chinese work experienced 
no such thing as a single author controlling the text (the masters were already dead 
in most cases), or a single voice or line of argument asserting dominance over 
others. 
It is important to know that, before paper was invented, a typical Chinese 
book was actually written on bamboo strips that were strung together by cords 
(occasionally on silk), which, for physical reasons, would impose limits on the size of 
a book: Too many bamboo strips would make the book too heavy to carry around. 
So, what happened then is that the writer had to remove (i.e., delete) some of the 
strips (i.e., some text) from the original book in order to carry around or to add his 
own writings to it. (It was very likely that he would sometimes do so deliberately to 
^ According to A. G. Graham, the Zkuamgzi is "a collection of writings of the fourth, third, and 
second centuries B.C., in which only the Inner chapters can be confidently attributed to Chuang-tzu 
himself" (Studies z'n Ckmese PMosopky 283). 
^ I suspect TTie Bz'Me was also created that way in the West. 
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"cleanse" the text.) Because of this, the book was constantly changing in terms of 
content creation. 
Likewise, the reader would have to remove some portion of a bamboo book 
(rolled into huge bundles) in order to read with ease. Consequently, there would be 
three options for the reader to do with that portion afterwards: 1) to "delete" it by 
dumping it into the trash can for various reasons; 2) to put it back into the book; or 
3) to put it back, but not in the original order. Obviously, the last option points to 
the disruption of textual sequence, which further suggests the integrity of the book, 
if any, did not depend on sequence. Indeed, because the bamboo book was made of 
scores of separated bundles, the sequence of reading, which is prearranged by the 
author in a modem book, now fell completely in the hands of the reader, who could 
pick up whichever bundle (i.e., section) he (or, occasionally, she) wanted and start 
the joy of book reading. This may sound primitive to a reader who is used to 
modem print, but I would call that kind of ancient book "reader oriented" or "user 
friendly," as the reader was able to take a more active role in interacting with the 
text. It was not only the writer who could decide what to keep or how to read; the 
reader had a say, too. (Does this remind us of a hypertext reader?) We can imagine 
that the writer had no worry about textual sequence, either: He could simply throw 
his own bundle into the bamboo pile. (Physically, the book looks like a bamboo 
pile.) Thus, strictly speaking, a classical Chinese work had no definitive beginning or 
ending. 
At this point, I probably can say that a bamboo book was a hypertext in itself, 
because it was indeed a "networked" text with many fragmentary sub-texts (on 
bamboo strips) bound together through cords (not through logic). Because of the 
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way the book was bound, a writer/reader could at his disposal remove, add, or 
rearrange the texts (Lewis 55), or simply connect them to another book, a 
phenomenon we see only in today's hypertext. This kind of interaction with the 
texts would have two implications. First, it means, as mentioned, that the bamboo 
book was non-linear and non-sequential, just like an electronic hypertext: No matter 
how you read it, it makes sense (or doesn't make sense to the logocentric-minded). 
Second, it means that the bamboo book was fluid and open-ended, with numerous 
possibilities (it is "endless" in theory) of creating new ideas, new meanings, new 
interpretations, etc. Paul de Man says "Rhetoric suspends logic and opens up 
vertiginous possibilities of referential aberration" (10). I think he has a good 
example, from the ancient bamboo book in China, to support that view. 
If s not hard to see why in ancient China a classic work commonly credited to 
a particular historic figure could result in numerous "adulterated" versions, because 
it was literally a social construction featuring an evolving process of textual 
transformation carried out by many writers/readers over the years. The variances 
of a text are the imprints of such a transformation. They tell us that classical Chinese 
rhetoric was shifting and unstable due to the absence of individual authorship (or 
control). Like what we have seen in hypertext, rhetoric in ancient China was defined 
by motion rather than by "momentary location" (Moulthrop 303). Stanley Fish once 
argued, following Paul de Man, that rhetoric is based on what it aims to dissolve/* I 
tend to say classical Chinese rhetoric had done just that, but only two thousand 
See his book Doing WTzaf Comes NafuraZfy. Durham: Duke University Press, 1990 (p. 493). 
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years ago: In its virtually endless motion, it deconstructed itself, making 
unattainable any new totality in rhetoric/" 
By now, I wish that I had made a "good case" about my claim that hypertext 
was first started in China. At least I think the Chinese hypertext fits well into the 
definition by Bolter: "the interactive interconnection of a set of symbolic elements." 
No doubt, not everything matches: The Chinese hypertext was manually linked, off­
line, whereas the modem hypertext is electronically connected, on-line. But I feel this 
is a minor difference. I'm speaking of classical Chinese rhetoric as "hypertextual" 
not just because its text was "networked" in the form of a bamboo book. More 
importantly, it exhibited a "spirit" we normally associate with modem hypertext: 
i.e., multiaccentual, fragmentary, non-linear, open-ended, fluid, unstable, and, 
finally, interactive. 
But if someone insists that stuff like "electronic" or "on-line" must be 
included in the definition, then I can at least say that there existed a "bamboo 
hypertext" in ancient China. 
Conclusion 
So far, I have discussed several important features of classical Chinese rhetoric: 
namely, rhetoric as harmonic or self-effacing, rhetoric as paradoxical (Yin and Yang), 
and rhetoric as multiaccentual. Without doubt, these features pose questions about 
the traditional perceptions, and strategies, of rhetoric in the West, prodding people 
to explore new areas to expand their conceptions on rhetoric as well as on culture 
and other issues. I wouldn't say that the Chinese tradition is the right way to 
^ As a matter of fact, the motion stopped sometime during the Han Dynasty (202 B.C.-9 A.D.), 
when paper was invented. The rulers of the state also realized the need to uncover "orthodox" 
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understand rhetoric, but at least it shows us an alternative to approaching this 
particular language art. 
For instance, reason and logic are very much privileged in the Western 
tradition of rhetoric, under the assumption that they provide epistemological 
certainty to the writer/ speaker as well as to the reader/listener. Texts as such often 
appear "ordered, controlled, teleological, referential, and autonomously 
meaningful" (Alvin Keman 144). Also, because of the obsession with logos, the 
Western tradition tends to treat rhetorical practice as a unilateral action, in which the 
rhetor argues "single-handedly," from the beginning to end, just to prove he or she 
is right without yielding space for audience participation (Carolyn Matalene 803). In 
contrast, classical Chinese rhetoric operates rather paradoxically, with emphasis on 
understanding through distinction instead of logical representation aimed at 
describing the world as it is. And, because of the collective authorship, the texts in 
CCR are largely dialogic, involving an open-ended process of making and 
remaking, which in turn points to more interaction between writers and readers. As 
Lee Jacobus says of Doo De jmg (which is generally believed to be a collection of 
aphorisms contributed by generations of Daoists), 
Sometimes the text seems to be purposely ambiguous—a rhetorical device 
that promotes examination and careful speculation on the part of the 
reader. This ambiguity may annoy a reader who is used to having ideas 
clearly spelled out and explained. [But] Lao-Tzu seems to treat ideas like 
seeds to be planted in the mind of a listener, to take root and grow as the 
soil will permit. (18) 
classics to control ordinary people's thought. 
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The ambiguity of Dao De /z»g and numerous other classical texts may indicate the 
lack of control by one particular author in text production, but it may also suggest 
that logic doesn't have much say in classical Chinese rhetoric. A. G. Graham has 
revealed the "curiously familiar-sounding syllogism" in a text by Wang Chong (A.D. 
27-C. 100) (Dzspwters q/ffzg Tao 168), and many other scholars, both Chinese and 
Western, have made similar discoveries, so there is no reason to assume that the 
ancient Chinese did not understand logic or could not think logically. However, it 
seems safe to say that in ancient China logic, or logical thinking, had never been 
elevated to such an important epistemological status as it had enjoyed in the West. 
This is because, points out Graham, Chinese thinking engages in "correlative 
thinking" Wzffzzrz Reason 97-119) as opposed to analytical thinking, that is, 
"in terms of process rather than of static entities" (77). That means, by extension, 
that the logical wouldn't be singled out as the most important mode of thinking or 
reasoning in the Chinese mind. 
It appears that I now have more grounding to say why classical Chinese 
rhetoric is holistic—because of the "process" mode of thinking that underlies it. 
"Process" indicates motion, which in rhetoric would be "fluidity," a feature Graham 
identifies in such classical texts as Dao De /mg and Yz /mg (Book of Changes) (97-119). 
Thus we may have seen an epistemological reason behind the open-ended, anti-
logical nature of classical Chinese rhetoric, in addition to the technical reason of 
"bamboo hypertext," as discussed previously. Once again, we may conclude, 
logocentrism has no place in Chinese rhetoric. Naturally, the next question will be, 
Does the other rhetorical strategy, logos, something intertwined with logocentric 
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thought in the Western tradition, have a place in the Chinese? A simple answer 
would be "No/' A prudent, and more sophisticated, answer would be, "Yes, but the 
Chinese tradition has a different definition of logos." No matter what, I will further 
discuss this issue separately, in Chapter 2. At this point I think I can at least say 
ethos has a much broader application than logos does in classical Chinese rhetoric. 
Also in Chapter 2,1 will give a more detailed discussion on Chinese ethos and 
on how it distinguishes from Western ethos. But I would like to conclude this 
chapter with some key terms in regard to Chinese ethos so that readers can have 
some rough idea first as to how compare it with ethos in the Western tradition. 
Like the word "rhetoric," there is no equivalent in Chinese (either classical or 
modem) to Greco-Roman ethos, but like "rhetoric," there are some concepts in 
Chinese rhetoric that are close enough to the concept of ethos defined in Western 
rhetoric. One example would be cfzm (sincerity) and cbm-y#» (truthful words), as 
identified by Lu Xing (175). Since ethos is to make one appear good or trustworthy 
to an audience, these rhetorical concepts in ancient China can be said to have some 
connotations of ethos as understood by Western students. To me, what appears 
most significant in terms of ethos is probably the idea of %zw-cz Zz gz dz#% (roughly 
translated as "rhetoric oriented towards trust") in CCR. According to Chen and 
Wang, Confucius (551-479 B.C.) was the first to invent the term %zw-cz in Chinese 
rhetorical history (32). Because the Great Master (i.e., Confucius) was so obsessively 
concerned with the moral codes of society, if s not hard to see why he related %z%-cz 
(rhetoric) to fz gz dim (establishing trust). The next question is how to establish trust: 
through individual appeal? or through the communal or cultural? My answer is, 
obviously, in the latter, as I will explicate in the second chapter. 
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In modem Chinese, the closest concept to ethos is probably "face" (nzàm-zz) 
Goffman defines face as one's "self-image" projected through approved attributes 
of a society, suggesting that it is more than an individual property. The reason I 
believe face is ethos of Chinese rhetoric is because it directly points to one's 
credibility—in terms of how one is accepted in a community. Without face, without 
social acceptance. Then, of course, without credibility. Since face is not seen as 
entirely of a personal quality in Chinese society, we can reasonably assume that 
Chinese rhetoric approaches ethos in a way different from Western rhetoric. How 
different? I will again discuss the question in greater detail in the second chapter of 
the dissertation. At the moment I just leave it as it is (which is called "Chinese 
suspense"). 
Appendix: Ethos in Western Rhetoric 
What is rhetorical ethos? The term is defined in Sharon Crowley's Aficzmf RWoric^br 
Co»temporary SfWerzfs as "a person's character" or "ethical proof" (81). But as we read 
through that whole chapter under the title of "Ethical Proof," we may soon discover that 
ethical proof does not tell us all about the concept of ethos, for technical devices, such as 
"verb tense and voice," "word size," and even "punctuation," also shape, or even create, 
the projection of ethos. Similarly, Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg in their "Introduction" 
to classical rhetoric in Tke Rkgforica/ Tradition identify ethos as "the ethical appeal [that] 
evokes the speaker's own moral authority" (29). But if we dip into those classical treatises 
on rhetoric (included in their anthology), we may again realize that the notion of ethos as 
explicated by Aristotle, Cicero, or Quintilian goes far beyond ethical appeal or moral 
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authority. I do not mean to dismiss from ethos the legitimate position of ethical proof. But, 
on the other hand, to set ethos within the confines of ethical proof does not seem to do 
justice to those classical rhetoricians. Still worse, our appreciation of the rhetorical role a 
rhetor plays in his or her own text could possibly be limited, or even distorted. This 
appendix is intended to discuss ethos from a broader perspective, based on analyzing 
classical treatises I have read, such as Aristotle's K/zgfonc, Cicero's Of Orafon/, and 
Quintilian's Institutes of Oratory; it also introduces some contemporary literature on ethos to 
call attention to its conceptual variance between classical and modem rhetorics. 
As we know, Plato's notorious attack on rhetoric was partly out of ethical concerns 
about the practice of rhetoric in his time. In the Gorgzas, Plato condemns rhetoric as 
"flattery" because "it aims at the pleasant and ignores the best"; he also contends that 
rhetoric is not an "art" (techne) since "it has no account to give of the real nature of the 
things it applies" (BH 72). For Plato, there is an inextricable link between truth and ethics: 
in pursuing the eternal, the rhetorician must necessarily refuse to adapt himself to the 
"crowd" for the mere gratification of their "base desires." Obviously, Plato's message is not 
"rhetorical" in essence, for the idea of "audience" has been woefully excluded from his so-
called "true rhetoric" (philosophy?). Thus, the Gorgzas soon ends up in a dilemma: sophistic 
rhetoric is rejected, yet the ideal rhetoric, aimed at the good and just in the Platonic sense, 
has no practitioner since it does not stress "the reality of particular human circumstances" 
(Johnson 100). Plato is apparently aware of this dilemma, and in the Pfzaedrws he somehow 
provides a "corrective" to his original definition of rhetoric. Here Plato finally recognizes 
that "rhetoric in its entire nature [is] an art which leads the soul by means of words, not 
only in law courts and the various other public assemblages, but in private companies as 
well" (BH 132). His statement can be seen as acknowledging rhetoric's persuasive power 
over the audience. Unfortunately, his elevation of philosophy over rhetoric makes his 
approval of rhetoric appear very pale. For Plato, reason, as exercised in dialectic, is "the 
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only faculty that affords an avenue to the Good" (Johnson 100). And his insistence that 
oratory comply with the eternal Good leads him in the end to limit rhetoric's scope only to 
issues of good and evil: "whether one be awake or asleep, ignorance of right and wrong and 
good and bad is in truth inevitably a disgrace, even if the whole mob applaud it" (BH 142). 
It must not be misunderstood that Plato, who raises ethical questions about rhetoric, 
is the same person who approves of the use of ethos in rhetoric, as suggested by scholars 
like Johnson (99-100). To the contrary, Plato rejects ethos as a means of appeal to the 
audience because persuasion so solicited would amount to providing "belief without 
knowledge" (BH 66), a sort of deception denounced by him in the Gorgwzs. It is the trickery 
of a sophist, Plato claims, "to make him appear in the eyes of the multitude to know things . 
.. when he does not know, and to appear to be good when he is not" (BH 69). There is 
probably one more reason for his rejection of ethos: since the only way to approach or 
convey truth is by reasoning rigorously in the form of syllogism, to appeal through one's 
character would be totally irrelevant to his Platonic undertaking. It seems unnecessary to 
draw Plato into this discussion of ethos since he is against using "character appeal" for the 
purpose of securing persuasion. The point I am trying to make is that ethics and ethos are 
not the same for Plato. 
Aristotle, unlike his teacher Plato, appears to be relatively pragmatic in his approach 
to rhetoric. He sees rhetoric as "the counterpart of dialectic" (BH 151), thereby reversing the 
pejorative role Plato has assigned to this language art. He also defines rhetoric as "the 
faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion" (BH 153), thus 
making space for rhetorical appeals previously disregarded by his teacher. For Aristotle, 
persuasion is effected through "three kinds" of appeals: ethos, "the personal character of 
the speaker"; pathos, "putting the audience into a certain frame of mind"; and logos, "the 
proof provided by the words itself." Of ethos Aristotle has the following to say: 
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We believe good men more fully and more readily than others: this is true 
generally whatever the question is, and absolutely true where exact certainty is 
impossible and opinions are divided. This kind of persuasion, like the others, 
should be achieved by what the speaker says, not by what people think of his 
character before he begins to speak. It is not true, as some writers assume in their 
treatises on rhetoric, that the personal goodness revealed by the speaker 
contributes nothing to his power of persuasion; on the contrary, his character may 
almost be called the most effective means of persuasion he possesses. (BH 153-4) 
A careful reader may sense in the above passage some sort of criticism against Plato's "true 
rhetoric" and, naturally, his rejection of ethos. Now "the appeal of character operates in the 
system of Aristotle because it admits persuasion based on probabilities and [. . .] is directed 
toward effecting a judgment in the audience" (Drew-Bear 10). Special attention should be 
given to Aristotle's comment that persuasion through ethos ought to be achieved by "what 
the speaker says, not by what people think of his character before he begins to speak," 
which I think points to the orator's own involvement in creating ethos or "ethical proof." 
That is to say, the orator's personal character or "goodness" does not have to be truly his 
own, as far as persuasion goes. We may understand this better if we look at the fact that 
ethos, like pathos and logos, is subsumed by Aristotle under the category of artistic proofs. 
This means that the orator must construct his material so as to "make his own character 
look right" (BH 145; 160). 
Then, does Aristotle himself suggest ethical proof and ethos or character appeal are 
the same? From my understanding of Aristotle in this regard, I tend to say "No." It is true 
that "personal goodness" belongs to Aristotle's category of ethos, but to say it equals ethos 
per se would be another matter. In his Kfzgfonc, Aristotle divides ethos into "three things": 
"good sense," "good moral character," and "good will" (BH 161). Strictly speaking, only 
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one of those "three things" has something to do with ethical proof. As Annette Drew-Bear 
has observed, Aristotle uses the word ethos to mean not only "moral character," but also 
"disposition/' "temper" and "habitual way of life" (19). 
In late classical times, Aristotle's strategy of inspiring "confidence in the orator's 
own character" was fully embraced by Roman rhetoricians, such as Cicero and Quintilian. 
More important is that ethos during this period was granted a conception "broader and 
more inclusive than Aristotle's," as James May points out: "it is an ethos that deals with the 
emotions, closely related to pathos but involving the milder feelings; it is an ethos attentive 
to and more intricately associated with style" (5). Cicero defines rhetoric as "an art of 
speaking well" (BH 237). To do so, an orator must attain the image of a stage actor with 
"consummate charm" (BH 218). Thus ethos for Cicero's rhetors would indeed be a strategy 
used "to paint their characters in words." He has Antonius speak of such "painting" in his 
Of Oratory: 
. . .  a t t r i b u t e s  u s e f u l  i n  a n  a d v o c a t e  a r e  a  m i l d  t o n e ,  a  c o u n t e n a n c e  e x p r e s s i v e  o f  
modesty, gentle language, and the faculty of seeming to be dealing reluctantly and 
under compulsion with something you are really anxious to prove. It is very helpful 
to display tokens of good-nature, kindness, calmness, loyalty, and a disposition 
that is pleasing and not grasping or covetous, and all the qualities belonging to men 
who are upright, unassuming and not given to haste, stubbornness, strife or 
harshness, are powerful in winning goodwill,. . . But all this kind of advocacy will 
be best in those cases wherein the arbitrator's feelings are not likely to be kindled 
by what I may call the ardent and impassioned onset. For vigorous language is not 
always wanted, but often such as is calm, gentle, mild: this is the kind that most 
commends the parties. (BH 240) 
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As we can see here, a prominent feature of Ciceronian ethos is its aptness in style, which is 
not so much an indication of the rhetor's own character as an intimation of adaptation to 
the audience being addressed. In order to persuade, the orator must be able to "paint" his 
character, to alter his "ethos," as occasioned by his audience. This is made very clear when 
Antonius says, "he [the orator] does not wish to appear so completely a sage among fools, 
as to have his hearers either regarding him as a clumsy Greekling, or for all their approval of 
the orator's talent and astonishment at his wisdom, yet taking it ill that they themselves are 
foolish" (BH 224). So Cicero's orator, idealized in the image of "the consummate actor" 
(217), is the one who knows how to present himself both in and out of character to invoke 
his audience. The orator could thus play a multi-character, as described by Antonius: "I play 
three characters, myself, my opponent and the arbitrator" (233). Or, he could feign his own 
feelings to induce desired pathos from an audience: "it is impossible for the listener to feel 
indignation, hatred, or ill-will, to be terrified of anything, or reduced to tears of compassion, 
unless all those emotions, which the advocate would inspire in the arbitrator, are visibly 
stamped or rather branded on the advocate himself" (BH 241). 
Ciceronian ethos has its characteristic "intimacy" with pathos, not only because 
ethos is exercised largely through a style adapted to the audience's frame of mind, but also 
because the distinction between ethos and pathos is now mainly determined by the style 
itself. As James May explains, "Ethos, for the Romans, represented a milder form of pathos, 
the presentation of the gentler emotions. Thus when ethos is vigorously and emotionally 
expressed, it yields to pathos, and the courtroom, to use Cicero's own words, is 
transformed from an wAczM/» into an mcefwfmm, inflaming the souls of the orator's audience 
and moving them where he wills" (167). Needless to say, to interpret ethos in terms of style 
has the implication of broadening its domain. 
Cicero's rhetoric is Aristotelian in essence, with persuasion as its ultimate goal. In 
contrast, Quintilian holds that to call oratory "the power of persuading is to give an 
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insufficient definition of it" (BH 319). Though he defines rhetoric, too, as the "art of 
speaking well" (BH 323), he gives the word "well" a tinge of both "effectively" and 
"virtuously," and as Bizzell and Herzberg have pointed out, "Oratory that does not move 
its hearers toward the good is not 'rhetoric/ by Quintilian's definition" (295). Thus 
Quintilian departs from Cicero regarding the role of rhetoric and, consequently, the 
definition of ethos. In his Of Omfon/, Quintilian asserts Plato's ideal about good 
rhetoric: "it embraces all the virtues of oratory at once, and includes also the character of 
the true orator, as he cannot speak well unless he be a good man" (BH 322). For him, the 
persuasive power of ethos lies in the orator being true to himself: 
. . .  f o r  s i m u l a t i o n ,  h o w e v e r  g u a r d e d  i t  b e ,  a l w a y s  b e t r a y s  i t s e l f ,  n o r  w a s  t h e r e  e v e r  
such power of eloquence in any man that he would not falter and hesitate whenever 
his words were at variance with his thoughts. But a bad man must of necessity utter 
words at variance with his thoughts; while to good men, on the contrary, a virtuous 
sincerity of language will never be wanting, nor (for good men will also be wise) a 
power of producing the most excellent thoughts, which, though they may be 
destitute of showy charms, will be sufficiently adorned by their own natural 
qualities, since whatever is said with honest feeling will also be said with 
eloquence. (BH 350) 
From this message and also from Quintilian's argument that "perfect eloquence [...] 
can[not] be united with a vicious character of mind" (351), we may draw a conclusion that 
ethos and eloquence are the same in Quintilian's system of "real oratory." Quintilian himself 
says, "If ethos denotes moral character, our speech must necessarily be based on ethos when 
it is engaged in portraying such character" (Book VI, ii. 17). 
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Drew-Bear has noticed that at times Quintilian betrays a less idealistic spirit when 
he comes to the practical treatment of ethos. For instance, Quintilian recommends the 
expedient of having the orator represent himself as "weak, unprepared, and no match for 
the powerful talents arrayed against [him], a frequent trick in the exordia of Messala" (35). 
Like Cicero, Quintilian treats ethos and pathos as alternative emotional modes for the 
orator to use from his repertoire of techniques; he regards ethos as "calm and composed" in 
contrast to pathos as "excited and disturbed" (Gill 159). Quintilian's pragmatism can also 
be seen in his comment on ethos as a strategy in oratory: 
The ethos which I have in my mind and which I desiderate in an orator is 
commended to our approval by goodness more than aught else and is not merely 
calm and mild, but in most cases ingratiating and courteous and such as to excite 
pleasure and affection in our hearers, while the chief merit in its expression lies in 
making it seem that all that we say derives directly from the nature of the facts 
and persons concerned and in the revelation of the character of the orator in such a 
way that all may recognise it. (Book VI, ii. 13) 
We may regard Quintilian as a "split" rhetorician on the issue of ethos: in his ideal rhetoric, 
ethos is eloquence devoted to virtue; in his practical rhetoric, ethos is still eloquence but 
devoted to "the skillful exercise of feigned emotion or the employment of irony in making 
apologies or asking questions" (Drew-Bear 36). As Christopher Gill points out, Quintilian's 
ethos becomes associated in practice with "a certain kind of emotional tenor and a range of 
stylistic qualities" (165). His irony is probably due to the central concern of rhetoric at the 
time—persuasion. No matter how virtuous the rhetor intends his oratory to be, he must 
necessarily adapt his speech to the audience in question in order to persuade. This means he 
has to alter his ethos. 
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When we look at ethos in classical rhetoric and then compare it with modem 
rhetoric, an obvious conclusion would be: Ethos has experienced a twist in its definition. 
Today, rhetoricians are probably less troubled with the question of ethical proof because 
rhetoric is seen by many as a mere skill (cf. Sullivan's article "Political Ethical Implications 
of Defining Technical Communication as a Practice"). The term ethos is commonly replaced 
by the word "voice/' "tone/' or "persona" in our composition class or elsewhere, which, 
Johnson suggests, is "reminiscent of Cicero's concept of ethos as the skill of 'painting' 
character in style" (112). In other words, ethos is more a verbal projection of one's self than 
ethical proof. 
Patricia Bizzell has noticed the classical notion of ethos being exploited on television 
in the talk-show format: 
A celebrity's views on abortion or censorship are solicited, not to begin a 
consideration of the reasonable or defensible positions that may be taken on such 
debatable issues but to establish what classical rhetoric terms the speaker's 
"ethos." The audience's interest in a talk-show guest is determined, it seems to me, 
mainly by a series of aphorisms that contribute, along with his or her physical 
appearance, dress, and gestures, to make up the guesf s "media image." (31-2) 
She suggests that "the dearth of extended rational presentation of ideas on television and 
the medium's dependence instead on the ethos of the speaker may help create freshman 
students of composition who have trouble with the skills of elucidation and validation and 
sequencing in expository writing" (which is based on the findings of a panel appointed by 
the College Board). If this is true, we may have to say that the "media image," which 
represents the exploitation of ethos in this modem industrial and digital world, could have 
the negative effect of "painting" our students' brains into the barren. 
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What appears most significant to me in the contemporary literature on ethos is a 
shift in identifying ethos from the "individual" to the "communal" in the postmodernist 
theory of rhetoric. Most notably, in his "On the End of Rhetoric/' S. M. Halloran proposes 
that ethos "indicates the importance of the orator's mastery of the cultural heritage; through 
the cogency of his logical and emotional appeals he became a kind of living embodiment of 
that heritage, a voice of such apparent authority that the word spoken by this man was the 
word of communal wisdom, a word to be trusted for the weight of the man who spoke it 
and the tradition he spoke for" (621). His notion of ethos as culture-bound is further 
developed when, elsewhere, he emphasizes ethos as "the spirit of a culture or people," a 
binding force which transforms "an aggregation of individuals into a community" (qtd. in 
Harris 126). Halloran cites Kenneth Burke in arguing that "the key term for a modem 
rhetoric is not persuasion but identification" (626), thus pointing out the necessity of viewing 
one's individual ethos as part of a community's collective ethos. 
Halloran's view is probably better understood through the example of a discourse 
community in which membership is secured essentially through "the projection of ethos to 
the communal level" (qtd. in Harris 125). A rhetorical situation as defined by the 
community ethos is one in which the rhetor or author does not speak his or her individual 
voice but rather a language of the community to which he or she belongs. As Harris puts it, 
to be an identifiable member of such a community is "to draw on its vocabulary, to echo its 
enthymemes, to wallow in its stylistic proclivities; in short, to evoke and perpetuate its 
ethos" (127). In a way, when we are teaching college students composition, we are invisibly 
making efforts to imprint on them the ethos of an academic community, to hold them 
together through a cultural heritage, for better or worse. 
Foucault sees ethos as a "way of acting and behaving that at one and the same time 
marks a relation of belonging and presents itself as a task" (39). If this holds true, then 
ethos in rhetoric should be considered less a strategy of persuasion than a task of 
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articulating and relating one's own self to the outside world (Halloran 626-31). And, of 
course, ethos as such would be less concerned with appeal than with identification. 
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CHAPTER 2 
FACE AND HEAVEN: KEY ISSUES OF ETHOS 
IN CLASSICAL CHINESE RHETORIC 
Rhetoric, defined by the Western tradition, is difficult, if not impossible, to match 
with an equivalent concept in Chinese. Over the years, its translations have ranged 
from %zw-cz (study of language embellishing) through yw-yorzg (applied 
linguistics) to mmg-bza» %z# (study of naming and arguing). But, we may notice, 
none of these concepts really matches well with what is indeed meant by "rhetoric" 
in the Western tradition. In recent years, some Chinese scholars attempted to 
translate die term into (study of persuasion), which by all accounts may 
be the closest "shot" when measured by Western standards. However, as I pointed 
out elsewhere/ because persuasion itself has never become an "art," or discipline, to 
be systemically studied and categorized in Chinese culture/ the translation (i.e., 
sfzw-^w %z#) could strike a Chinese ear as "outlandish." In my view, the seeming 
untransl atability of "rhetoric" into Chinese underlies some profound differences 
between Western and Chinese rhetoric that can best be explained from a cross-
cultural point of view. 
It has become a commonplace that the primary function of rhetoric in China 
is harmony as opposed to persuasion, which has largely defined Greco-Roman 
rhetoric (e.g., Oliver 361; Matalene 795; Scollan and Scollan 142). During the pre-Qin 
' See Chapter 2, "Classical Chinese Rhetoric: An Overview" (pp. 2-6). 
^ The claim is subject to debate as there have been innumerable books or treatises written in the history of China 
that explore systematically the subjects of writing or composition. However, rhetoric, consciously defined as the 
art of persuasion that involves using any means in any situation to convince an audience, was not a familiar 
term in Chinese culture. The categorization and systematization of rhetoric as such was also unheard of in the 
rhetorical history of China. 
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period (722—221 B.C.) when classical Chinese rhetoric (CCR) was thriving, China was 
plagued by "dynastic decay" (Schwartz 56) and "social chaos" (Lu, RWonc m 
Anaent Ckz?uz 6), inflicted, among others, by wars and conflicts among the 
competing fiefs (independent states and principalities within the feudal system of 
the Zhou Dynasty). Given the historic background, it seems conceivable that 
harmony, other than persuasion, had come to play a defining role in classical 
Chinese rhetoric. In the first place, the idea of harmony relates to the question of 
how to restore or maintain social order, as characterized by Confucius's (552-479 
B.C.) "K" (ritual; rites), the observance of which, according to the Master, was "a sign 
of perfect social order" (de Bary, et al. 18). But, broadly speaking, harmony is also 
concerned about how to situate human existence in "the stream of the universe" 
(Lao Zi, ch. 28), in the sense of establishing unity between man and nature, and man 
and the Dao (the Way). To those ancient thinkers, social harmony in the form of Zi 
ought to be mirroring an order beyond (humans), as seen, for example, in a 
statement by Zi Chan (580-522 B.C.), a political reformer from the state of Zheng: 
L: [Rites] represents] the fundamental regulation of heaven, the basic 
righteousness of earth, and the correct behavior of people. The fundamental 
regulation of heaven and earth should be followed by people. Modeling 
themselves after the brightness of heaven and following the nature of the 
earth, the six gz or vital energies are created, and the Five Phases are put into 
action. [...] The distinction between king and subjects and that between the 
inferior and the superior are used to follow the righteousness of the earth. 
The relationship between husband and wife, that between outer and inner, is 
established to regulate the opposites (yin and yang). The relationship 
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between father and son, that between elder and younger, and that between 
uncle and nephew, as well as the rites of marriage, are set to imitate the 
brightness of heaven. Endeavor in government is devoted to modeling 
oneself after the four seasons. Punishment and jails, which make people 
fearful of illegal actions, are employed in imitating thunder and lightening 
which kill things. Benevolence and harmony are cultivated in emulating 
heaven in creating things and nurturing them to grow/ 
There is probably no need to question the validity of the argument quoted above in 
connecting relationships between family members to the "brightness of heaven/' or 
prison and punishment to "thunder and lightening." What is significant is the 
understanding that Chinese harmony has its ideological roots in recognizing the 
Dao as the ultimate source of order—unveiled, to the Chinese mind, though such 
natural phenomena as heaven, earth, and the four seasons. 
Because of the emphasis on harmony, rhetorical practice in ancient China 
would typically leave the role of an individual out of the picture, focusing instead on 
collective workmanship in discourse production, as exemplified in the case of 
"bamboo hypertext," where texts, like Lao Zi's Doo De /mg or Confucius' Lwn 
(Amzkcfs), were compilations of works contributed to by generations of disciples/ 
But what I mean by collective workmanship also refers to the fact that the CCR 
practitioners would frequently write/ speak like each other, modeling after what 
Schaberg describes as "patterned rhetoric" (13), in which a discourse presentation 
was structured in line with the "order" and "terms" of the "received language" (30). 
^ The translation was originally from J. Legge's 77# C&z/ieje CZaasics (Vol. 5, p. 704) but was revised by 
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For example, as Schaberg has noticed, the histoiiographical speeches recorded in 
Zwo ZkwM (Zuo Commentaries) and Gwo Yw (Narratives of the States)^" had in 
general followed a "patterned structure" (44) that can be formulated like this: "a 
judgment of present events; general principles; citations from canonical works, 
aphorisms, and the like; historical precedents; observation and description of events 
at hand; matching of principles, citations, and precedents with these events; and a 
prediction of future events" (43). While numerous exceptions could be cited, I would 
say the "patterned" feature of CCR marks a rhetorical tradition distinct from Greco-
Roman rhetoric. For what is suggested in patterned rhetoric, and, to a larger extent, 
collective workmanship and harmony, is that "Originality was discounted" (Oliver 
361), and eloquence was viewed as conforming oneself to discourse rituals that had 
been collectively valued and culturally sanctioned. This does, of course, sharply 
contrast with the Western tradition, where rhetoric is seen as an individual 
endeavor, identified with self-presentation, or even self-sell. The Western sense of 
rhetoric "as an avenue for the individual to achieve control" warrants "originality 
and individuality," says Matalene (795). 
The impact of "patterned rhetoric" upon Chinese society can be illustrated by 
the example of "eight-legged essays" (&#-#%) administered in Ming and Qing^ civil 
Leo Chang and Yu Feng in their 77# Fowr fo/ificaZ 7reaf»gj of f&g Fg/Zow Emperor (p. 13). 
* See the section on Bamboo Hypertext in chapter 2 " Classical Chinese Rhetoric: An Overview." 
^ Early Chinese classics compiled by followers of Confucius. Zwo Zkwam, one of the Five Classics in the 
Confucian canon, expands, with exegetical comments, on giw (Spring and Autumn), a chronicle of 
historic events (during 722-479 B.C.) credited to the authorship of Confucius. Gwo Tw, a collection of 
anecdotes, also with exegesis, is widely regarded as a supplement to Zwo Zhwan. 
* Ming refers to the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644 A.D.); Qing refers to the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911 A.D.). 
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service examinations to recruit state officials/ The "eight-legged essay" was divided 
into eight parts, hence the name. Its style and structural features (e.g. parallelism and 
antithesis) are said to have evolved from the (exposition on the classics) used 
in SongG examinations (Lee 154). However, according to Jin Ke-Mu, a Chinese scholar 
on the strict prescription imposed on its composition may actually reflect an 
attempt to mimic writing patterns in the Four Books* (129—47), which were also 
decreed by the state to be the exclusive content of the test. Though the "eight-legged 
essay" was devised to measure the ability of examinees to make effective use of 
classical knowledge in argumentation, hence their potentials, it has been widely 
criticized (especially since the late 19th century) for stifling originality and stultifying 
the intelligentsia because of its obsession with platitudes and rigid adherence to the 
subject frame, structure, style, tone, number of characters, etc. I am not here to weigh 
the pros and cons of but just wish to say that the essay indeed represents the 
Chinese tradition of patterned rhetoric, which had been put to use to its extreme in 
the Ming-Qing period. 
The "eight-legged essay" saw its official abolition in 1902, under an edict by 
the empress dowager Ci-Xi (Ayers 215). But tradition dies hard. Traces of 
writing are still present in modem-day China, as discovered by Matalene, when she 
worked in the country as a writing teacher. From her students' essays as well as the 
"arguments" that had appeared in the government-run English newspaper CMmz 
^ The Chinese civil service examination system saw its emergence in the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.-221 A.D.), 
systematization in the Tang (618-906 A.D.), and abolition in 1905 (Menzel vii-viii). But according to Max 
Weber, the "first traces of the examinadon system seem to emerge about the time of Confucius" (59). 
s The Song Dynasty (960-1279 A.D.). 
* The Four Books (Greof Igornmg, 7%e Mean, .ArWecfa, and Menciwj) and the Rve Classics (Boot qf/f/fej, 
Boot of CAangej, Boot of Poetry, Boot of Documents, and Zwo ZAwo/%) have been regarded as the core of the 
Confucian canon in Chinese history. 
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DmZy, Matalene noticed a "standard pattern" of writing that includes in it an 
"opening description" of an event, a "look back" at history, an "explanation," and a 
"concluding moral exhortation" (800)/° While a pattern like this could have resulted 
from the rule of "communist bureaucracy," which Matalene admits, it does show 
traits of writing characteristic of ba-gw, such as the "appeal to history, the delayed 
argument followed by a turn, and the final unconnected assertions" (801). These 
traits, I would like to add, also point to a rhetorical tradition dating back to the pre-
Qin period, when patterned discourse found its way into classical texts, like Zwo 
Z/zwm and G wo Yw. 
When I was in China a few years ago doing research on Chinese business 
communication, I was struck by the uniformity of languages and structures used in 
business documents there, which could prompt one to wonder whether or not the 
Chinese were engaging in "empty talk."" In retrospect, I would have to argue that 
this sort of "empty talk," like the "eight-legged essay," actually exemplifies the 
practice of using "received language" in traditional Chinese rhetoric, which, it would 
seem, goes all the way back to the Confucian teachings of "ritualization" in 
connection with harmony in antiquity. I will further discuss "patterned rhetoric" in 
relation to language ritualization later in the paper, when exploring Confucius' 
"rectification of names." But, for now, I would just like to point out what appears to 
be immediately related to the topic of the paper: i.e., the "empty talk," or "new 
as Matalene would call it, after her Chinese colleagues (801), can be taken as an 
^ The "eight-legged essay" follows a pattern like this: I) presentation of thesis (po-f;), 2) explanation of thesis 
(c/KMg-#), 3) description (gf^/Wzg), 4) preliminary exposition (fi-2%), 5) minor exposition (zioo-W), 6) middle 
exposition (zAomg-6:), 7) final exposition and 8) conclusion (j&ow). 
" See my paper presented at the ABC Annual Conference in 1999, "Empty Talk or Collective Ethos? 
Discussing Business Communication in China." 
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exhibition of what I would call "collective ethos/' in that it shows how Chinese 
writers/speakers create their appeals (i.e., ethos) by engaging in "received/' or 
culturally established, discourse practices. Some postmodern rhetorical theorists, like 
S. M. Hollaron, would define ethos as culture-bound, built up on the "orator's 
mastery of the cultural heritage" (621). I think they will be able to find numerous 
examples for support in Chinese rhetoric because of the way ethos is created. The 
uniformity, as I once witnessed in the business documents, may highlight the fact 
that Chinese writers don't put a premium on "originality," something much valued 
in Western culture, but it also points to the possibility that they know how to evoke 
credibility through the continual use of languages and structures that are commonly 
shared, as a cultural heritage, among Chinese business communication practitioners. 
In practical terms, the "Chinese way" of using set, or received, language 
phrases/structures to communicate could be an effective way to establish rapport 
with readers. Because they (i.e., set phrases and structures) are culturally familiar to 
readers, a writer can employ them to affirm a shared ground with his or her 
audience, which, in Aristotelian terms, may be called "good will," one of the three 
means identified by Aristotle that a rhetor can use to secure trust, therefore ethos. But 
I would like to choose "identification," after Kenneth Burke, to describe the rhetorical 
move by a rhetor to establish a shared ground with audience, in that it goes beyond 
the personal relationship implied in "good will." 
In his A R&gtorzc of Motives, Burke says, "You persuade a man only insofar as 
you can talk his language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, 
your ways with his" (55). So, Burke's identification can be seen as a 
rhetorical strategy in the first place. However, he also uses the term to refer to 
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"consubstantiality" (20), the "condition of possibility for collective action" among 
humans (Biesecker 40). Burke writes: 
A doctrine of coMswWaMfWzfy, either explicit or implicit, may be necessary to 
any way of life. For substance, in the old philosophies, was an ccf; and a way 
of life is an acfmg-fogefkgr; and in acting together, men have common 
sensations, concepts, images, ideas, attitudes that make them cmswWanfW. 
(21) 
In the broader sense, then, the idea of identification points to an important goal of 
rhetoric transcending personal gains or advantages traditionally associated with 
rhetorical persuasion: achieving the sense of acting-together-ness, or collectivism. For 
Burke, rhetoric "could not be directed merely towards attainable advantages" 
because "a persuasion that succeeds, dies" (274). I will have to skip those passages in 
A RWonc q/"Mofzt%5 that explain how Burke has reached that conclusion, but what is 
significant to me is that he sets the goal of rhetoric above persuasion, and that his 
identification theory "accounts] for the way in which discourses promote social 
cohesion between estranged individuals" (Biesecker 42). 
We may notice a striking similarity between "social cohesion" involved in 
Burke's rhetorical identification and "harmony" that characterizes the function of 
classical Chinese rhetoric—not just because they are almost identical in semantics, 
but also because they are both premised on collectivism, on understanding language 
as "a material mediator" (Oravec 182) that can bring individuals to act together 
through identifying their shared grounds, like history, cultural heritage, or even the 
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language itself. In the case of CCR, the "collective workmanship/' as mentioned 
earlier, could be a good example to illustrate the sort of acting-together-ness in 
discourse productions in pre-Qin China. But, more importantly, it was also a practice 
in which the CCR practitioners affirmed their common ground by, for example, 
engaging in ritualized discourse practices epitomized in the form of "patterned 
rhetoric," and by creating texts attributed to the teachings of the same old masters, 
like Lao Zi and Confucius. Needless to say, the practice that happened over two 
millenniums ago in pre-Qin China, of using the same patterned discourses and 
writing about the same masters, would be a classic act of identification in Burkean 
terms. 
The theory of identification also helps explain the collectivist nature of ethos 
in classical Chinese rhetoric. As I have argued elsewhere, the projection of ethos in 
CCR was quite different from that in Greco-Roman rhetoric: Instead of emphasizing 
the appeal of one's personal character, with a vocabulary steeped in self-
representation, Chines ethos was, in essence, an invocation of one's cultural heritage, 
with which rhetors not only identified themselves but also, through such 
identification, created their own appeals. I would call ethos as such "collective" for 
reasons that the projection itself had little to do with the personal qualities of a 
rhetor, as was the case with Western ethos, and that the act of identification and the 
cultural heritage to be invoked through such an act were collect!vist in nature. In 
classical Chinese rhetoric, to make one appear credible or one's words trustworthy 
was to connect (i.e., identify) what one had to say/write with what had already been 
collectively established in history and culture, such as historical figures, values, 
rituals, the awesome, but also abstract, Dao and the attendant notion of Heaven, the 
"wisdom" of legendary sage-kings in the remote past, who were believed to have 
direct inspirations from the "divine" (i.e., the Dao/Heaven) (Schwartz 26), and the 
teachings of great masters, like Lao Zi and Confucius, that would ensure the passing-
down of such wisdom from generation to generation. In this sense, we may say that 
Chinese ethos comes from without (one's cultural heritage), rather than from within 
(one's self-hood). 
In what follows I will discuss in more detail the collectivist aspect of ethos in 
CCR, by focusing on what I deem as the defining issues of rhetoric, and culture, in 
pre-Qin China: namely, the issues of face and Heaven. The paper will have two 
sections. Section I, "Face, C/ieng-Ya», and Chinese Ethos," provides a general 
description of ethos in CCR; Section H, "The Ethos of the Heavenly," tackles the 
notion of Heaven as a cultural heritage and its ultimate role in defining Chinese 
ethos. The first section serves to identify as well as to bridge the conceptual gap 
between Western and Chinese ethos. The second section is the focus of the paper, 
with questions related to contemporary theories of rhetoric and communication 
being raised and explored. 
Face, C/zeng-Ya», and Chinese Ethos 
1. A general remark 
Speaking of ethos, we may face the challenge of finding an equivalent to it in 
Chinese, just as we have had with the word "rhetoric." However, because ethos is 
about trust or credibility, die Chinese language is not short of phrases that bear 
similar connotations. For instance, Huo Yu-Jia, a scholar on ancient Chinese thought, 
cites several CCR cases, in his Tactics o/Wmnmg tke Heart, that involved the use of 
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fàm-rmMg (clean reputation) (93), bwz-rm (affection toward people) (98-111), and 
(trust and truthfulness) (112-19), which, we can see, are all reminiscent of 
Aristotelian ethos. And in the four Texts of tfze YeZZow Emperor,^ %m (trust), as a moral 
principle, had even been linked to "Zz-nzmg," the establishing of the Mandate of 
Heaven^: "The Yellow Ancestor,^ of old, had been cherishing trustworthiness right 
from the start, hence his image, whereby he ruled the nation with moral rectitude 
and inculcated the multitude with devotion."^ 
For Confucius and his followers, the idea of trust or trustworthiness was, first 
and foremost, a moral principle, but it was also recognized as a political tactic for 
government, which by definition involves a rhetorical move. Confucius once stated: 
"If the ruler adhered to trust, all the people would follow suit and be truthful with 
their words."^ In the first place, the statement by Confucius can be taken as an 
advocacy for a moral principle, but the suasory aspect of "trust" is also implied here, 
in that it (trust) could be utilized as a tactic to motivate people to be "truthful with 
their words." 
2. Face as a rhetorical strategy 
To me, the closest in meaning to the term ethos would be the concept of face (nzwrn-zz) 
in Chinese culture. For one thing, the concept is about one's image as perceived by 
others (Scollan and Scollan 35), something also associated with Aristotle's ethos 
^ The original author was unknown of the fowr T&cfj, attributed to the Yellow Emperor, the legendary 
ancestor of the Chinese people. According to Leo Chang and Yu Feng, the book was "more likely written in the 
third century B.C." (2). 
^ The Mandate of Heaven can be interpreted as the ultimate ethos for a ruling Chinese king or emperor. 
The Yellow Emperor. 
^ My translation, based on the original Chinese version in Chang and Feng's fbwr PoWficoZ Treafwea of (Ae 
Fe/Zow Emperor. See Section I, Book II (145). 
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(Golden and Corbett 3-4). For another, it deals with the question of credibility or 
trust; in Chinese culture, to say one loses face is to say one loses trust by others. 
According to Lu Xing, the concept embraces "the Confucian value placed on honor, 
pride, and achievement" ("Influence of Classical Chinese Rhetoric"16), which may 
explain why "face" has carried such weight in shaping the life of a Chinese. 
Rhetorically, face has long been used for persuasion, especially in the form of a "face 
saving strategy," which, Lu argues, can be traced back to Han Fei Zi (280-233 B.C.), a 
rhetorical, and social/political, theorist in pre-Qin China (#%d.). While Han Fei Zi 
himself did not mention the word "face," his theory of using the sense of "shame" 
and/or "pride" to control others' behavior has been widely considered as a proposal 
for "facework strategies" (15-6). 
The following excerpt from "The Difficulties of Persuasion" by Han Fei Zi 
may illustrate how a face-saving strategy cashing in on somebody^ s sense of pride or 
shame could work in classical Chinese rhetoric: 
The important thing in persuasion is to learn how to play up the aspects that 
the person you are talking to is proud of, and play down the aspects he is 
ashamed of. Thus, if the person has some urgent personal desire, you show 
him that it is his public duty to carry it out and urge him not to delay. If he 
has some mean objective in mind and yet cannot restrain himself, you should 
do your best to point out to him whatever admirable aspects it may have and 
to minimize the reprehensible ones. If he has some lofty objective in mind 
and yet does not have the ability needed to realize it you should do your best 
My Translation, based on the original Chinese version in 77# Cbmpkfe four Book? owf five CZasjics tWf/z 
AwMAzfiofw, edited by Han Lu, et al. See Section XIII, LM/i-Yw (123). 
to point out to him the faults and bad aspects of such an objective and make 
it seem a virtue not to pursue it. If he is anxious to make a show of wisdom 
and ability, mention several proposals which are different from the one you 
have in mind but of the same general nature in order to supply him with 
ideas; then let him build on your words, but pretend that you are unaware 
that he is doing so, and in this way abet his wisdom.^ 
At first glance, what Han Fei Zi proposed is very much like a persuasive strategy 
commonly employed in Western rhetoric in that it emphasizes the need to adjust, 
rhetorically, to what a target audience desires, or wants. However, we may notice 
that the face saving strategy implied here, in the sense of eliciting pride or 
eliminating shame (Lu 15-16), is being directed towards constructing or retaining 
the ethos (i.e., face) of an audience, not that of a rhetor, as has been the usual case in 
Western rhetoric. To put it another way, Han Fei Zi's "face saving" was meant to 
make the audience, not the rhetor, look good/* 
One may argue that Han Fei Zi's strategy resonates with Aristotle's "good 
will," as both were designed to establish rapport between a rhetor and his/her 
audience. But for Aristotle, good will was used mainly for the purpose of gaining 
trust for the rhetor, whereas the face saving strategy proposed by Han Fei Zi was 
used largely for the purpose of building up trust, or the appearance of such trust, for 
the audience. This is where, we can see, the traditional definition of ethos in Western 
rhetoric, "the appeal of speakers or writers to their own credibility and character" 
(Covino and Jolliffe 52), does not appear to fit with the Chinese concept of ethos (i.e., 
From /fAefonc; Concepts, De/Wz:o%j, BowfK&zriej, edited by Convino and Jolliffe (380). 
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face), which concentrates more on the appeal of an audience when used as a 
rhetorical strategy. 
3. The definition of the situation and Confucius' Zi 
That Western ethos works quite differently from Chinese may have to do with the 
fact that it has been equated with a projection of a rhetor's personal character, 
grounded, Alcom would argue, in the "coherence" (9) and "stability" (16) of the self. 
But Chinese ethos, or face, has more to do with the interpersonal than with the 
personal, as its projection hinges in a fundamental way on how one interacts with 
others on social occasions. The "definition of the situation," as proposed by Goffman 
in his Preserwfio» of Se/f (4), may explain it better: Because the situation a person 
finds him-/herself in can be influenced, and therefore defined, by all the participants 
present, his or her behavior or "performance" would thus vary from one social 
occasion to another: for example, the "front-stage" performance (in public) versus 
the "back-stage" (in private).^ This would imply that his or her face presented as a 
result of interactions with other people would vary, too: Instead of being "coherent" 
and "stable," a person's face can simply be "chameleon-like," in correspondence to 
the fluidity of the definition of the situation. So, if Chinese ethos differs from 
Western, it is, first of all, because of the social dimension assumed in presenting 
one's face, which, in my view, would amount to rejecting the claim by some Western 
rhetoricians that ethos can be single-handedly created, or manipulated, by a rhetor. 
One can, of course, present a "trustworthy" face, but at least it has to be "supported 
One, of course, can also make somebody look bad by using a "face-losing" strategy, as seen in the case of 
"character assassination" used by politicians to attack their opponents. 
For more information on the subject, see Chapter 1, "Performances," in Goffman's Prejervofiom qfSgy(pp. 
17-76). 
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by judgements and evidence conveyed by other participants" (Goffman, Wmzcfzozz 
RztzwzZ 6) before it can be established. 
"Face," says Goffman, "is an image of self delineated in terms of approved 
social attributes" (Wmzcfzo# RzfzW 5). If I interpret him correctly, Goffman is 
actually pointing out the communal, or collectivist, nature of one's face: Namely, 
presenting one's face involves a social process of fitting that face into the frame of 
expectations set by a community. For instance, in a collectivist society, where 
harmony is prized over other social attributes, it would be more appropriate for a 
person to present a face that shows "allegiance to groups like the family or the 
employer" (Goleman 40), whereas in an individualistic society, where competition 
takes priority, it might work better for people to present their face as "independent 
agents" (Samovar and Porter 85). In this sense, then the definition of the situation, 
where one's face is presented, ought to be extended to the parameters of the 
communal or the cultural. Goffman's face theory, based on his study of the Chinese 
concept of face, has been claimed to have some universal applications across 
cultures (e.g., Scollan and Scollan 36-49), but I think it may have more relevance to 
the explication of Chinese ethos, in that it is, in essence, a theory of identification, 
like Burke's, which explains how one's ethos (i.e., face) is projected through a 
process of identifying, or fitting in, with what has already been collectively 
established or approved in a culture, a point I have made earlier in the chapter. 
One can rest certain that the "definition of the situation," as a sociological 
terminology in the 20th century, would never find its equivalent in the massive 
body of classical Chinese texts; however, one can't help noticing the resemblance it 
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bears to the "rules of conduct" (Zz) advocated by Confucius over two thousand years 
ago, as seen, for example, in the following excerpt from the AWecfs: 
At court, when speaking with officers of lower rank, he [Confucius] was 
pleasant and affable; when speaking with officers of upper rank, he was 
formal and proper. When his ruler was present, he combined an attitude of 
reverential respect with graceful ease.^ 
We probably can—without guilt—use the term "face" to substitute the changing 
mannerism posed by Confucius on different social occasions. It may sound a bit 
disrespectful to say that the Great Master had shown a face of a chameleon, but it is 
significant to see that Confucius understood perfectly how the situation, where one 
interacts with other people, could impact the way one presents one's social image. 
Thus, his changing behavior manners on different social occasions may be 
interpreted as a "rhetorical move" to adjust his self-image to the definition of the 
situation. 
Students of Confucian studies would argue that the Great Master was indeed 
exemplifying the "rules of conduct" (Zz), or ritual, as part of the Confucian scheme to 
restore social order of his time, making sure that the conduct of every and each 
individual was to be held "within the framework of fixed convention" (Graham 11), 
which I wouldn't dispute in the least. However, in emphasizing the observance of 
rituals, Confucius acknowledged, it would seem, the dynamics of social occasions 
on which one conducts, or presents, oneself. That is why, as the ArzaZecfs recorded, 
From m C&zjMcaZ C/wMfje PA/kuop/zy, edited by Ivanhoe and Van Norden (27). 
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Confucius frequently changed his "face/' for example, from a "respectful 
countenance" when seeing "someone wearing a ritual cap" to a "solemn expression" 
when attending "a sumptuous banquet."^ His (in)famous motto, cZzmcZzm, 
zzzz" (i.e., Rulers must act like rulers, subjects like subjects, fathers like fathers, 
and sons like sons), has often been cited (in both Chinese and Western scholarship) 
as a formalistic prescription for a rigid social hierarchy, but, if we read it 
deconstructively, the motto also implies a recognition that one has multiple faces to 
present when interacting with other people: In front of one's children, one must 
show the face of a father, but with somebody else, that face has to change. 
In a word, the Confucian doctrine of "ritualization" (Zz) is reminiscent of 
Goffman's "definition of the situation," which views the presentation of one's self as 
being defined "from the point of view of social interaction" (PrgsgrWzorz of SeZf242). 
Of course, Confucius was more interested in restoring social order through Zz, the 
rules of conduct for all under Heaven to follow for the purpose of preserving 
harmony, but implicit in the ideal of Zz is the notion that one conducts or presents 
oneself in a manner befitting the situation where one interacts with others. As 
Heiner Roetz points out, "the rules of well-mannered social intercourse are 
themselves part of his message" (92). We may use Goffman's "impression 
management" (Prgsen%zfzo?z of SeZf208) to describe the "rituals" involved when one 
presents oneself in relation to other interacting partners, but I feel the phrase "ethos 
projection" could be equally appropriate, especially since it also deals with the 
question of how to present one's self. However, this is where we may see, again, the 
distinction between Western and Chinese ethos. 
^ Prom headings in C/wnzae edited by Ivanhoe and Van Norden (28-29). 
82 
Western ethos, points out Baumlin, is projected through the "identification of 
a speaker with/in his or her speech" (xi), which I may take liberty to interpret as a 
projection based on the definition of the text. Because text in Western society is 
treated as something to be "owned" by the writer or speaker, the "definition of the 
text" is thus, in my view, indeed the "definition of the self," but only from the point 
of view of the writer or speaker, who is responsible not only for creating, or 
manipulating, text, but also for presenting his or her ethos. In a way, Western ethos 
is all about self-projection or self-representation. 
4. The definition of the Other versus self-projection 
I wouldn't say that a Chinese writer or speaker is not responsible for text production 
or ethos projection, but such responsibility in Chinese society doesn't necessarily 
translate into self-projection or self-representation. The practice of collective 
workmanship in classical Chinese rhetoric, as mentioned earlier in the paper, would 
have rendered irrelevant the idea of text ownership, the "material" basis for defining 
ethos as self-representation in Western rhetoric. The doctrine of ritualization (Zz), 
which I have just discussed, would have de-emphasized self-projection for the sake 
of "ritual propriety" (Ivanhoe, SeZf OwZfzmfzoM xi), deemed quintessential to the 
realization of harmony and social order in Confucianism. More importantly, 
Confucius's Zz demands that one carry his/her conduct strictly in accordance with 
the "definition" of the social occasions where one interacts with others. This would 
mean that the presentation of one's self (or ethos, face, image, etc.,) would have to 
involve the participation, and even approval, of other people. In this sense, we 
probably can rephrase the "definition of the situation," upon which a Chinese ethos, 
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or face, is projected, as the "definition of the Other/' so as to distinguish from the 
"definition of the self," which, as I have argued, underpins Western ethos. 
Earlier, I mentioned that the CCR practitioners had engaged in "patterned 
rhetoric" and identified themselves in writings with tradition and other cultural 
establishments, a case in which the definition of the Other, one may argue, could 
have been undermined because of the apparent absence of social interactions 
necessary for such a definition. But practicing a patterned rhetoric in writing was 
indeed following a path paved by the Other, not one's own (often in the name of 
"originality"), and identifying with tradition or other cultural establishments was 
actually invoking the authority of the Other in securing one's own ethos. So, the 
definition of the Other would still apply, albeit not directly. 
5. Cheng-yan, the Confucian ideal of good rhetoric 
Another phrase in Chinese rhetoric close to the meaning of "ethos" would be dzezig-
y#», as suggested by Lu Xing in her groundbreaking work, R&gforzc m AncWf Ckma 
(175). The word could mean "honest talk," "genuine discourse," or, using Lu's own 
translation, "sincere speech" (AM.). American scholar Kennedy argues that the 
"moral lightness of the message" among others would constitute Chinese ethos in 
classical texts (Comparable RWonc 151), a point that resonates with Lu's c/zerzg-yaM in 
my opinion. And Lu writes: 
In his work, Mencius^ highlighted the persuasive power of cheng y an, 
claiming, "There has never been a case when total sincerity cannot move 
^ Mencius (390-305 B.C.) has been widely considered the second most important figure in the founding of 
Confucianism. 
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others. Without sincerity, one cannot move others" (M 4a 12.161). Thus, for 
Mencius, cheng y an referred not only to sincere and honest speech, but also 
to an innate moral quality out of which sincere and honest speech naturally 
and powerfully arise in our efforts to influence one another. Therefore, his 
understanding of cheng y an was similar to Aristotle's notion of ethos, in that 
cheng y an is an indication of ethos and serves as the most effective means of 
persuasion. (Aid.) 
I am not certain whether ckeMg-yarz, taken as an indication of one's "innate moral 
quality," would match Aristotle's notion of ethos, which, we all know, is taken as a 
mode of artistic proof (i.e., rhetorical creation) in Aristotelian rhetoric (e.g., Kennedy, 
CZassmzZ R&efonc 68), but because of the ethical dimension it points to, dzmg-yaM 
could be the closest link in bridging the gap between Chinese and Western ethos, 
especially in terms of how to create the perception of trust. In a sense, Mencius's 
"sincerity" (in ckeM^-yan), used as means to "move others," is just another word for 
the notion of "trust" embedded in Western ethos. 
Despite some similarity, c/ifMg-ya» also distinguishes from Western ethos, in 
at least two ways. First, it is "both the means to an end and the end itself of 
communication," according to Lu Xing (jR&gtonc m Afzczmf C/zma 175), whereas in 
Western rhetoric ethos is largely seen as a persuasive strategy. Perhaps we can 
compare c/zeM^-yarz to Burke's "identification," which, I have argued, can be taken as 
both a strategy and goal of communication. Confucius himself had put much more 
emphasis on "sincerity" or "sincere talk" as a moral principle, but one of his 
statements, to be quoted in the following, seems to indicate the principle can be used 
as both the goal and the strategy: "A gentleman ought to dedicate himself to 
cultivating virtue and establishing glory. Because sincerity helps one improve on 
virtue, rhetoric must be used to build that sincerity,^ which, in turn, would pave 
the way to one's achievements."^ 
Heiner Roetz believes that "sincerity" has played "an important role in the 
Confucian concept of rWorz'c" (92). His argument that it is "the prerequisite of a good 
and not only strategic rhetoric" (AM.) seems to support Lu's view that ckeMg-yaM is 
"both the means to an end and the end itself of communication." But a good rhetoric, 
says Roetz, can "[dispense] one from the need to convince the other" because, he 
quotes Xun Zi,^ " 'even if others should not be convinced, one would still be held in 
esteem by all of them' [because of one's sincerity]" (AM.). Thus, the ends of 
Confucian rhetoric, we may see, are much more important than its means, which I 
think proves a significant point of distinction from utilitarian rhetoric as commonly 
practiced in the West. 
I am not saying that Western utilitarian rhetoric is not, or less, interested in its 
ends (utilitarian rhetoric, by definition, is "goal-oriented"), but it does not 
deliberately separate its ends from means (persuasive strategies) or treat means as if 
they were in a less important position, as seems to be the case with Confucian 
rhetoric, let alone singling out "sincerity" as the goal of rhetorical practice. 
^ "Rhetoric must be used to build that sincerity" comes from "ziw-ci /i g; c/zeng," which can also be translated 
as "rhetoric oriented towards trust." 
^ My translation, based on the original Chinese version in 77# Comp/efe Fowr Boot; and Five CZoMics wz'fA 
Awzofadorw, edited by Han Lu, et al. See "Wen-Yan Zhuan," Z&ow M (439). 
^ Xun Zi (298-238 B.C.) is arguably the third most important figure in the founding of Confucianism. 
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6. The performative function of language 
Second, and probably more important, the idea of dzmg-y#» in Confucian rhetoric 
focuses more on the appeal of language (i.e., yan) than on the very person who 
speaks or writes it, contrasting the emphasis placed on the appeal of the writer or 
speaker as a person in Western rhetoric. One explanation could be that "Confucians 
have always linked their concept of speech to that of right conduct and have, 
accordingly, seen one's language as a mirror of one's inner morality" (AM.). That is to 
say that some sort of unity could be assumed between external language and internal 
morality in the Confucian concept of rhetoric (which sounds pretty much like 
Platonic rhetoric): the focus on language would mean the focus on those who use it. 
However, if we look at Confucius's "rectification of names," which I have discussed 
elsewhere, we may see the "performative function of language and its 
interdependence with social convention" (Graham 23) are weighing more in the 
Confucian moral system than the very person who speaks the language. For 
Confucius and his followers like Xun Zi, language was not just a medium for 
describing Zi, it was also a social practice that constitutes (part of) Zi. That is why they 
were so concerned about correctness in names (i.e., language), which they believed 
would lead to one's moral correctness because of language's structuring impact on 
human behavior. 
Thus, we may have two implications to address with regard to cZzmg-yan. One 
is that language, as a social practice, mediates one's conduct (e.g., through Zi). The 
emphasis on "sincere speech," not on "sincere personality," in Confucian rhetoric can 
therefore be seen as a recognition of the "regulative function of language" in shaping 
"people's attitudes and inclinations to act" (Hansen 59). The other, also related to the 
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first, is that the emphasis on language would imply that human agency, if any, is 
playing a lesser role (at most) in the Confucian vision of "good rhetoric/' in contrast 
to the Platonic, which "seeks to discover and express the truth of the soul" on the 
premise of "the moral and, ultimately, theological inseparability of the speaker-agent 
from the speech-act" (Baumlin xiii). Confucian thinkers, such as Mencius and Xun Zi, 
did talk about human agency, but it was not so much about selfhood in an individual 
as about "human nature" in general terms (van Norden 103-34). 
Ckeng-yan, for its appeal to language, has presented a far cry from Western 
ethos, which, as Baumlin points out, is stressing "the inclusion of the speaker^s 
character as an aspect of discourse, the representation of that character in discourse, and 
the role of that character in persuasion" (xvii). And I'd like to add that understanding 
Chinese ethos as "sincere speech," not as "sincere personality," is also consistent with 
a rhetorical tradition that has been de-emphasizing the role of the individual in 
discourse practices. 
To sum it up, I have given a general description of Chinese ethos in this 
section by exploring, mainly, two concepts in Chinese rhetoric: face and ckmg-yaM. 
Face can be used for the purpose of protecting the self-esteem of an audience (i.e., 
face saving). So, rhetorically, it works to make the audience look good rather than the 
speaker, as has been the case with Western ethos. At the sociological level, face can be 
seen as a function of the "definition of the situation," to use Goffman's terminology. 
Because of its implicit emphasis on the involvement of other people, face may well be 
regarded as a function of the "definition of the Other," in contrast to the "definition 
of the self," which characterizes Western ethos. Cbrng-ya» mirrors Aristotle's ethos 
when it comes to the notion of "trust." However, ckgMg-yan also implies the 
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Confucian ideal of a good rhetoric, therefore distinguishing itself from Aristotle's 
ethos in the sense that the latter is treated as no more than a mode of "artistic proof/' 
Further more, ckeng-yo» embraces an understanding of the power of language in 
regulating a person's social behavior and moral attitudes. Finally, the emphasis on 
sincere language, instead of sincere personality, can be interpreted as a reflection of a 
tradition that depersonalizes discourse or rhetoric. 
Ethos of the Heavenly 
1. The concept of Heaven 
Any Westerner who has an extended exposure to classical Chinese rhetoric will be 
struck by the "Chinese obsession" with Heaven (fwm in Chinese), and Heaven-
related notions, like the Mandate of Heaven, Will of Heaven, Way (i.e., Dao) of 
Heaven, etc. (The Mandate of Heaven can be thought of as the ultimate ethos only 
an emperor or king could lay claim to.) In many ways, Heaven was to the Chinese 
what God was to the Christians in Western countries (Goldin 51-4).^ But despite its 
"omnipresence" in ancient Chinese texts, the concept of Heaven didn't appear as 
clearly articulated in those texts as the Christian God did in the Bible. Ironically, the 
conceptual vagueness of Heaven often proved a rhetorical "advantage" to many of 
CCR practitioners, who would (ab)use Heaven to argue the unarguable and explain 
the unexplainable. 
Heaven was meant to represent many things in ancient Chinese thought: 
Lord-on-High, a cosmic moral order in the sense of the Dao, a physical object in the 
^ According to Ivanhoe and Norden, Heaven in pre-Qin China was "nof primarily thought of as a place," and 
was "not connected with any explicit views about an afterlife" (360), which may serve as a point of distinction 
from the Western concept of Heaven. 
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sense of the sky opposite to the earth, a metaphysical entity representing Yang 
complementary to Earth as Ym, nature, human nature, fate or destiny, just to name a 
few. The multivalent meaning of Heaven may indicate a conceptual evolution it had 
gone through in early Chinese thought. For example, in the early Zhou^ period 
(1066-771 B.C.), Shun Kwong-Loi points out, Heaven "was thought to be responsible 
for various natural phenomena, to have control over human afairs, and to have 
emotions and the capacity to act" (15). In addition, it represented "a source of 
political authority" for the Zhou king to rule, hence the Mandate of Heaven (f%m-
mmg) (AM.). But in the late Zhou, Heaven came to be known as a force for 
"rewarding the good and punishing the evil/' and for "the preservation and 
destruction of states," a change that implies that the king was not the sole 
beneficiary of Heavenly authority (unless he behaved!) (16). During this period, 
Heaven was also seen as "the source of norms of conduct," so that a moral basis 
could be established for "the observance of Zi" (AM.). 
2. Heaven and the Dao 
Whatever the differences in view of Heaven, the general consensus among 
scholarship seems to be that for Confucius the term referred to "a supreme, personal 
deity," but after him it was more and more associated with "a superior moral force 
or nature" (Ching 80). In the latter sense, Heaven came close to the concept of the 
Dao, the ultimate principle of governance in the universe for all of the beings and 
non-beings. In many classical texts, Heaven and the Dao were used interchangeably 
to denote the order of the divine or the natural, believed to be above or beyond that 
^ Zhou refers to the Zhou Dynasty in Chinese history, roughly from 1066 to 221 B.C. The later Zhou included 
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of the human. But very often Heaven would serve as an attendant notion of the Dao 
to suggest that the visible or the nameable (i.e., Heaven) is, ultimately, a reflection, 
and part, of the invisible or the nameless (i.e., Dao). For example, in his essay "On 
Heaven" Xun Zi argued that "Heaven is governed by a constant Way (f%m yow d%mg 
dao),"^ making it clear that Heaven is dependent on the Dao; in Dao De /mg Lao Zi 
claimed that "the nameless is the beginning of heaven and earth" (ch. 1), thus 
implying that "Heaven and earth are not the ultimate" (Schwartz 196). 
In early Chinese thought, the term Dao was also used to refer to a variety of 
subjects, covering a range of references greater than Heaven. Philosophically, 
especially in the school of Daoism, it was often meant as a metaphysical concept to 
represent the ultimate, which by definition remains "completely beyond human 
perception" (Kohn 46), hence the ineffable Dao. In a way, this may add to the 
explanation why the concept of Heaven could be ambiguous (i.e., when used in 
association with the ultimate Dao). 
3. The Dao, Truth, and Western logocentrism 
In the rest of this section, I will mainly discuss the centrality of Heaven to the 
projection of ethos in ancient China and the raison (f'efre behind it, but before that, I 
would like to give a little background information concerning the position of ethos 
in classical Chinese rhetoric. First, let me start with a passage from Dao De /mg in 
which Lao Zi describes the Dao: 
the "Spring-Autumn" (722-481 B.C.) and Warring-States (403-221 B.C.) periods, often likened to the Axial 
Period in the West by historians. 
^ My translation, based on the original Chinese version in Sekcfed /kcWrngj From Famous CAtnese 
fMojo^Agrj, Vol. 1, edited by Shi Jun (208). 
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Look, it cannot be seen—it is beyond form. 
Listen, it cannot be heard—it is beyond sound. 
Grasp, it cannot be held—it is intangible. 
These three are indefinable; 
Therefore they are joined in one. 
From above it is not bright; 
From below it is not dark: 
An unbroken thread beyond description. 
It returns to nothingness. 
The form of the formless, 
The image of the imageless, 
It is called indefinable and beyond imagination. 
Stand before it and there is no beginning. 
Follow it and there is no end. (ch. 14) 
The passage by Lao Zi could be easily dismissed as "elusive" by someone with a 
"positivist" attitude, but actually it addresses several important philosophical issues 
being echoed in the postmodernist movement in the West. And what strikes me 
most is the extraordinary similarity it shares with the Vacuum Genesis theory in 
modem physics, which declares literally, and bluntly, that the whole universe 
simply started from "absolute nothingness/'^ There is probably no need to elaborate 
on the "eternal emptiness" of the world from the point of view of Daoism, which 
^ See "The Creation of the Universe," PBS, October 28,2003. 
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may turn out quite a distraction from the major theme of the chapter, but 
nevertheless we can still draw implications from Lao Zi's passage relevant to issues 
of language and rhetoric. 
First, the Dao, or the ultimate reality, is considered beyond reach in early 
Chinese thought in that it cannot be "seen/' "heard/' "held" or even "imagined." If 
we compare it with the transcendental truth framed in the Platonic fashion, we may 
see the immediate difference. For Plato believes that truth, like "the great power of 
geometrical equality among both gods and men"(BH 100), is accessible to humans if 
a rigorous reasoning, modeled after his dialectic, is conducted. It is known that 
Western philosophy, since Plato, has been driven by what Derrida calls 
"logocentrism" (11), phrased after the Greek term Zogos (i.e., logic, reason, language, 
etc.,), but what has been celebrated in the logocentric tradition is indeed Plato's 
idealistic notion that absolute truth can somehow be determined. 
To say that absolute truth is beyond reach is one thing, but to say that such 
truth does not exist in early Chinese thought is another. In fact, the Dao is just 
another word for absolute truth. However, unlike their Greek counterparts, who 
were so possessed with rational demonstration in their quest for truth, supposedly 
independent of human intervention, ancient Chinese thinkers (at least the vast 
majority of them) appeared to take a "let-it-go" attitude towards truth so that they 
could redirect their energy to using what had already been accepted as true, like the 
Dao, to promote their moral or political agendas. It seems that Graham sums it up 
quite well: for Confucius and Lao Zi, "problem-solving without useful purpose is a 
pointless frivolity" (7). Or, perhaps we can rephrase it: the approach to truth in early 
Chinese philosophy is based on "a pragmatic [,...] not a logical or empirical 
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justification," to borrow terms from Johnston (4). "Logically," we can further draw 
two conclusions here: 1) the pragmatic approach to truth yields more space for 
rhetorical actions (or skw in Chinese); 2) such an approach blends rhetoric (study of 
the conventional^) and philosophy (study of the truthful) into one instead of 
separating them. That is why, says Kowal, Dao De /mg can be read as "a work of 
rhetoric" as well as a treatise on philosophy (364). 
Second, Lao Zi's message can also be interpreted as a recognition that 
ultimate Truth, if any, cannot be conveyed through language, simply because it is 
"indefinable," and "beyond description." Again, if we compare Lao Zi with Plato or 
Aristotle, we can see the difference between them. Though Plato has been known for 
his hostility to rhetoric, he never abandons rhetoric altogether. 
(Or, put another way, he can't separate rhetoric from philosophy.) What is more, he 
believes that "the truth behind appearances can be delineated" by a discourse that is 
"more analytical, objective, and dialectical" (Bizzell and Herzberg 56). So, what he 
really denounces is the emotive, or irrational, elements that he thinks can induce 
"flattery" (BH 96). Clearly, Plato privileges logic, or logos (as Derrida would call it), 
the defining element of a "good rhetoric." We know that Aristotle has made a 
vigorous defense of rhetoric, placing it as "the counterpart of Dialectic" (BH 151), 
but, like his teacher Plato, he, too, privileges logic, as is made clear in his statement 
that "enthymemes [...] are the substance of rhetorical persuasion" (Awf.). In many 
ways, Aristotle's R&gfonc can be read as "a popular 
logic" among others (Cooper xx). That Plato and Aristotle and, by extension, the 
By "the conventional" I imply the cultural. A good example would be the use of Heaven in Chinese ethos, 
which can be seen as a cultural phenomenon. I will further explain this later in the section. 
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logocentric turn of Western philosophy privilege logic seems self-explanatory: It 
operates, conceptually, on the premise of truth; whoever knows how to apply 
logic grasps, in Derrida's words, the "signifier" and "signification of frwffz" (10). 
4. Logic and its position in Chinese rhetoric 
While the absolute was absolutely "indefinable" in language to Lao Zi and other 
thinkers, I wouldn't say that logic, as a special language formulation, was 
completely alien to early Chinese philosophy and rhetoric alike, but rather that it 
just did not enjoy the status it did with Plato, Aristotle, and other Greeks. For 
example, as Schaberg has demonstrated through his analysis of passages in Zwo 
Zfzzwm, "the syllogism was among the techniques of proof available to early Chinese 
speakers and writers." He uses the following form as an example: "one who is the 
object of awe, concern, modeling, and imitation has wezyz [i.e., dignity and 
deportment]; King Wen^ was the object of awe, concern, modeling, and imitation; 
therefore King Wen had wezyz" (41). 
What seemed to distinguish the Chinese from the Greek is that the former 
generally didn't share the same degree of "rigor" with the latter, for two reasons. 
One is that Chinese writers or speakers were more pragmatic: if everything else is 
already made clear, then "the conclusion [...] is left implicit;"^ the other is that the 
Chinese preferred to have "logical demonstration" (apodezzzs) and "showy display" 
(gpzdezxzs) "intertwined" in texts (z'6%f.), a point that appears to confirm what I have 
^ Founder of the Zhou Dynasty (1171-1122 B.C), widely regarded as a sage-king in Chinese history. 
^ For a Chinese, something like "All swans are white, and this is a swan" could be enough, as the conclusion, 
"Therefore this swan is white," is self-evident and therefore can be left unsaid. This may in part explain why 
many Chinese find it perplexing that writings in the West frequently demand a "conclusion." As an added note, 
Aristotle prefers to leave the premises implicit because of the concern that "a tight logical argument is not 
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suggested: the pragmatic approach to truth blends the rhetorical and the 
philosophical. But overall, it seems, early Chinese writers or speakers would pay 
more attention to the rhetorical; as Schaberg points out, rhetorical "elegance" is 
"paramount" in the texts of Zow Zbwm and Go% Yw (30). 
Aside from some sporadic pieces of "logical" writing collected in the 
aforementioned Confucian classics, it is generally agreed that pre-Qin China did see 
a brief episode of "rationalism" represented by Mo Zi (480-420 B.C.) and his school 
of thought, Mohism. While Mo Zi and his followers didn't formalize logic in the 
Aristotelian sense, their "logical sophistication" (Graham 137) has been widely 
recognized by both Chinese and Western theorists. The early Mohists were 
primarily concerned over "problems of morals and government," but the Neo-
Mohists extended their inquiry into such areas as "logical puzzles, geometry, optics, 
mechanics, economics" (zW.). Nevertheless, the Mohist school of thought has been 
traditionally "dubbed" as an anti-Confucian, therefore anti-establishment, 
movement. Thus, despite a brief period of thriving in the pre-Qin period, its position 
in the development of Chinese philosophy has remained at best "secondary" (7), if 
not marginal. 
Because of a renewed interest in Mohism and other schools of rationalism 
(like the School of Naming) in recent years, many contemporary Chinese scholars 
feel the urge to correct the "misconception" Western scholars have entertained: 
namely, "Chinese rhetoric is not interested in logic" (Lu, RWonc m Af%cze?zf CMwz 
31). For example, in 1997, Dong Zhi-Tie compared Aristotle's logic with Chinese 
effective in rhetoric" (Kennedy, CZa&Hca/ /(Aeforic 71), seemingly contrasting the Chinese preference for an 
implicit conclusion. 
"naming" and "arguing" (largely based on Mohism), and reached the conclusion 
that the latter, despite its lesser degree of formalism (190), represents "the study of 
logic in ancient China" (4). Lu Xing, for another example, argued that Western 
theorists have been wrong in using their own terms to judge Chinese rhetoric, in 
that they are "unfamiliar" with tenus in Chinese "associated with the classical Greek 
meaning of Zogos" (37). 
I would have to say these Chinese scholars do have some merits in their 
arguments, but elevating Chinese rhetoric (i.e., naming and arguing in pre-Qin 
China) to the "logical" status may suggest, on their part, a misunderstanding of the 
cultural, intellectual context with which classical Chinese rhetoric had been 
developed. As discussed earlier, the absolute truth, and its determinability by 
humans, has formed part and parcel of Western philosophy, hence the tradition of 
logocentrism, but such has never been the case with Chinese thought—at least in 
classical times. Because the mainstream philosophers, who were also rhetoricians, 
were "pragmatic" about truth, they were, generally, not particularly interested in 
logic, both as the "signifier" and "signification of truth" by Western standards. Yes, 
logic or logos did have its presence in CCR texts, but it was rarely considered the 
substance of rhetoric because of—for the most part—the rhetor's "faith" in the 
"incontrovertibility" of "received definitions and texts" (Schaberg 42). And based on 
my own readings of classical texts, even a rationalist like Mo Zi would frequently 
have to resort to "Heaven" to hammer out his argument. So, in my view, the 
assessment by some of the Western theorists, such as Oliver, that "Chinese rhetoric 
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is not interested in logic" is basically "&z" (acceptable),^ even though it may sound a 
bit belittling to those who are attempting to "rationalize" classical Chinese rhetoric. 
Once more, this doesn't mean that "the Chinese do not speak or write in ways that 
presume the facticity of assertions. It is only that there is little interest in raising the 
issue of facticity or literalness to the level of speculation and theory" (Hall and Ames 
135). 
By now I may have risked a "digression" from the main topic of the paper, 
but I think it is important for readers to see how ancient Chinese differed from 
Greeks in their attitudes towards logic and its application in rhetoric: logos. For, 
only when we understand that logos was never as privileged in CCR as it was in 
Greek rhetoric, then can we better appreciate the fact that ethos has taken center 
stage in traditional Chinese rhetoric. Hall and Ames argue that "the Chinese have 
been more apt to argue along patfzos- and gfbos-based lines than to employ objective 
Zogos-style argumentation" (z'bzd.), a view echoed, in part, in Kennedy's Comparofzre 
RWorzc, which suggests that Chinese rhetoric is "strong in ethos" (151). He does not 
say that logos "was not privileged" in CCR, but his statement that "Deductive 
argument in the form of enthymemes seems underdeveloped" at least suggests that 
logos in CCR was not held with the same amount of enthusiasm as in Greek 
rhetoric. However, Kennedy also contradicts Hall and Ames by stating that Chinese 
rhetoric "generally avoids pathos except in military exhortations and in some of the 
more severe announcements or instructions" (zW.). As far as pathos is concerned, 
^ The word (acceptable) was characteristically used in classical Chinese texts when a judgment was called 
for, in contrast to the frequent use of "true" or "valid" in similar situations in Western texts. This may also serve 
as an example to show that ancient Chinese in general were not particularly interested in strict logical 
demonstrations. For practical reasons, what is "acceptable" would have a wider range of applicadons than what 
is "true" or "valid" based on logical demonstration. 
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my impression is that it has been as much applied in Chinese rhetoric as it has in 
Western rhetoric, but it has not yet arrived at the status of ethos in Chinese rhetoric 
just as it hasn't the status of logos in the West. Since pathos is not the concern of this 
paper, I would like to avoid further statements on the issue. 
5. Ethos as a cultural construct 
The seemingly unshakable "faith" in received wisdom or knowledge that Schaberg 
mentioned may have constituted a rhetorical strategy in itself. Because it "must 
never open to question," such a faith, Schaberg contends, "encouraged a looseness 
of form in proofs" (42). For pragmatic reasons, an argument using Heaven to "bluff" 
others would be easier to make than the one relying on a rigid process of rational 
demonstration, which could well turn out to be—for Heaven's sake!—a linguistic 
"drab," given the cultural penchant for rhetorical elegance. I would like to add that 
the faith in the past, as a tradition, is still being observed in todays s Chinese 
rhetorical practice, notably, for its emphasis on "repeating set phrases and maxims, 
following patterns, and imitating texts" (Matalene 804).* 
Besides being pragmatic, the emphasis on received wisdom or knowledge in 
CCR can also be seen as signifying a conscious effort on the part of a rhetor to utilize 
what had already been culturally accepted, or established, in constructing an appeal 
to his audience, a point that I have made earlier when speaking of the collective 
nature of Chinese ethos. But, we may see, ethos as such is essentially a cultural 
construct—based on the invocation of tradition. The faith in the wisdom of the past 
could be an indication of an intellectual tradition (indeed a cultural tradition), but 
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the variables of such wisdom, such as the Dao, Ym-Yong, Heaven, Confucianism, 
etc., are all of cultural formulations of an early Chinese tradition distinct from that of 
the West. That is why ethos projected based on such wisdom is a cultural, and 
therefore collective, construct. Kennedy points out that the "tradition of the 
ancestors who continue to watch the living" plays an important role in creating 
Chinese ethos (151), which, I think, confirms the significance of the cultural in 
shaping how the Chinese choose to present their ethos (through the ancestral 
lineage, for example). But in what follows, I will mainly concentrate on the tradition 
of using Heaven as the ultimate source of appeal in classical Chinese rhetoric, which 
is probably more revealing about the culture-dependent aspect of Chinese ethos. 
For obvious reasons, whoever could appropriate the power of Heaven or 
place himself under the "blessings" of Heaven would conveniently have ethos in his 
hands to do what might otherwise be thought of as morally incomprehensive: for 
example, usurping the throne or conquering another kingdom. That is why every 
founder of a dynasty in Chinese history would invariably claim to inherit fwrn-Mzmg 
(the Mandate of Heaven) for "the establishment of new regimes" (Lu, R/zetorzc m 
Anczmf Cfzzw 50) and kings or emperors would never hesitate to claim the title of 
fwm-zz (the Son of Heaven) to ensure their authority as "the ultimate rulers of human 
affairs" (55). Sfzz Jz»g (the Book of Poefry) contains numerous lines describing how 
King Wen, founder of the Zhou, had been granted a "command" (fmg) from Heaven 
^ This may help explain, at least in part, why the issue of plagiarism has never been culturally serious in 
Chinese society. 
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to overthrow the Shang^ and to establish his own dynasty, as seen, for example, in 
the stanza of Da Ming: 
The Mandate came from Heaven 
Commanding this King Wen 
To rename the kingdom as Zhou and establish its capital in Haojing 
And to marry an heiress from the state of Shen. 
She later bore King Wu, 
The elder son [of King Wen] who continued the course [of the farther]. 
Blessed by Heaven, he [King Wu] carried on the Mandate, 
Coordinating military attacks against the Great Shang.* 
Apart from Skz /mg, Sfwmg Skw (the Boot of Documents), and other classics, has 
similar passages showing how King Wu had used the Mandate of Heaven to "spin" 
his political ethos, as seen, for example, in a "motivational speech" given to his 
generals and soldiers: 
Heaven always shows its mercy to the people, and the ruler must obey the 
Will of Heaven. Jie of the Xia^ disobeyed Heaven above and therefore caused 
grave calamities all over on Earth. That is why Heaven granted its Mandate 
^ The Shang Dynasty (around 1600-1066 B.C.). King Zhou, the last ruler of the Shang, is historically perceived 
as personally responsible for the demise of the dynasty because of his "wicked" rule. In SVzz and other early 
classics, he often serves to exemplify how a bad ruler is doomed by the Will of Heaven. 
* My translation, based on the original Chinese version in 77# Few Five CTa&sicj wzfA 
AmmokzAo/», edited by Han Lu, et al. See "Da Ya," Jmg (753). 
^ Jie, the last king of the Xia Dynasty, established around 2100 B.C. and conquered by the Shang around 1600 
B.C. Historically, Jie, together with Zhou (earlier mentioned in a footnote), is a typical example of despotism. 
But unlike Zhou, the existence of Jie is not positively supported by historical evidence. 
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to Cheng Tang^ to terminate the Dynasty of Xia. Today, the crimes of the 
king [Zhou] far exceed those committed by Jie. He persecutes the innocent 
and sends them into exile; he punishes and butchers his ministers who try to 
voice an honest opinion. He claims to have the Mandate of Heaven, yet dares 
to say that to revere Heaven is useless, that sacrificial ceremonies produce 
nothing good, and that his despotic practices won't hurt society. He is thus 
not far away from his own demise, as shown by the example of Jie. That is 
why Heaven confers the turn on me to rule the country. Plus, the dream I 
dreamed accords with the signs revealed through divination: They both tell 
good fortunes ahead, predicting an inevitable victory over the Shang. It is 
true that he has followers in millions, but they are shallow and ignorant. It is 
true that I have only ten ministers, but they are highly capable, knowing fully 
well how to govern the country and having a strong determination of 
working together for me. Surrounding oneself with crowds of cronies is 
nothing compared with leading a few men defined by virtue. 
My people have witnessed what Heaven has witnessed [i.e., the ills of 
the day]; my people have heard what Heaven has condemned. If the people 
are complaining [of the social ills], I cannot stand aside; I have the sole 
responsibility to react. Now, I will lead my troops to charge forward.^ 
While it may not be necessary to do a lengthy rhetorical analysis to point out the 
complexity of modes of appeals King Wu used and to show their relation to the 
historical, cultural context in which the audience was addressed, it is important to 
know that the quoted passage from SfwiMg displays the presence of a high level 
^ Founder of the Shang, one of the legendary sage-kings in Chinese history. 
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of rhetorical technique long prior to the time of Confucius.*' For instance, logic, 
especially in the Aristotelian category of "historical example" (BH 147), was applied 
in the argument to show that the Shang Dynasty would be doomed because of its 
despotic king, Zhou. The usage of "example" could be summarized as this: "King Jie 
disobeyed Heaven, hence the destruction of his dynasty. Now King Zhou is 
disobeying Heaven; his dynasty is approaching an end, too." There is little doubt 
that King Wu was using this "example" to legitimize his military attacks against the 
Shang as well as to advise his listeners that victory would be on his side in the end. 
However, we may also sense a subjugation of logos to ethos in the speech for 
the fact that the use of logic is dependent on the spin of Heaven—the basis of King 
Wu's ethos or, in Schwartz's words, "the ultimate source of the king's authority" 
(29). In fact, the whole argument would collapse if his ethos could not be sustained 
by the invocation of Heaven. For example, if Heaven did not exist, or Heaven did 
not punish Jie (but rather Jie caused his own failure), then it will be useless for King 
Wu to present his ethos, in the speech, as the inheritor of a heavenly mandate (as in 
"Heaven confers the turn on me to rule"), which will in turn render "invalid" the 
application of a "logical" example that links Jie's fall to the prospect of Zhou's fall. 
(At least, there is no way to tell that Heaven chooses King Wu to execute its 
Mandate.) But what appears to be ludicrous to a modem mind made perfect sense to 
King Wu and his audience, because the king's claim "to a special relation to 
Heaven" had been quite established in early Chinese thought for both "political" 
^ My translation, based on the original Chinese version in 77# Comp/efe Fowr and Five C/a&ricj wifA 
edited by Han Lu, et al. See "Tai Shi (middle section), Book of the Zhou," SAang SA% (1434). 
* SAang SAw is historically classified as a pre-Confucius classic, though Confucius and his disciples may have 
plaid a role in its editing or even revising. 
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and "religious" reasons (43). In this sense, we might say as well that King Wu's 
ethos—in the name of the Mandate of Heaven—is a cultural construct of his time. 
Schwartz and Ching, among others, have both traced the permeance of 
Heaven in Chinese culture and its association with kingship in Chinese thought to 
the practice of shamanism in the early stages of Chinese civilization. "The 
emergence of Ti [Heaven]""" with its supreme power, speculates Schwartz, "may be 
associated with the theological meditations of shamans and other religious 
specialists who were in the royal entourage" (30). In that "motivational speech" just 
cited, King Wu's accusation that King Zhou did not revere Heaven may be seen as a 
recognition of Heaven's "ultimate sovereignty" (zW.) over all humans, under 
heaven including the king. The mentioning of "sacrificial ceremonies" and 
"divination" by King Wu is suggestive of the fact that practices of a shamanistic or 
religious nature in the early stages of Chinese civilization were used to reveal the 
power of the divine and to confirm "the king's claim to a monopoly of access to Ti" 
(z'W.). 
In Mysfzczsnz amf Kzngs/zzp zrz C/zzrza, Ching points out that Chinese kings of the 
early ages were often "shamanic figures" themselves (xiii).^ For obvious reasons, 
those "shamanic kings," as well as "their heirs," "fabricated the tales of divine 
ancestry," creating the "mystical" role of kingship as "mediator between Heaven 
and Earth" (xii-iii). The legends of "sage-kings," who have "semi-divine attributes 
and the ability to maintain communication with the divine" (67), were indeed the 
invention of "later times," possibly by Confucius, Mencius, and other pre-Qin 
* Ti, also D: or SAamg-Di in Chinese (i.e., Lord on High), was the god worshipped by people of the Shang 
Dynasty. It was replaced by Heaven in the Zhou Dynasty, but with the meaning remaining the same. 
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thinkers, who created the "myth" of sage-kings "for the sake of having real rulers 
emulate such mythical figures" (xii). Confucians and the like may have created the 
"sage-king" myth for the purpose of promoting their own moral or political 
agendas, but in doing so, we may infer, they were also, wittingly or unwittingly, 
institutionalizing the office of kingship, together with its "heavenly" authority, just 
as those shamanic kings in the earlier period had used sacrificial ceremonies, 
divination, ancestral worship, and other ritualistic practices to institutionalize their 
rule over all under Heaven. In a way, this may explain why Confucianism "was 
declared the official creed of the nation" by the court of the Han (in the second 
century B.C.), and Confucian Classics "became the principal study, if not the sole, of 
all scholars and statesmen" in post-Qin China (de Barry, et al. 19). But perhaps we 
are witnessing something even more significant here: the institutionalizing 
(Confucianism) finally turns into the institutionalized. 
Though Ching does not use the word "ethos" to describe the authority of the 
king's "mandate," the following excerpt is quite telling in terms of how ethos was 
created for the king and how it was institutionalized for its own sustention: 
. . .  t h e  c h a r i s m a  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  s h a m a n i c  e c s t a s y  c r e a t e d  t h e  a u r a  f o r  t h e  
office of kingship, giving it a sacred, even a priestly character. But this 
charisma was eventually institutionalised and routinised, by a line of men 
who no longer possessed the gifts for summoning the spirits and deities. To 
support their power, however, they frequently resorted to the suggestion of 
charisma and of divine favour. They fabricated tales of divine or semi-divine 
^ For example, the author cites a study by the Japanese scholar, Kato Joken, as saying that King Wen and his 
son, King Wu, were both "shamans" (17). 
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origins; they consulted with the deities and spirits through divination, 
sacrifices, and other rituals. Such examples abounded in the rest of Chinese 
history, (xii) 
It probably won't change the semantics of "charisma," "aura," or "divine favour" if 
we substitute them here with the rhetorical term "ethos." But what is more revealing 
is the fact that the power of early Chinese kingship clearly depends on the creation, 
or fabrication, of ethos or, in Ching's words, "charisma," "aura," "a sacred and 
priestly character," etc. The association of ethos with "power" helps explain why it 
(i.e., ethos) was eventually "institutionalised and routinised," but we may push the 
argument further: i.e., the reason that ethos is institutionalized is exactly because it 
partakes in the process of institutionalizing kingship and its power, hence the 
conclusion that ethos and power, or the institutionalizing and the institutionalized, 
are implying each other—and are intertwined! 
Perhaps we can push the argument even further: If logos is the "signifier" 
and "signification" of truth in the Western tradition of "logocentrism," then ethos is 
certainly the "signifier" and "signification" of power in the Chinese tradition of 
what I would have to call "ethocentrism."^ The notion of ethocentrism, I believe, 
should explain, in the fundamental way, why ethos has taken center stage in the 
development of Chinese, especially classical Chinese, rhetoric. (With this 
ethocentrism in mind, Westerners may better appreciate why the concept of face, 
* I probably need to give a little clarification here. By ethos as "signifier" of power, I clearly mean that ethos 
has the function of signifying the power, say, of Chinese kingship; by ethos as "signification" of power, I mean 
such power is also implied in the process of the signification, for example, in the case of institutionalization. 
And I believe Derrida is suggesdng the same—truth is signified by logos and at the same time is implied by 
logos. Or, I might put it this way: because of truth, that's why we have logos as signifier; because of logos as 
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which is also ethos, has been carrying such a massive weight in the life and thought 
of the Chinese.) 
6. Ethos as an institutionalized discourse formation 
Because of the crucialty of shamanic ethos (or charisma) to sustaining the power of 
kingship, the creation of such ethos, which we might say is a discourse practice or a 
function of discourse practice using postmodernist jargon, was well incorporated 
into the institutions of the early Chinese dynasties. For example, the Shang Dynasty 
set up the offices of D%o-B% and Z/wm specially to take charge of divination, and the 
ww (i.e., shaman) at the time was the official bureaucrat responsible for mediating 
between gods or spirits and humans (Guo 208). In the Zhou Dynasty, the sbamamc 
bureaucracy became even more complex and more powerful,* given the status 
ranked second only to the king. In fact most of the six highest-ranking offices, such 
as Tm-Zkw (Grand Invocator, in charge of sacrificial ceremonies), Tm-Bw (Grand 
Diviner), and Tm-Zomg (Grand Genealogist, in charge of recording royal lineage), 
were directly responsible for religious or shamanic practices (265). The bureaucratic 
system of the Shang or the Zhou went of course beyond the periphery of 
shamanism, but we could see that the system was quite dedicated to mystifying and, 
in doing so, sustaining, the authority or power of kingship—with the suggestion of 
divine or heavenly charisma, aura, etc., associated with the state-run,^ 
institutionalized apparatus of signification, such as divination and sacrificial 
signification, that's why we have truth. Likewise, because of power, the Chinese king has ethos to signify it; 
because of ethos as signification, that's why the Chinese king has power! 
* Ching believes that "religious fervor had greatly diminished" during the Zhou times (8), but I doubt it 
happened right away in the beginning of the Zhou. Since the Zhou covered a span of over 800 years, it's more 
likely (and even certain) that religious or shamanic practices played a lesser role in the political system in the 
later periods of the dynasty. 
107 
ceremonies. And the remark made by King Wu, in a speech quoted earlier, that "the 
dream I dreamed accords with the signs revealed through divination" can thus be 
taken as a strategy of ethos signifying his relation to Heaven and, as such, implying 
his Heaven-related power as well. 
The "bizarre machinery"—as Foucault would call it (135)—involved in the 
process of signifying the ethos and therefore power of early Chinese kingship is a 
good example to show what Foucault has illustrated in his 77# ArckaeoZogy of 
KnowWge: namely, discourses are institutionalized formations (as in the case of 
heavenly ethos in China), "made possible by a group of relations [...] established 
between institutions, economical and social processes, behavioural patterns, systems 
of norms, techniques, types of classification, modes of characterization" (44-5). 
However, he also suggests that the power of institutions, etc., cannot escape the 
"totality" of discourse (55) because, after all, discourses are "practices that 
systematically form the object of which they speak" (49). I would rather not dwell on 
Foucaulf s discourse theory, but it is important to point out the obvious: i.e., the 
mutually defining relationship between the institutionalized (discourse) and the 
institutionalizing (authorizing institutions) that Foucault has identified is applicable 
to what I have just argued about the "ethocentric" nature of the system of 
signification in the early ages of Chinese civilization, where ethos and power were 
mutually implying each other.* 
Schwartz points out that the king is "in some sense the 'high priest' of the worship of Ti [Heaven]" (35). 
* The fact that the power of kingship is implied by a system of signification suggests that the system can 
sometimes override the power of the king. For example, according to James Legge, yi/mg (the of 
CAangej, used as a divination manual) has intimations that "only defensive war, or war waged by the rightful 
authority to put down rebellion or lawlessness, is right," that "the younger men [...] would cause evil if 
allowed to share [power] with the oldest son," etc., (77# 7 CAmg 24), suggesting that the king has to follow what 
has been unveiled though divination, or signification. Similarly, Ching points out that the kingship system, 
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So far, I have explained the central position of ethos in the development of 
traditional Chinese rhetoric by focusing on its intertwinement with divine power in 
early shamanic or religious practices that often served to link the authority of 
kingship to that of Di or Heaven, a point that may, simultaneously, help account for 
the central!ty of Heaven to Chinese ethos. I wouldn't say shamanism in early 
Chinese culture was "utter nonsense,"^ but it is more important to see that its 
practice as a way of signification was reflective "of the needs or desires of society 
and institutions and of available methods [...] of coming to know something," to 
quote Bizzell and Herzberg (1127). The unique historicity of the early shamanic or 
religious practices, of the methods of knowing and signifying characteristic of such 
practices, and, finally, of the association of ethos with power intimated with such 
practices and methods ought to lead us to conclude that Chinese ethos, as a 
discourse formation, is—fundamentally—a function of a cultural heritage, rather 
than a creation of a personal making. 
7. A philosophical paradigm 
The fact that Heaven has played such a crucial role in creating Chinese ethos may 
prompt one to speculate whether or not the rampant (ab)use of Heaven in classical 
texts might have something to do with a humanly desire to appropriate Heaven to 
"boost" the ethos of the writers working behind those texts. While the king may 
control the access to Heaven, it is a fair game for anybody else to say that he has the 
zfzz (knowing) of how Heaven operates, for example, in terms of punishing the evil, 
which includes the system of signification, "became a factor that restrained a ruler's arbitrary exercise of 
authority, and sometimes functioned as an ultimate control over state power itself' (34). 
The fact that so many Chinese and Western scholars are still fascinated by M /wig, which was written starting 
the 12th century B.C. as a divination manual, should be quite telling about the shamanic wisdom. 
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or bringing down good to those who have diligently obeyed or the 
Mandate of Heaven. (In many cases, the king would need such explicatory spins to 
support his authority.) Dong Zhong-Shu^ (1797-104? B.C.), the leading Confucian 
scholar of the Han Dynasty,** once said: "[To know] is to predict accurately... The 
person who knows can see fortune and misfortune a long way off, and can 
anticipate benefit and harm" (qtd. in Ching 5). So, we can infer, from the statement, 
that the zfzz in ancient Chinese society implied some sort of knowing about Heaven 
(as in "see fortune and misfortune a long way off" or "anticipate benefit and harm"), 
and it was not monopolized by the king. In the Awzkcfs, Confucius has been 
presented as someone who knows the Dao (Way) of Heaven (Ivanhoe and van 
Norden 2), blessed by "a special relationship with Heaven" (Ching 79), which I think 
can be taken as a rhetorical move on the part of his followers to add to the appeal of 
the Great Master. Sometimes Confucius claims that he is the one who understands 
"the Mandate of Heaven," and lashes out at "the petty person" for failing to 
appreciate the Mandate (e.g., Ivanhoe and van Norden 43; 50). But again we may 
interpret this as a strategy of ethos, used to legitimize his moral mission to restore 
the Zz of the early Zhou times, which the historical Confucius believed was "the 
Golden Age of humankind" (Ivanhoe and van Norden 1). 
But perhaps a more "logical" explanation regarding the "high-frequency" 
occurrence of Heaven in classical Chinese texts, one seemingly supported by 
documentary evidence, is the philosophical longings among the ancient Chinese for 
"seeking a higher consciousness of oneness with the universe" (Ching xiii), which 
* Dong is credited as the most important figure in Chinese history for establishing Confucianism as the official 
creed of the nation. 
^ The Han was the first post-Qin dynasty in Chinese history, lasting from 206 B.C. to 220 A.D. 
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may be rephrased as something like "maintaining harmony with nature/' "striving 
for unity between man and nature, and between man and the Dao/' etc. The idea is 
that the humankind is part of nature or the universe, and therefore is, like anything 
else, governed by Heaven as a "guiding Providence" (de Barry et al. 17). This sort of 
idealism, believed to form a philosophical paradigm in early Chinese thought 
(Ching 99-131), underpins almost all the schools of philosophy in pre-Qin China, 
particularly, Daoism and Confucianism. 
For Daoism, "Heaven's net casts wide," with nothing to slip through "its 
meshes" (ch. 73). It advocates "caring for others and serving heaven" (Lao Zi ch. 59) 
and "realiz[ing] one's true nature" by leading a life of "simplicity," "cast[ing] off 
selfishness," and "temper [ing] desire" (ch. 19). Its ideal of ww-wez (i.e., doing-
nothing) (ch. 2) is sometimes seen by Westerners as "nihilistic," but actually it 
carries a political message for rulers, for example, in advising them against using a 
heavy hand in governing (ch. 58). Morally speaking, ww-wez cautions people not to 
be obsessed with material gains, for the "Tao [Dao] of heaven is to take from those 
who have too much and give to those who do not have enough" (ch. 77). The 
nihilistic overtone probably comes from the notion of "non-striving" as embedded 
in WM-Wez, but, as Merton explains, Daoism is actually emphasizing conforming 
one's action to the "divine and spontaneous mode [...] of action" of the Dao, the 
"source of all good" (24). So, philosophically, we may say, the ideal of ww-wez, and 
Daoism at large, has formulated "an expression of the continuum between the 
human being as the microcosm of the universe as macrocosm," to use words from 
Ching (xi). 
I l l  
The Dao of Heaven^ stands at the core of Confucius' call for the return of Zz, 
and for moral rectitude. For the Great Master, the consummate ritual system (Zz), 
established by the Zhou founders, King Wen, King Wu, and the Duke of Zhou,^ has 
carried within it "a set of sacred practices" (Ivanhoe and van Norden 1) embodying 
the Dao of Heaven. So, his teachings on Zz can be regarded as an attempt to "lead his 
fallen world back to the Dao, 'Way/ of Heaven" (2). Once Confucius claimed, 
"though my studies are lowly, they penetrate the sublime on high. Perhaps after all I 
am known—by Heaven,"^ thus linking his teachings to the order of the divine. 
Another time he uttered, "If I have done anything contrary to the Way, may Heaven 
reject me! May Heaven reject me!"^, implying that the Dao of Heaven is the ultimate 
guiding principle for all human actions. But then what is the Dao of Heaven for 
Confucius? Let us take a look at an excerpt from the AnaZecfs to get a clue: 
Confucius said: "I wish I did not have to speak at all." Tzu Kung [his student] 
said: "But if you did not speak, Sir, what we disciples pass on to others?" 
Confucius said: "Look at Heaven there. Does it speak? The four seasons run 
their course and all things are produced. Does Heaven speak?" (Section 17)* 
The word dao literally means "path" or "way" in Chinese. It is used metaphorically to refer to some sort of 
transcendent governing force of the universe in Chinese philosophy. The Dao of Heaven (Awt-dao), which 
occurs in the AnoZects (Section 5), could have two connotations: one is that Heaven itself is governed by the 
Dao; the other is that Heaven is representative of the Dao. Either way, we can see that Heaven serves as an 
attendant notion of the Dao, pointing to some kind of absolute truth beyond. 
^ The brother of King Wu (1043-1036 B.C.). After King Wu died, he served as the prince regent, resisting the 
advice of many to usurp the throne, hence widely regarded as a paragon of virtue by later generations. 
Historically, he is more significant for his role in establishing and perfecting the rituals and institutions of the 
Zhou Dynasty, the model for to Confucians. 
^ From Sowrcej of CAifiese WWom, edited by de Barry, et al. (22). 
^ From in C&zMKxzZ CYzifzgje fAiZojop/zy, edited by Ivanhoe and van Norden (18). 
* From Sowrcej of CAmeae WWo/M, edited by de Barry, et al. (30). 
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The Great Master seems to pose a paradox for himself by suggesting that true 
knowledge is not to be taught or learned but rather comes directly from Heaven,^ a 
point that rings quite similar to Socrates' "soul knowledge."^ For, if this were true, 
his sacred mission of transmitting the wisdom about the Dao of Heaven would 
certainly lose its practicable basis. That aside, we may sense that Heaven referred to 
by Confucius is indeed "a natural order" (de Barry, et al. 17), which does not speak 
but yet reveals itself through the cycle of four seasons,^ growths of ten thousand 
things, etc. For Confucius such an order carries norms (as in the "season-comes-
season-goes" cycle), or messages of the Dao, which he believes must translate into "a 
moral order" (zW.) in society. So, the idea of Zz, as discussed earlier, is really about 
the norm of human behavior, as seen, for example, in his motto: "Rulers must act 
like rulers, subjects like subjects, fathers like fathers, and sons like sons." 
In a word, Confucius' teachings, like Lao Zi's, At into the philosophical 
paradigm described earlier of ancient Chinese thought: the oneness of Heaven and 
humanity (f%m-rgM fze-yz). But Daoism and Confucianism have different leanings: 
Daoism, in general, is more interested in transcending humanity to the Dao of 
Heaven, whereas Confucianism is more intent on applying the Dao of Heaven to 
this world, focusing on what is right for human mortals.^ The "Dao," as Schwartz 
points out, has thus become "Confucius' inclusive name for the all-embracing 
normative human order" (63). 
^ This may show Confucius' indebtedness to Daoism, famous for its speaking-the-unspeakable paradox. 
^ See, for example, the Memo (in CoWecfed DWogwej of P&zfo), where Socrates says that "the truth about 
reality is always in our soul" (371), and that "there is no such thing as teaching, only recollection" (364). 
^ Using the phenomena of four seasons, day and night, life and death, etc., had been a cliché among ancient 
Chinese thinkers to show the existence of a natural order and, further, of the governing force of the Dao. 
* This may explain, in part, why Daoism later, for the most part, deteriorated into mystic, and even 
superstitious, practices whereas Confucianism came to enjoy the status of state orthodoxy. 
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8. Oneness of ethos and logos 
If we take a closer look at Heaven used in Daoism or Confucianism and Heaven in 
earlier shamanic practices as the ultimate source of ethos for the king, we may soon 
realize that these two "Heaven's" actually refer to two different concepts: in the 
former case, Heaven represents an impersonal, natural process, more or less in the 
category of truth (e.g., transcendent truth) whereas in the latter, Heaven is a personal 
god, or a supreme deity, more or less in the category of power (e.g., the power of 
awarding the good and punishing the evil). In this sense, the word "Heaven" has 
symbolized what Westerners would see as an antithesis: an "active conscious will" 
and the "source of universal order" (Schwartz 51) or, to put it in a philosophical 
way, "the category of ontological creativity" and "the categories of the primary 
cosmology" (Neville 72). 
Many hypotheses have been proposed to solve this philosophical or non-
philosophical puzzle, ranging from the dismissal that the Chinese mind doesn't 
know the distinction between theism and non-theism to the admiration that it is 
more "inclusive" and "balanced," therefore able to reconcile what appears to be 
irreconcilable to the Westerner (e.g., see Neville 48-74). I have no intention to get 
into the debate, but just wish to point out the obvious, something I have mentioned 
earlier in the section: namely, Heaven had gone through a conceptual evolution in 
early Chinese thought, for example, from Lord-on-High worshiped by the Shang 
people to the "source of norms of conduct" revered by Confucians. Undoubtedly, 
such an evolution has caused a semantic "problem" for Heaven as a concept—its 
ambiguity, one of those "corrupting elements" that a positivist feels ought to be 
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purged for the sake of "the reasonableness of discourse/' points out Bennett (244). 
However, citing Kenneth Burke, Bennett argues that ambiguity can actually prove 
an advantage, in that it "makes possible the transformation by means of which a 
symbolic act develops" (247). The analysis by Burke of the speeches on love in the 
P/wWrws, says Bennett, illustrates this advantage: Because of "the ambiguity of 
'love'," that is why the transformation in speech, from erotic love to divine love and 
finally to "the principles of loving speech," can be made possible (248). 
Likewise, the reason that the ancient Chinese used Heaven to refer to two 
seemingly antithetical concepts is because "Heaven" as an ambiguous term had 
materialized a conceptual transformation. Just as the Western "love" could mean 
both "erotic love" and "divine love," the Chinese "Heaven" could be used—with a 
degree of comfort—to represent an "active conscious will," as well as the "source of 
universal order." We probably can imagine what would happen next because of the 
"heavenly" ambiguity (which I believe has opened wider space for rhetorical 
maneuvering): The king, or Son of Heaven, can utilize Heaven to symbolize his 
power sanctioned by the divine, as well as his moral authority derived from the 
order of the universe. I wouldn't say that "the central!ty of kingship" (Ching 36) in 
Chinese society (until the 1911 revolution) has been completely built upon the 
ambiguity of Heaven as a conceptual term; however, it is important to realize how 
Heaven, with its dual association with the divine and the cosmic, has played a 
central role in formulating a discourse that has transformed the king into "the 
paradigmatic individual, reflecting in himself so much of that which is greater than 
himself: the universe as an organic whole, vibrant and alive" (66). 
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Perhaps more significant, and more relevant to philosophy and rhetoric alike, 
is that the Chinese "Heaven" has blurred the line of demarcation between ethos and 
logos. If ethos signifies power and logos truth, as has been discussed earlier, then we 
might say that Heaven signifies both, because of its conceptual ambiguity or dual 
association. That is to say, Heaven can be used as both ethos and logos, and for both 
rhetorical and philosophical purposes. I have already explained the centrality of 
Heaven to Chinese ethos, which I think is essentially in the rhetorical category 
because of its conventional, or cultural, nature. The idea of Heaven used as logos 
seems self-explanatory if we go back to what was discussed a little earlier: namely, 
humanity as implied in the heavenly, a moral order in the natural, the transcendent 
in the cosmic, etc., for all of these can be categorized as truthful and therefore 
philosophical.^ 
The following passage, from the fowr Tezfs of ffze YeZ/ow Emperor, may 
exemplify Heaven's ethos/logos ambiguity: 
As for the principle of [human] affairs, it depends on whether one complies 
with (the way of heaven) or rebels against it. If one's achievement 
transgresses (the ways of) heaven, then there is punishment by death. If one's 
achievement is not enough as heaven requires, then one retreats without any 
^ How to decide what is true or not true is really an epistemological or methodological (e.g., scientific 
demonstration) issue. Since différent cultures may have different epistemological approaches, it's important not 
to set a universal standard on the issue. The Dao, which is regarded as the absolute among the Chinese, may 
appear ludicrous to the Western mind; the Platonic Truth, which may have an enduring appeal to Westerners, 
would make little sense to the Chinese, not to mention the fact that Plato failed to discover it himself, except in 
theory or through the suggestion of mathematical models. It is known that mathematical equations have led to 
the proof of the Big Bang, but nothing further. That is, the Absolute is still elusive to all of us. However, I 
would regard those equations as truthful, even though they are not truth themselves. Those Chinese ideas, like 
humanity implied in the heavenly, may sound untrue to a Westerner, but they are true or truthful to the Chinese 
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fame. If one's achievement accords with heaven, one will thereby attain great 
fame. It is the principle of [human] affairs. One who complies will enjoy life; 
one who follows the principles will succeed; one who is rebellious will suffer 
death; one who loses [will have no] fame. (1.8.2)*° 
In the first place, the passage may be summarized as something like "follow the Dao 
of Heaven," in that it advises the reader to act in compliance with Heaven. In this 
sense, Heaven is used as logos because it represents a moral order guiding human 
behavior, something the ancient Chinese would accept as true. However, if we take 
a closer look at the passage, we may sense that it is actually advocating the doctrine 
of the Golden Mean, advising people against being too aggressive or too shy in 
getting what they want. Thus, the repeated use of Heaven can be seen as a strategy 
of ethos for the purpose of adding to the appeal of the message. (That is, even 
though less appealing, the message itself still stays if the author did not use Heaven 
in the text.) What is more, Heaven is invoked for its power in punishing those who 
rebel and awarding those who follow—a clear indication of ethos being applied. I 
may appear over-stretching in my explanation, but what seems clear is that 
Heaven's role as logos or ethos is ambiguous in the text. 
The oneness of ethos and logos is not uniquely Chinese. The fact that Plato 
tried to split philosophy from rhetoric but failed to do so suggests that the truthful 
simply cannot be separated from the conventional or cultural in the first place. And 
the famous aphorism by John Keats, "Beauty is truth, truth beauty," actually points 
and approached as such by Chinese philosophers. That's why I categorize them as the philosophical and treat 
them as logos. 
From Chang and Feng's 77# Fowr Po&ficaZ Treofwej of f&e y<eHow Emperor. See Section 8, Book I (139). 
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to an awareness in the West of such oneness^ long before the postmodernist 
movement. But due to the dominance of logocentric thinking, the issue has largely 
been ignored in the Western rhetorical/philosophical tradition. I have argued that 
the Chinese were pragmatic in their attitudes towards truth; they blended the 
rhetorical with the philosophical, the conventional with the truthful, instead of 
separating them, thus making it possible for ethos and logos to become one, as seen 
in the application of Heaven in early Chinese writings that has bridged the gap 
between the two seemingly different categories in the West. We may use a simple 
diagram for illustration: 
Transcendent Truth (universal order) Logos 
71 hi 
Heaven One (Heaven) 
S 71 
Divine Power (conscious will) Ethos 
Figure 1.1. Diagram of oneness of Chinese Heaven 
According to Kenneth Burke, human beings are capable of both using and 
misusing "verbal symbols," which can in turn become the "realities of human 
existence" (Bennett 243-^). This would imply language practice, as a symbolic or 
signifying action, creates meanings that may not cohere with reality in the true 
sense. Further, it suggests that language itself may even imply or constitute reality, a 
point that early Chinese thinkers, such as Confucius and Lao Zi, would have fully 
appreciated. Indeed, Heaven would be a good example to illustrate how a language 
symbol can be (mis)used or (ab)used to create reality far beyond our imagination. 
The fact that Heaven had permeated through Chinese culture for thousands of years 
I suspect that "Power is knowledge" would be another example of such awareness in the West. 
118 
may point to the triumph of a language symbol and the reality created with such a 
symbol, despite its conceptual ambiguity. Finally, I would like to point out that the 
oneness of ethos and logos is indeed the triumph of ethocentrism in that it indicates 
that the rational appropriation of logos cannot be set apart from the irrational, 
conventional, rhetorical, or cultural projection of ethos—philosophy in the end is "in 
defense of un-reason" (Bennett 243). 
To sum it up, I have explored, in this part of the chapter, the concept of 
Heaven and its central role in defining Chinese ethos. To put my explication in 
perspective, I have also discussed rather extensively the central!ty of logos, or 
logocentrism, in the Western tradition, in comparison with Chinese ethocentrism. 
Just as there are historical, cultural, or epistemological reasons behind logocentric 
thinking in the West, the ethocentric turn in Chinese rhetoric has to be appreciated 
in light of a cultural tradition that carries its own historical complexities and 
philosophical intricacies. As I understand it, the significance of Heaven in defining 
Chinese ethos points to a unique cultural heritage shaped by a collective human 
desire in seeking "a higher consciousness of oneness with the universe" (Ching xiii). 
Historically, Heaven symbolizes, and has been institutionalized into, the power of 
kingship because of its dual association with the divine and the cosmic in Chinese 
culture. In the former case, Heaven represents the ultimate ethos that only a king or 
emperor can lay claim to; in the latter, Heaven intimates the order of the universe 
that a king or emperor can appropriate to secure his moral authority over (all 
under heaven). And because the order of the universe (the Dao, indeed) is 
conceptually dose to what might be called the absolute, or Truth, in Western 
ideology, Heaven can be said to represent the truthful in the philosophical sense. 
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One may thus conclude that in ancient Chinese discourse, the concept of Heaven 
blends into one power and truth, ethos and logos, and, finally, rhetoric and 
philosophy. 
Conclusion 
This chapter discusses the central topic of the dissertation, collective ethos, with an 
in-depth look at "face" and "heaven," two of the defining issues in regard to ethos in 
classical Chinese rhetoric. While it is impossible to exhaust discussions on the 
subject, what has been presented here ought to give readers some idea as to how 
Chinese ethos had evolved on a track rather different from the Western tradition, 
especially when we think of it as a collectively shared cultural heritage. 
Like Western ethos, the concept of face deals with the question of how to 
present oneself, with concern over one's image, credibility, etc. It has also been used 
as a persuasive strategy by rhetors to influence their audience's attitude and action. 
What distinguishes Chinese face from Western ethos, however, is that the former is 
largely projected through involving the participation, and approval, of other people, 
hence the "definition of the Other," which, broadly speaking, can be interpreted as a 
social process of making one's face or image fit into the frame of expectations set by 
a community. In contrast, traditional Western ethos is often projected through the 
"identification of a speaker with/in his or her speech" (Baumlin xi), understood to 
be the creation of a personal making. It is true that a Western rhetor has to adjust his 
or her own ethos, rhetorically, to the demands of the audience and situation, but 
such adjustment is largely motivated by a drive for self-representation (e.g., making 
one look good) rather than by an expectation that one should follow the 
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crowd—behaving like others. So, the "definition of the self befits ethos in the 
Western tradition. 
The collective nature of Chinese ethos is perhaps better understood when we 
look at how the creation of ethos had been incorporated into the institutions of early 
Chinese society, where rulers would engage in shamanic or religious practices to 
signify, and mystify, their power and authority with the suggestion of divine and 
heavenly charisma. The reason that Heaven was so central to the projection of ethos 
on their behalf is because it was deeply rooted in a cultural psyche, where the desire 
for heavenly transcendence had long been harbored. So, in the end, the significance 
of Heaven in defining the ultimate ethos in Chinese society can be appreciated as a 
function of a cultural tradition. 
Before ending this chapter, I want to make it dear again that I didn't mean to 
exhaust all the explanations about collective ethos in dassical Chinese rhetoric. 
Personally, I feel the investigation is far from over, espedally since I already have 
other topics in mind, like Confudus' self-cultivation and rectification of names. The 
idea of self-cultivation has its political and moral purpose of restoring Zz, but it also 
points to the ideological differences between the East and West in view of the 
individual and its relationship to sodety at large. In Chinese culture, the self has 
been traditionally played down, which could add to the explanation why it has been 
out of the picture where Chinese ethos is concerned. Investigating what Confudus 
and his followers had to say of the virtue of self-cultivation and their impact on the 
rhetorical practices of later generations might shed additional light on 
understanding collective ethos from a cultural point of view. 
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The notion of rectification of names has been another important feature that 
defines the Confucian discourse system. The famous statement by Confucius that "If 
names are not rectified then language will not be in accord, if language is not in 
accord then things cannot be accomplished ..." can be regarded as a blunt 
acknowledgment that language plays a role in shaping how one can reach moral 
accomplishments. More importantly, it also implies a denial of agency, deemed to be 
crucial to the formulations of Western ethos, in that language is recognized for its 
potential in regulating human behavior. We are who we are not because of some 
kind of essence within, as Plato might have claimed, but because of the epistemic 
function of language in formulating moral and metaphysical categories and in 
creating social reality based on those categories. Confucius's rectification of names 
poses an interesting comparison with Foucaulf s poststructuralism, which also 
rejects human agency, together with such notions as self, ego, subject, and 
individual. 
What was discussed very early, in the beginning section of the chapter, of 
"patterned rhetoric" in classical Chinese texts is also a subject worthy of further 
research and discussion—because, in my view, this phenomenon is not uniquely 
Chinese. One may find numerous examples in professional writings in the West that 
fall into the category of patterned rhetoric, such as memo, letter, proposal, report, 
just to name a few. Also, those who submit articles for publication in a scholarly 
journal cannot afford to ignore conventions and formats. It is common to see a 
research paper written in a "patterned" way: for example, starting with an 
introduction of a topic, then a review of existing literature, followed by a new 
thought that would contribute to the current discussion, then a research design 
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and/or methodology, followed by research findings, followed by a discussion 
drawing on the findings, and finally followed by a conclusion in which some sort of 
"confession" is the norm—how imperfect the findings are, how inconclusive the 
conclusion is, how much remains to be done, etc. All these would remind me of ba-
writings (eight-legged essay) in old China! 
But what interests me most is the question whether the patterned rhetoric 
mentioned here would also translate into a consciousness of collective ethos with the 
mainstream Western rhetoricians. With the rise of postmodernism, which has 
seriously challenged the philosophical basis of self, ego, human agency, etc., and 
with the rapid advancement of Internet technology, which has already put to 
question the traditional notion of authorship, it seems possible that more and more 
people will realize that rhetoric as social praxis is indeed a collective action, hence 
the need for "the projection of ethos to the communal level," as Holloran has once 
pointed out (qtd. in Harris 125). At this point, perhaps a more prudent answer 
should be: "Lef s wait and see." 
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CHAPTER 3 
ETHOS ONLINE: A CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 
An online text should still be considered a rhetorical text, in the sense that it has to 
be persuasive one way or another in order to induce some kind of action in a 
reader: for example, purchasing a product or service, leaning towards a new 
attitude, or simply getting interested in the content of the text. It is rhetorical also 
because the creation of such a text takes into consideration purpose, audience, 
context, etc., elements that shape the production of ordinary discourses, such as a 
speech presentation or a scholarly writing. The reason I'm speaking of an online text 
as rhetorical is because this would lead to what I'll try to explore in this paper: i.e., an 
online text involves the use of rhetorical ethos, which varies from culture to culture 
just as rhetoric in general does from culture to culture (Robert Oliver 358). 
One may argue that an online text is more than rhetoric in that it involves the 
use of digital expression as in the case of multimedia, where various communication 
media such as graphics, audio, animation, and video are brought to play together, as 
we have often seen on the Internet. The implication is that rhetorical rules, including 
the use of ethos, don't necessarily apply online. But I would argue that when text 
moves from page to screen, it still falls within the realm of rhetoric simply because it 
has a mission of fulfilling communicative purposes. The difference, as Richard 
Lanham points out, is that electronic media "are essentially dynamic rather than 
static" (16). Lanham also argues, "Digital expression has resurrected the world of 
proverbial wisdom, but through vast databanks of icons rather than words" (37). 
So, it may be said, if traditional print text is a medium of rhetoric through written 
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words, then digital expression is a medium of rhetoric—more dramatic, 
apparently—through iconic presentations. 
In Greco-Roman times, rhetoric relied heavily on oral delivery for its 
effectiveness in persuasion. Based on Aristotle's five-canon definition, delivery is 
simply part of rhetoric, serving to present speeches with effective acting and vocal 
modulation. What is noticeable here is that the non-verbal (as in delivery) is not 
separated from the verbal in classical rhetoric. But, as we know, since print text 
replaced oral text as the principal means of transmitting knowledge in human 
society, the system of delivery has been frequently neglected or treated as if it were 
inconsequential in the practice of rhetoric. Naturally, when rhetoric becomes 
truncated, stripped of its non-verbal component, its effectiveness in persuasion can 
be called into question. 
Jay Bolter has argued that electronic text "more closely resembles oral 
discourse than it does conventional printing or handwriting" (58-9), which I take to 
mean, especially after reading his Wrzfmg Space, that an online text has incorporated 
what is generally missing in a printed text: the non-verbal. And, in the context of this 
paper, I would like to take one step further to suggest that digital expressions may 
have also restored classical rhetoric in the true sense of the word, by providing new 
means of delivery (e.g., multimedia) that cannot be realized through ordinary 
written words. 
At this point it seems "logical" to say that one of the rhetorical strategies, 
ethos, can be digitally enhanced online. In classic rhetoric, ethos is projected, at least 
partly, through delivery. Cicero once claimed that the orator must be "the 
consummate actor" so as to be able to "paint" his character (i.e., ethos) (BH 217; 
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240). That is to say, the presentation of one's ethos is also a function of delivery. I 
certainly have no intention to contend that ethos presented electronically would be 
the same in effect as that presented through oral delivery over two thousand years 
ago, but it is important to realize that the electronic text represents an expressive 
process that can enhance the projection of ethos through iconic manifestation. While 
the physicality of a Greek orator standing above the crowd delivering the appeal of 
his character with effective voice, gestures, and facial expressions may yet have a 
long way to go to become a digital reality, the promise of electronic media in 
creating an image, or ethos, through visual and sound manipulations certainly 
surpasses a printed page. In addition, the online ethos can be constantly recreated, 
remodeled, and therefore redelivered, an advantage that can never be matched in 
traditional print text. 
Having established the idea of ethos being projected through delivery, I now 
might be able to have more leeway to tackle the central topic of this paper: i.e., 
online ethos varies from culture to culture. This is because the question of delivery is 
also a question of cultural variance, which, I have every reason to say, impacts the 
way ethos is being delivered. 
In what follows, Til try to answer these four questions: 1) What is ethos?; 2) 
How does it vary cross-culturally?; 3) How does culture impact the delivery of ethos 
in visual arts and design?; and 4) How does online ethos vary from culture to 
culture? The question of how to define ethos has yet to be settled in rhetorical 
scholarship, so a brief theoretical introduction may be necessary for the purpose of 
clarification. The answer to the second question is framed from the Chinese 
perspective. Chinese ethos, as well as Chinese rhetoric at large, differs drastically 
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from its Western counterpart, which could serve as an example to illustrate how 
ethos can vary cross-culturally. The third question is tackled mainly from the point 
of view of visual delivery, whose cultural variations may directly impact the way 
ethos is created. The answer to the last question is meant to be practical—to analyze 
and compare online texts (Eastern and Western) to illustrate how ethos is delivered 
differently (or similarly, if I have to draw that conclusion) in Cyberspace across 
cultures. This section is not intended to be a "scientific" study, but rather an attempt 
to demonstrate the "typical," which, I admit, could be a very subjective choice. 
As a note of caution, I do not intend to present any sort of conclusive findings 
in this paper; rather, my whole purpose is to initiate further discussion on the topic 
so that we may better appreciate the fact that the online ethos is culturally 
constructed just as much as the offline is. 
I. Background 
Aristotle sees rhetorical persuasion as threefold, coming from logos, the appeal of 
logical reasoning, pathos, the appeal of emotional invocation, and ethos, the appeal 
of one's personal character. Of the three, says Aristotle, character "may almost be 
called the most effective means of persuasion" (BH 154). He explains, "Persuasion is 
achieved by the speaker's personal character when the speech is so spoken as to 
make us think him credible. We believe good men more fully and more readily than 
others: this is true generally whatever the question is, and absolutely true where 
exact certainty is impossible and opinions are divided" (BH 153). Ethos, it thus can be 
said, refers to a rhetorical strategy that "emphasized the role a speaker's character 
plays in persuasion" (James Baumlin xii). 
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However, traditional Western rhetoric seems to lack a consensus in terms of 
how to define that role, which is sometimes seen as relating to "the problematic 
identification of a speaker with/in his or her speech" (Baumlin xi). There have been, 
mainly, two versions of ethos in the history of Western rhetorical theory: One is 
Platonic, regarding ethos as an individual quality of a rhetor, independent of 
rhetorical manipulations; the other is artistic, treating ethos as something that can be 
created, and manipulated, through means of good sense, good will, and good use of 
language, as proposed by Aristotle in his RWonc. Obviously, the two versions are in 
conflict with each other. 
Strictly speaking, Plato himself never uses the word ethos, and his anti-
rhetoric stance may well give the impression that he is also anti-ethos. However, his 
emphasis on "true rhetoric" and the truthfulness of human character presented in 
that rhetoric suggest that he is just as concerned about how to identify one's self in a 
speech/writing as his sophist rivals, if not more than them. Thus, "by inference," 
says James Baumlin, one might still figure out "a Platonic definition" of ethos (xiii). 
To understand what counts as a Platonic ethos, we may need to look first at 
the Platonic or transcendent truth. Plato insists that such truth has nothing to do 
with the worldly (rhetoric included); however, he believes that humans were 
somehow in contact with it before their birth, "when [their] souls were with the 
Divine" (BH 55). The question is, How can humans possibly seek truth when they 
exist in the flesh? Plato offers his dialectic, "the whole process of rational analysis by 
which the soul was led into the knowledge of Ideas" (Hunt 64). Obviously, this is 
where the issue of character plays out, for one must be truthful to oneself in order 
to discover or express truth, an assertion made by Plato in both the Gorgzas and the 
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PfwWrws. Of course, in his eyes, only the philosopher, not the rhetorician, has the 
moral rectitude to be truthful. 
It is important to note that Plato's ethos, the truthfulness of human character, 
is also an embodiment of soul knowledge. As Baumlin points out/ since dialectic 
"seeks to discover and express the truth of the soul, then ethos describes the inner 
harmony among language, character, and truth—in Platonic fashion, ethos defines 
the space where language and truth meet or are made incarnate within the 
individual" (xiii). This is to say that the Platonic ethos is essentially incamationist, in 
the sense that it projects truth by relating to what is deep within the individual: the 
soul. 
We may never be able to determine what exactly Plato means by the "soul" 
in modem terms, but we can reasonably assume it is about some kind of immortal 
essence an individual self possesses within. If the Platonic ethos is individualistic, if s 
because it is premised, fundamentally, on the notion of an essentialist self in Western 
ideology, presupposing the existence of an eternal, static identity within the 
individual that can endure the vicissitudes of time and space (Baumlin xvii-xviii). In 
other words, ethos (the character of self and embodiment of truth) stands by itself, 
to be revealed through language, not to be created in language: Rhetoric has no role 
to play. 
Without doubt, Aristotle departs to a great extent from his mentor in 
conceptualizing ethos. Though he includes the aspect of moral character in ethos, his 
pragmatism gives rhetoric a much more significant role in connecting human 
character to the epistemic function of language. Aristotle argues that persuasion by 
means of ethos ought to be achieved by "what the speaker says, not by what people 
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think of his character before he begins to speak" (BH 153). Namely, the orator must 
construct his material (artistic proofs) to "make his own character look right" so as 
to "inspire trust in his audience" (BH 160; 161). So, in contrast to Plato who insists 
that the speaker's character must be upright for its own sake, Aristotle seems to say 
that it is sufficient to win an audience simply by making "ourselves thought to be 
sensible and morally good" (BH 161). To put it bluntly, the Aristotelian ethos can be 
faked. 
In sum, the Western tradition of rhetoric has been marked by a tension 
between the Platonic and the Aristotelian in terms of how to identify ethos. The 
Platonic ethos assumes the moral character of a speaker to be something innate, 
outside the confines of language and society, while the Aristotelian ethos reflects a 
rather pragmatic approach in discourse, stressing the need for a rhetorical 
reconstruction of human character. Or, we may say, the Platonic ethos entertains a 
philosophical essence, separable from the "flattery" of rhetoric; the Aristotelian 
ethos, on the other hand, incorporates the rhetorical, which in turn adds to, and 
even creates, the trustworthiness of a rhetor. 
H. Eastern Perspective 
However, as Baumlin suggests, throughout the history of rhetorical theory, the 
Platonic ethos appears to have had the upper hand over the Aristotelian (even 
though Aristotle himself is considered the framer of Western rhetoric), due to a 
logocentric tradition in ideology that "embraces [...] the philosophical model of 
selfhood over the [...] rhetorical model" (xviii). He writes: 
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Western culture, in other words, has largely identified itself with the tradition 
beginning with Plato and Isocrates and developed by Augustine, Aquinas, 
Descartes, Kant—all of whom treat the self as a moral, metaphysical, and 
ultimately, theological category (rather than as a function or effect of verbal 
behavior), (ibid.) 
Further, what appears problematic is that, even though Aristotle's ethos is said to be 
"quintessentially a linguistic phenomenon" (xxiii), it never gives up in its own 
categories the notion of selfhood or individualization—how to represent the 
character of an individual is still the central concern of the Aristotelian ethos. If the 
Platonic ethos is the projection of self through philosophy, then the Aristotelian 
ethos is largely the projection of self through rhetoric. That is, discourse has now 
become an instrument in such projection. So, no matter how we look at the Western 
ethos, it has always been seen as "the appeal of speakers or writers to their own 
credibility and character" (Covino &: Jolliffe 52), be it the Platonic or Aristotelian. I 
would add that the image of a Greek rhetor standing above the crowd and single-
handedly inciting his audience into actions might also have its imprint on the 
Western perception of ethos. 
By contrast in Chinese rhetoric, especially in classical Chinese rhetoric (CCR), 
there is no such concern as to the relations between human character and discourse. 
This doesn't mean that ethos has no bearing on Chinese rhetoric but only suggests 
that it takes on a different definition, with its sources (of credibility) shifted from self 
to non-self, or, to put it more specifically, from the individual to the collective, 
communal, and cultural, as I will argue in this section. It appears that when 
perceived from an Eastern perspective, Western ethos is anything but universal, 
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especially from the following three aspects of classical Chinese rhetoric: function of 
rhetoric, epistemology, and "bamboo hypertext." 
1. Function of rhetoric 
Instead of striving for individual welfare as seen in Greek rhetoric, classical Chinese 
rhetoric emphasizes the need for maintaining social harmony (Scollan and Scollan 
142), with its discourse production essentially depersonalized. If s hard to imagine an 
ancient Chinese rhetor (swi-te) standing above the crowd engaging in some kind of 
public speech or debate—not because the notion of democracy failed to prevail, but 
because such practice was simply out of character with the cultural themes of 
humility, collectivism, and adherence to social rituals. 
It must be pointed out that harmonic rhetoric should not be interpreted 
simplistically as avoiding conflicts or submitting to authority; rather, it is about how 
to position one's self in the world (society and nature) through the medium of 
language. To achieve harmony is ultimately to seek unity between man and the 
Dao, a cosmic moral order of being in ancient Chinese ideology. Rhetorically, this 
would mean denying an individual appeal on the part of the rhetor, who would 
have to appeal to culturally and historically established authority, such as ancestral 
lineage and the sage-kings like Yao, Shun, and Yu, for the purpose of establishing 
his ethos. The ancestral lineage would give the rhetor some kind of legitimacy in 
positioning himself in a social hierarchy. The sage-kings were thought to "maintain 
a divine afflatus" (Schwartz 26) and therefore have the power to perceive the Dao. 
Therefore, the appeal to such authority is essentially the appeal to the Dao, through 
which the rhetor builds up his persuasive power. 
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2. Epistemology 
Unlike Western rhetoric, which is predominantly logocentrically oriented, classical 
Chinese rhetoric never embraces the ideal of language as "an enterprise to 
represent or depict or describe an external reality independent of man and society" 
(Hans Lenk 6). Its primary epistemological function is to make distinctions of the 
world perceived to be an ontological Yin-Yang duality, rather than to express the 
certainty of transcendent truth as advocated by Plato and other Western thinkers. 
For a Westerner, language and reality can be separable; for a Chinese, language and 
reality are one, in the sense that we have to use language to make distinctions 
between Yin and Yang, good and bad, right and wrong, etc. Thaf s why Confucius is 
so obsessed with the "rectification of names" (zTzeng mmg), because he knows very 
well that such rectification can lead to the rectification of moral behavior. Within the 
Confucian (Daoist as well) system of ideology, discourse constitutes social reality. 
Now we can see that the epistemology underlying CCR is turning the 
Platonic ethos upside down. Because it never concerns itself with "an object-marking 
account of the way words relate to the world" (Hansen 71), truth has been a non-
issue in CCR, and the individual self, seen as an embodiment of truth in a Platonic 
definition, would thus carry little weight in presenting a rhetor's ethos. To put it 
another way, Chinese ethos does not have to serve as some kind of connection 
between the truthfulness of discourse and the truthfulness of human character. 
We can also see that traditional Chinese epistemology implies a denial of 
human agency as presupposed in a Platonic definition of ethos. For Plato, the 
objective discovery and representation of truth must be done by (or incarnated 
within) an individual self, but because truth is a non-issue in ancient Chinese 
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thought, the concern for human agency to exercise such objectivity is thus out of the 
question. Indeed, I would say that discourse production in ancient China is "agent-
less" in the sense that the speech-act itself has never been assumed to be something 
individual—not just because discourse is essentially depersonalized for the sake of 
maintaining social harmony, as mentioned earlier, but also because there has been a 
widespread recognition of language's structuring impact on human behavior. For 
Lao Zi, the "name" (i.e., language) is "the mother of ten thousand things" (1); for 
Confucius and his followers like Xun Zi, morality comes out of naming, not the 
other way around. All this would pose further challenges to the Western perception 
of ethos: If discourse practice is "agent-less," then where do we locate a rhetof s 
ethos? 
3. Bamboo hypertext 
Classical Chinese rhetoric can be metaphorically described as "bamboo hypertext" 
in that it shares many textual features that are normally associated with modem 
electronic hypertext, which, according to Jay Bolter, is "the interactive 
interconnection of a set of symbolic elements" (27). The reason I choose the term 
"bamboo hypertext" also has to do with the physical features of classical Chinese 
texts, as all of them were written (or occasionally carved) on bamboo strips. I have 
already argued elsewhere how classical Chinese rhetoric fits all those descriptions 
about hypertext: namely, non-linear, open-ended, collective, multi-accentual, 
interactive, and networked. In the following, I will mainly discuss how the "bamboo 
hypertext" phenomenon in CCR questions the Western definition of ethos in terms 
of authorship. 
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Almost all the Chinese classics we've seen today, like Lao Zi's Dao De /mg and 
Confucius' AmzZecfs were created as a collection of short essays, paragraphs, or 
sentences written and rewritten by the disciples, or disciples of the disciples, of Lao 
Zi and Confucius over a span of decades or even centuries. While the texts bore the 
name of Lao Zi or Confucius, as its official author as a token of respect from those 
disciples, as Mark Lewis suggests (53), the master himself may never have 
contributed a single written word to the collection (though it is popularly believed 
that those quotations by Lao Zi or Confucius had the master's imprint one way or 
another). 
Consequently, after the texts had passed through numerous hands, they 
would invariably become inconsistent or self-contradictory in both meaning and 
purpose due to the absence of individual authorship (or control). In addition, many 
disciples would use the master as a source of authority to create their own texts (or 
agenda, using today's political terminology) with degrees of deviation and variance 
from the predecessors depending on the then ideological climate and scholarly 
trends. The readers also took an active role in interacting with the texts, and very 
often they were even part of an ongoing process of textual transformation. So, if s 
not surprising to see that a classic Chinese work credited to a historic figure could 
have numerous "adulterated" versions. The problem, of course, comes from a 
collective authorship responsible for the production of "bamboo hypertext." 
What is significant about "bamboo hypertexf is that its authorship seems to 
break away from all of the "self-structure" (Marshall Alcom 3) associated with a 
Western ethos: character, personality, person(a), voice, image, and, above all, the 
self, none of which matters that much in classical Chinese rhetoric. Because of the 
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collective authorship that transcends time and space, a CCR text is typically defined 
by motion rather than by "momentary location" (Moulthrop 303). That is to say, it 
aims to dissolve itself, which would mean it also dissolves the kind of stableness, 
however relative, that a self-structure must have in order to establish ethos (Alcom 
3-35). 
Alcom says, "A theory of ethos needs to be grounded in a relatively clear, 
but also a relatively complex, understanding of the self" (4), but does this theory 
also apply to classical Chinese rhetoric? I would doubt it, for the reason that its 
collective authorship projects self-effacement rather than self-representation as 
commonly seen in Western culture and rhetoric. I wouldn't say there is no such 
thing as ethos in "bamboo hypertext," because a Chinese rhetorical text, like its 
Western counterpart, must establish certain trust or credibility in order to effect 
persuasion. Indeed, Confucius' "%z% cz Zz %z cWz," which can be translated as "rhetoric 
oriented towards trust," may exactly point out how important ethos is in Chinese 
rhetoric. But the difference is that Western ethos is created to gain trust for the 
rhetor as an individual, whereas Chinese ethos has a broader purpose of telling or, 
to use Lewis' words, "writing the masters" (53) instead of one's self. 
In this section, I have discussed the three aspects of classical Chinese rhetoric 
to illustrate how a Chinese ethos can differ from a Western one. The "function of 
rhetoric" part points out an important characteristic of classical Chinese rhetoric, 
depersonalization, which suggests that a Chinese rhetor must invoke culturally 
established authority, and ultimately the Dao, to create ethos. The "epistemology" 
part explains how truth is a non-issue in CCR; therefore, the individual self, which is 
supposed to be an embodiment of truth in the Platonic sense, would carry no 
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weight in generating ethos in classical Chinese rhetoric. The "bamboo hypertext" 
demonstrates at the discourse production level how a fluid, collective authorship in 
CCR defies the stableness of a self-structure thought to be necessary in formulating 
a Western ethos. 
EI. Ethos in Visual Arts and Design 
In the above two sections, I have briefly discussed how ethos has been defined in 
the Western rhetorical tradition and how a Chinese ethos appears to be a far cry 
from such a definition. In this section, I would like to explain, in passing, how the 
delivery of ethos can vary cross-culturally (mainly Chinese vs. Western) with focus 
on visual arts and design. But before doing that, I think it may be necessary to 
clarify what I mean by the delivery of ethos. To me, delivery implies creation: The 
two cannot be separated, just as we cannot separate the process of writing from the 
process of creating a fiction. Thus, in this section, and the following, the word 
delivery would mean creation or, specifically, "creation through visual delivery." 
Visual design has long been recognized for its rhetorical effectiveness, so 
much so that sometimes it is also known as "demonstrative rhetoric" (Buchanan 
91-109). Because of the need to attract (or sometimes to overwhelm) an audience or 
to affect its attitudes or emotions, principles of rhetoric have been widely used in the 
visual arts, such as sculpture, architecture, and painting (Vickers 340-74). The notion 
of ethos, accordingly, has found its way into the design of those arts, in which 
demonstrating good taste, good will, good skill, and good command of material is 
commonly considered a very important appeal to the audience (see, for example, 
Buchanan 101-3; Vickers 351-2). Designers, like architects, are sometimes known as 
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"builders of images" (Tafuii 103), which suggests that they are aware of their work 
being related to building up ethos (the "image" is a core component of ethos). 
How exactly ethos is delivered in visual design is probably a question only 
designers can answer. I would rather focus in the following on how culture impacts 
the way ethos is conceptualized (with visual examples, of course). The discussion will 
be divided into three parts: 1) the visual sublime, 2) the question of self-
representation, and 3) the notion of harmony. 
1. The visual sublime 
To make it clear, my purpose here is not to theorize about the sublime in design art, 
but rather to use it as an example to show cultural differences in the creation of 
ethos. The conception of sublime was, arguably, first proposed by the Greek 
rhetorician Longinus, who defined sublimity as "a certain distinction and excellence 
in expression" (62). Longinus' sublime is traditionally associated with the emotive 
(Monk 13), but in my view it is also a play of ethos, as it builds upon "grand" and 
"lofty" images. A key component of Longinus' sublime is "noble conceptions," 
which suggests to me that the sublime has more to do with ethos than with pathos, 
because it is essentially an appeal to something "great." 
In visual arts, works that display "grace" and "greatness" can be said to have 
a "sublime" appeal (Monk 177; Harrington 124). I have coined the term "visual 
sublime" to mean some kind of excellence in design that "wows" an audience by 
invoking forces of the grandiose or the great: for instance, Michelangelo's frnaf 
(frescos painted in the Sistine Chapel), the majestic dome of the U.S. 
Capitol, or the Great Wall in China. According to Monk, the idea of sublime implies 
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"supreme beauty" (185)/ but it also suggests breaking down the normal, in the 
sense of conveying beauty through "the terrific" (188-98), as seen, for example, in 
the architectural design of European gothic cathedrals or the mystic pictures drawn 
by the eighteenth-century English Romanticist William Blake (Appendix 1), where 
beauty is mingled with the grotesque and grace comes in the awesome. So, we 
might say, the sublime is ethos created, and also intensified, through the 
extraordinary. 
In Chinese culture, the idea of sublime in visual design is probably just as old 
as that in the European tradition. The grandeur of the Great Wall, stretching for 
thousands of miles over the North China mountain ridges, is a good example to 
illustrate how a finite man-made design can rise above the ordinary human scale 
arousing the feeling of sublimity. The "terrific" sublime (i.e., grand beauty of the 
awesome) is also a common theme in Chinese arts and design as typically 
represented through the grotesque image of dragons, the primary embodiments of 
the imperial and the heavenly (Appendix 2). 
The visual sublime may exist in both Western and Chinese cultures, but there 
is a world of difference between the two in terms of sources of its ethos. To 
summarize it, the sublime in the West draws much admiration to the magnificence 
of design itself, whereas the Chinese sublime focuses more on how to relate a 
design to "the Great Whole of continuous duration, infinite space, and infinite 
change" (Rawson and Legeza 11): i.e., nature and, ultimately, the Dao. For example, 
the sheer magnitude of the Capitol's dome may well stand for its own appeal of 
ethos, but the greatness of the Great Wall has to be appreciated with the 
' According to Richard Buchanan, showing "a concern for beauty" delivers ethos, so we might well say that the 
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architectural structure integrated into the mountainous surroundings that stretch 
out endlessly (Appendix 3): Its ethos is delivered from without, not from within. 
Or, let me phrase it a bit differently: In the Western world, the "grace and 
greatness" of sublimity can be delivered through design itself, just as Longinus 
believes that it can be done through the art of rhetoric; in Chinese culture, the 
"grace and greatness" of the sublime can also be delivered, but only by relating the 
design to something beyond, like nature or the Dao. Traditional Chinese thought 
holds that the Great Whole is nameless, beyond human reach (see, for example, Lao 
Zi's D«%) De /mg), which would mean in design that the unspeakable supreme beauty 
can never be defined, or confined, within a mundane visual format. To reach the 
sublime is thus to do it indirectly: to "use objects," suggest Rawson and Legeza, "to 
convey a sense [my emphasis] of the infinite space and undefined possibility which 
stretch out beyond their borders, both before and beyond the surface" (20). 
Therefore, in the true sense, the Great Wall itself is not the sublime; rather, it relates 
to the sublime, indirectly. 
In short, in the West, the visual sublime (or supreme beauty, or supreme 
ethos) is believed to be delivered from within (the design), whereas in Chinese 
culture, the visual sublime is thought to be from without. The difference, I think, still 
rests on how to define ethos: Is it individualist, amounting to some kind of self-
representation? or is it collectivism drawing on appeals of things other than the self 
or works of the self? I will explore the question further in what follows. 
sublime delivers "supreme" ethos. 
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2. Question of self-representation 
Rawson and Legeza argue that Western people "tend to think, diagrammatically, of 
a world of separate things—some of them alive—arranged in an independent 
space" (9), a point that I think may explain, in the philosophical way, why 
mainstream Western thought tends to focus on the individual self instead of the 
community or environment, of which the individual is a part. To the Western visual 
artists and designers, this sort of individualistic view of the world may have two 
implications regarding ethos: One is that ethos is now thought of as an individual 
appeal, equal to self-representation; the other, also related to the first, is that the art 
of design has now become an isolated undertaking, with efforts focusing on creating 
its own character or ethos, without regard to its relationship to the environment. 
Let me explain further by quoting a statement made by Richard Buchanan in 
his "Declaration by Design." In defining ethos of design, Buchanan writes: 
Products have character because in some way they reflect their makers, and 
part of the art of design is the control of such character in order to persuade 
users that a product has credibility in their lives. In essence, the problem is 
the way designers choose to represent themselves in products, not as they 
are, but as they wish to appear. Designers fashion objects to speak in 
particular voices, imbuing them with personal qualities they think will give 
confidence to users, . . . (101) 
While Buchanan may be echoing Aristotle's vision of ethos—projecting the self 
through artistic manipulation (of design, to be specific), he is basically saying that the 
"character" (i.e., ethos) of design points to designers, and that "credibility" or 
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"confidence" evoked through such design has much to do with how designers 
"choose to represent themselves in products." 
But, as I have argued earlier, ethos in the sense of self-representation is 
problematic from a Chinese perspective, not just because the individual appeal is out 
of the picture, but also because sources of ethos are considered non-individual, 
located in ancestral lineage, culturally and historically established authority, etc., and, 
ultimately, in the Dao. Thus, instead of representing one's self, the Chinese 
artist/designer may well choose to draw on the appeals of ancestry, sage-kings, or 
entities the Dao is believed to work through (nature, heaven, etc.), for the purpose 
of establishing his or her ethos. 
An example I'm thinking of is a painting by Lan Ying (1585-1664 A.D.) of the 
Ming Dynasty (Appendix 4). The painting might be taken as a simple landscape 
picture at first glance, but a closer look could reveal a "hidden dragon" (in the shape 
of "dragon veins") winding itself all the way up into the sky, which, according to 
Rawson and Legeza, would "lend magic power to painting" (26). Whether readers 
are sensing its magic power is not something I can tell, but one conclusion seems 
reasonable: since the dragon is a cultural symbol in China, its presence in the picture 
may well indicate efforts made by the artist to appeal to a collective ethos in order to 
reach out to his audience. I have argued elsewhere (in my dissertation) that in 
Chinese culture ethos is essentially an invocation of cultural forces, so the "hidden 
dragon" might be seen as a deliberate attempt by the artist to invoke cultural forces 
(embodied in the dragon) to deliver his ethos. 
Another aspect at issue of Western ethos as self-representation is that it 
separates the design of an individual work from its environment, as if an object of 
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design could stand by itself. We can see this from Buchanan's emphasis on 
presenting "qualities of character" in design so that objects can "assert their own 
existence and, through that existence, the attitudes that are an integral part of an 
objecf s present being" (101,107). Whether to assert the existence of one's individual 
work or to show "attitudes" as a means of that assertion, the Western ethos in 
visual design is clearly seen as something projected from within, to be built on the 
merits of "an objecf s present being." Thus, to a Western visual artist/ designer, a 
golden temple is a golden temple: its beauty and craftsmanship declares itself. 
Without a question the Chinese counterpart would approach it quite 
differently. Rather than focus on the design itself, he or she will first ask where to fit 
the golden temple and then decide how to match the design with the place where it 
is to be built, so that the beauty and craftsmanship of the building may reflect the 
unity of its natural environment. Thus, instead of asserting its own existence, a 
Chinese golden temple would draw its appeal from fitting into a natural scheme that 
transcends the physical limits of the temple (Appendix 5). That is to say, the ethos of 
the temple does not stand by itself. 
When visiting a traditional Chinese garden, a Westerner may be struck by its 
"irregular design, broken edges, meandering streams, and patches of plants" 
(Martin / u4 -l.html), things that don't assert their own "character" or "attitudes" by 
Western standards. But, as David Martin points out, they were actually designed in 
line with the Daoist theme of expressing nature and harmony (z6zd.), a theme that by 
definition contrasts sharply with the Western ideal of expressing one's own 
individual character and passions. Thus, unlike the Western designer who 
deliberately puts up man-made efforts by, for example, setting sculpture or 
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displaying ornaments in the garden, the Chinese designer would seek to transfer 
the garden into a natural setting, where twisted and eroded rocks and stone of 
natural shapes will greet a visitor's eye (Appendix 6), to attain, as Martin has put it, 
the "spiritual communion" with the Dao (ibid.). 
I should point out here that the ideal of expressing nature has been nothing 
foreign to Western artists and visual designers: for example, the rise of landscape 
gardening in eighteenth-century Europe with England taking the lead and followed 
by France and Germany (Monk 164)/ The so-called Romantic movement in the 
West starting around the end of the eighteenth century and continuing through 
much of the nineteenth century, could probably be best described as one featuring a 
strong "going-back-to-nature" sentiment, as seen, for example, in many of the 
landscape paintings by Millet (French), Turner (English), and Thomas Cole 
(American). But the Western romanticism was also characteristically driven by a 
passion for self-expression, by the belief that the individual, not social, order is closer 
to nature. Because of this individualistic bent, nature was frequently used by those 
romantic artists / designers as an occasion for self-projection, and "was sought," as 
Monk points out, "not so much for what she was, as for what she was not" (204). 
This is undoubtedly in sharp contrast with the Chinese ideal of self-effacement—to 
portray nature in such a way so as to submerge one's self within its harmony 
(Appendix 7). 
In Chinese visual arts, such as garden designing, sculpturing, painting, and 
seal engraving, to express nature or, in the words of the fourth-century Chinese 
^ Landscape gardening in the West might have been inspired by the Chinese garden, according to Monk, who 
drew references from Author Lovejoy's "The Chinese Origin of a Romanticism." See 7EGP, xxxn (1933), 
1-20. 
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artist Gu Kai-Zi, to "portray the Dao through natural images" (yz-zm-mez-dao) (see 
Zhang Guang-Fuo 187) demands the ability to hide one's skill and craftsmanship or 
to erase traces of man-made efforts put into design. This is because in Chinese 
thought skill or craftsmanship is an indication of artificiality, not necessarily in 
tandem with the naturalness of the Dao. Therefore, great artists/ designers often try 
to inject a "primitive" quality into their works, as if they were done by some 
"awkward" hands (Appendices 8 & 9). If skill or craftsmanship shows off one's ethos 
by Western standards, then it appears that those Chinese artists/designers are just 
interested in "damaging" their own ethos. But in Chinese culture the sources of 
ethos come, ultimately, from the Dao: To dear away the artificiality of one's art 
work is to clear away the obstacles standing in the way to portraying the Dao, 
therefore enhancing one's ethos. 
To sum it up, the point I'm trying to make here is that Western ethos is 
questionable from a Chinese perspective, for two reasons. One is that ethos has 
been treated as some kind of "individual property," with a narrow focus on self-
representation (linking ethos of design to character of a designer). Obviously, ethos 
as such cannot hold true when we look at those Chinese artists/designers, who do 
not resort to their personal characters in design. The other is that, because of its 
focus on self-representation, the Western notion of ethos appears to lose sight of 
relations between works of design and their environment, with much emphasis on 
displaying the "attitudes" of the former. I would term such an approach to design as 
a "micro" approach. Since the Chinese artist/designer prefers a rather holistic 
approach (i.e., taking into consideration the relationship of design products to the 
environment), which may be called a "macro" approach, efforts to deliberately 
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"boost" the beauty or craftsmanship (i.e., ethos) of an individual work without due 
regard to context would thus be considered inappropriate. As a result, we often see 
Chinese artists/designers taking great pains to make sure that their design would 
get along with the flow of the environment (cultural, natural, etc.,) and their 
products wouldn't be artificially intrusive. 
"High context" and the notion of harmony 
Wang Qiuye, a Chinese scholar, recently did a study comparing graphics from 
Chinese and American science magazines and manuals, and she found that the 
Chinese visuals are more context-oriented (i.e., providing more contextual 
information) as opposed to the American visuals, which are "focused and direct" 
(553-60). While Wang's study had nothing to do with "visual ethos," it did reflect the 
fact that Chinese design pays more attention to the question of how to relate a 
visual design to its context. 
Wang's findings may echo Edward Hall's "high-context system," which 
describes Chinese and other non-Westem cultures as "high-context" cultures, in the 
sense that communication in these cultures relies on the context to deliver messages, 
which are generally less explicit, less elaborated, compared to those "low-context" 
cultures in the West (Beyond CwZfwre, 85-128). Hall's "high context system" doesn't 
tell directly about Chinese ethos, but it does point to the linkage between context 
and communication and, by extension, visual design (which is communication, too). 
Since Chinese visual arts and design pay great attention to the environment that 
surrounds an individual work, we might just say that an ethos thus delivered is an 
ethos of "high context." 
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A Chinese term for Hall's "high context" would be harmony (Tzg-zze). This is 
because "harmony/' like Hall's "high-context," suggests a holistic approach to 
communication that emphasizes the necessity of not only seeing a particular tree but 
also seeing the forest, of which the tree is a part, to put it in a Chinese way. The 
notion of harmony in Chinese thought is sometimes narrowly interpreted as 
avoiding conflicts or submitting to authority (Lu Xing 29-30). But, in my view, it 
actually is more concerned with the question of how to grapple with the Whole^ 
(humanity as a whole, nature as a whole, humanity-nature as a whole, the Dao as a 
whole, etc.). The idea is that harmony is achieved only when one is able to perceive 
the whole and find a way to be in that whole. In visual arts and design, this would 
mean that emphasis should be on making connections to seeing the whole picture 
(forest) rather than on highlighting isolated visual items (trees). Wang's study, 
which has shown Chinese visuals to be more contextualized, seems to suggest that 
Chinese designers are culturally "geared" towards making connections. 
But the "harmony of the whole"* is more than about making contextual 
connections; it also means, in a more significant way, that visual design reflects the 
pulse of the Dao, which, according to Rawson and Legeza, is like "a seamless web of 
unbroken time and change" (10). If, as I have argued, one's ethos comes ultimately 
from the Dao, then visual design invoking the harmony of that "web" would 
certainly appeal to an audience steeped in the Daoist tradition. In today^s language, 
this is to say that design work ought to be placed under the control and influence of 
nature and environment. I have already mentioned that Chinese artists/designers 
adopt a macro approach to design, focusing primarily on how design objects will 
^ According to Osamu, "true harmony" in Chinese thought is closely associated with the "whole" (91). 
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chime in with their surroundings. In the following, I'll briefly discuss how traditional 
Chinese artists/designers also strive to keep their works "in harmony with the 
skeins of the Dao" (Rawson and Legeza 21) at the metaphysical level by introducing 
two key concepts in Chinese design: Ym-Yorzg and fmg-S/zwf. In doing so, I might be 
able to explain from a broader angle why ethos is essentially a cultural thing, instead 
of a personal quality. 
Ym-YoM# is often seen in the West as a pure philosophical concept, abstract as 
well as mysterious, but in Chinese culture there has never been such a thing as 
pure philosophy (in the Platonic sense): A philosophical concept like Ym-Yang is 
also a pragmatic principle that can be applied in everyday life. To me, Ym-Yang is 
somewhat like applied philosophy, as it has been widely practiced in Chinese and 
other Eastern cultures in almost all aspects of human life, for example, in food 
preparation, medicine, martial arts, military, rhetoric, and visual arts and design. 
One way to describe Ym-Yang is that it is a perception of the world as an ontological 
duality, where the opposite forces of nature (Ym and Yang, male and female, heaven 
' I borrow the term from Osamu (91). 
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and earth, tips and downs, hot and cold, light and dark, etc.) are constantly 
changing, evolving, and reversing. So, Yzzz-YoMg signifies, one might suggest, change 
and motion (in the form of black and white swirls of its symbol, as shown above). 
On the other hand, and probably more significantly, the concept of Yzn-Ymzg also 
represents balance and harmony. The equally divided black and white swirls of the 
Yzrz-Yafzg symbol (seen above) portray the world as a rhythmic, give-and-take 
dynamic that at the same time underlies order and stability. Put differently, the Ym-
Yarzg opposites are not just contradictory; they are also complementary with each 
other in creating harmony. Indeed, it is this scheme of Ym-Yang, says Graham, that 
"calls attention to the most often noticed difference between Western and Chinese 
thinking, that the Western tends to centre on conflicting opposites (truth/falsehood, 
good/evil), the Chinese on complimentary polarities (64). 
Ym-Ya/zg, and the notions of motion and balance, has been a dominating 
factor in shaping traditional Chinese visual arts and design. The art of calligraphy 
has been so important in Chinese culture (also in Korean, Japanese, and other 
Eastern cultures) mostly because of its potential in helping cultivate the vision of 
motion and balance. The flow of strokes displays one's mastery of Qz (some kind of 
vital energy, which will be discussed later), but the key lies in how to channel the 
flow of Qz so as to create a rhythmic yet balanced line of visual characters that also 
intimates the oscillation between Yzzz and Ya?zg (e.g., some strokes slow, some fast; 
some strokes thin, some thick; some strokes light, some heavy) (Appendices 10 & 
11). According to Rawson and Legeza, even the popular color pattern in Chinese 
visual arts and design—red and green—identifies with the Daoist scheme of Yang 
and Ym (30). 
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When applied in visual arts and design, the concept of Yin-Yang would often 
translate into the principle of "complementarity" (Mitchell and Wu 16-8), as seen, 
for example, in Chinese garden, where hills (Yong) and ponds (Yin), and stones 
(Yang) and woods (Yzn), etc., are used to complement each other so as to reflect, 
says Chan, "the harmony and order of the universe" (qtd. in Mitchell and Wu 17). 
Beijing, the ancient Chinese capital, has been well known for its architectural 
complementarity. There, the famous Gate of Heavenly Peace (i.e., Tzan-An Men, the 
front gate of Forbidden City) is being complemented by the Gate of Earthly Peace 
further to the south of the city. Tourists who have visited the Temple of Heaven 
might be lured to see its complementary "other," the Temple of Earth. Incidentally, 
the Coca-Cola Company has branded one of its drinking products as "Heaven and 
Earth" (Tzan-Yw-Dz, which is equivalent to "Dasani" sold in the U. S. A.) in the 
Chinese market with a symbol of Beijing's architecture printed on the bottle. 
Western viewers may have little trouble noticing that traditional Chinese 
painting, particularly of the "mountain-water" theme, is conspicuously unrealistic in 
that the landscape presented in a painting does not match reality at all. This is 
because, explains Zhang Guang-Fu, the Chinese artist is far more concerned about 
capturing the "spirit" of nature than about directly copying the "scenes" of nature 
(188-89). I would "stretch" Zhang's argument by pointing out that the "unrealistic" 
aspect of Chinese painting might well reflect efforts on the part of the artist to fit 
metaphysically into the Daoist scheme of Yzn and Yang. In Daoist thought, 
mountains represent forces of Yang and waters (rivers, lakes, etc.) represent Yzn just 
as heaven is part of Yang and earth part of Yzn. So, traditional Chinese artists often 
use "mountain-water" landscape paintings as a way to portray the metaphysical 
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harmony of Ym-Yarzg, to show, through images of mountains and waters, how the 
opposite forces of nature interact, integrate, and complement with each other 
(Appendix 12). Needless to say, the landscape painted as such can be a far cry from 
physical reality. 
Whether the Ym-Yang stuff makes scientific sense to Westerners is not the 
concern of this paper. What I have been trying to show is that Chinese visual arts 
and design are more metaphysically oriented in the sense that "we are not just 
designing for ourselves but instead are relating our work to the patterns [i.e., Ym 
and Yang] of the cosmos" (Mitchell and Wu 37). I have suggested that Chinese 
culture embraces a "macro" approach to visual arts and design as opposed to a 
"micro" approach often observed in the West. The macro approach is more or less 
collectively driven drawing on appeals of design culturally established (e.g., 
harmony), whereas the micro approach is more or less individually oriented with 
much emphasis placed on design as self-representation (e.g., character or attitudes 
of designer). Now I might as well say that the Chinese approach to visual arts and 
design bears on the cosmic in that it connects design to Ym-Yarzg, presumably the 
metaphysical totality of a changing universe. Ym-Yang, so to speak, defines Chinese 
visual arts and design. It also constitutes their ethos, as the "harmony of the whole" 
thus invoked would have an appeal of eternity to the Chinese audience (Rawson 
and Legeza 25). What is worthy of mention here, and relevant to the central topic of 
this paper, is that the ethos of Ym-Yang is definitely a collective ethos, having 
nothing to do with what is perceived to be at the core of Western ethos: the self or 
self-representation. And we could have a better understanding of the cosmic appeal 
of Chinese ethos by looking at another key concept in Chinese design, fgng-Skwi. 
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Translated literally, fg»g-S7zwz means wind and water. Though sometimes 
tainted with superstitious beliefs/ the concept of fgMg-Sfzwz basically tells us how to 
integrate in design with nature and environment and, further, with the metaphysical 
Qz, which in Daoist thought is the vital energy of the universe that animates 
everything from heaven to earth/ To apply Fezzg-Sfzwz in design is to coordinate 
human activities with the flow of Qz so as to "enable people to live in better 
harmony with the natural environment and the cosmos" (Mitchell and Wu, 25). A 
simple example would be one's living home, where a certain measure of width and 
height in space must be secured to ensure that one can live and breathe in comfort. 
In the language of ferzg-S/zwz, this is to say that home design must be such that it 
induces the healthy flow of Qz in our living space. 
f gzzg-Skwz has been widely practiced in Chinese architecture and design, but 
its impact can also be seen in other branches of visual arts and design. For instance, 
Chinese painting artists use white space much more boldly, and freely, than their 
Western counterparts. This is because white space can help create a sense of fluidity 
resembling the flow of Qz, as seen, for example, in Appendix 13, where the lavish 
white space can easily be recognized as sky and water. So, Qz is induced here, in the 
sense of energizing the picture through the use of white space. We can also do a 
little experiment by cutting off white space on the top of a mountain-water picture 
(Appendix 14) to see how Qz works. Picture A (with white space cut off) brings a 
sense of crowded-ness, and readers may feel there is little room for breathing (i.e., 
^ Later Daoism was also tainted with superstition. 
* There is no equivalent in English to gi, but we may define it as some kind of essence or spirit in the universe 
that "pervades and enlivens all things and is therefore synonymous with primordial energy" (see 
Encyclopedia o/Earfern fAiZojopAy /k/igiorz.' gwcW/ufTM, MWwism, Tooijm, Zen. Boston: 
Shambhala,1994). 
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Qz is blocked); in contrast, readers may breathe with much more ease with picture B 
(the original), where the white space helps create a feeling of openness. 
Recently, I was struck by a direct-mail document sent by Sprint targeting the 
Chinese community in this country. The designer has incorporated many Chinese 
themes (visual symbols, color, slogans, etc.), but I was most intrigued by the bold 
use of white space, which adds liveliness to the document because of the fluidity it 
has created (Appendix 15). To be fair, using white space in document design is 
greatly encouraged in Western cultures, but for different reasons. For example, 
white space can make a document appear clean; it can also make texts easier to read. 
However, it is never used for the purpose of energizing design by bringing in a 
sense of fluidity (Qz)- Thus, the wide use of white space often carries the "guilt" of 
making a document look "thin," resulting in less appeal, or less ethos (Appendix 16). 
But with Chinese design, we probably don't have to worry about this "problem": 
Since white space indicates the flow of Qz, what appears to be "thin" to a Western 
eye might just look "full" to a Chinese audience. 
It seems safe to say that the "trick" of Western ethos lies (at least in part), in 
how to make works of design look "full," as if the more you express yourself, the 
more credible you appear. I would define this as a "doing-more" mentality as 
opposed to the Chinese "doing-less" mentality. Buchanan says design "persuades 
by looking authoritative" (102). Obviously, things that appear "thin" because of less 
work (e.g., more white space) would thus look less authoritative. This "doing-more" 
mentality, I think, may account in a fundamental way for the fact that like Western 
rhetoric, Western visual arts and design are generally more elaborate, more explicit, 
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more colorful, and, of course, more "fully" expressed, in comparison with Chinese 
visual arts and design. 
But what underlies this "doing-more" mentality is still the perception of 
ethos: i.e., how to regard the role an individual plays in his or her work. In the West, 
because ethos is associated with self-projection or self-representation, as discussed 
earlier, doing more or expressing more is thus deemed necessary to render one's 
ethos. So, unlike the Chinese counterpart, who would deliberately leave large 
chunks of space unpainted to visualize the flow of Qz, the Western painting artist 
might feel the urge to do the opposite—to paint every comer of a canvas—for fear 
of not expressing his or her self fully. In Chinese culture, because ethos is a seen as a 
collective phenomenon, and because visual arts and design integrate with nature 
and environment and, metaphysically, with the cosmic order of the Dao, doing 
more for the purpose of self-representation would thus seem out of question. 
Instead, we might see a different mind-set, one I would call the "doing-less" 
mentality, in the sense that the "harmony of the whole" does not need much 
meddling from humans, and that a design does not have to declare itself in full. 
The "doing-less" mentality characterizing traditional Chinese visual arts and 
design might be better understood in the light of ww-wez (translated, literally, as 
"doing-nothing"), the Daoist ideal of cultivating virtue by abstaining from "striving" 
consciously in everyday life/ In the philosophical sense, doing nothing is essentially 
to let the ultimate Dao prevail. But since now the Dao takes care of everything 
under heaven, doing nothing is indeed doing everything—and anything. That is 
why Lao Zi insists, "If nothing is done, then all will be well" (3). So, that is to say, 
^ I have a rather detailed discussion of ww-we: in my dissertation. 
158 
doing less in design—with less artistic elaboration or fewer personal touches—could 
also mean "doing more/' if perceived from the point of view of That 
traditional Chinese visual artists / designers can use less expression to make their 
works of design look more energetic (e.g., in painting) is a good example to 
illustrate this "less-is-more" Eastern logic. 
The reason I'm raising the doing-more/less question is because it marks an 
important distinction between Chinese and Western web design. As we will see 
later, in the following section, Chinese web sites are generally more "plain-looking," 
fitting in with the "doing-less" characterization whereas Western web sites tend to 
be more elaborate and aggressive, clearly exhibiting a "doing-more" attitude. But, 
more importantly, the question also tells us, in a nutshell, a major difference 
between Chinese and Western ethos whether it concerns web design or 
conventional visual design. Western ethos is individualistic, hence the need to do 
more to create personal clout to deliver that individual appeal. But because Chinese 
ethos is a collective thing, drawing on appeals from outside the self, doing less 
would be more becoming, as it could reduce personal show-off and let the harmony 
of the Dao unveil itself. Indeed, because of the broader appeal created in the 
reminiscence of the Dao, the ethos delivered by the Chinese visual artist/ designer 
could have more substantial power of persuasion over the audience. 
To summarize, in this part of the section, I have argued in length that Chinese 
visual arts and design have been characterized by a holistic approach, which can be 
described as "high-context," to borrow Edward Hall's term, in the sense that the 
Chinese artist/designer lays emphasis in connecting objects of design to their 
context, instead of concentrating on design as an independent vehicle of visual 
159 
expression. But the holistic approach also means making cultural connections, in the 
sense of incorporating in design the culturally appealing themes of Ym-Yang and 
Fmg-Sfzwi so as to create the appeal of the "harmony of the whole/' Because of this 
desire to integrate with the metaphysical order of the Dao, traditional Chinese visual 
artists/designers typically would do less in their design to make sure that the Dao 
has been observed without much meddling by human hands. While there is no such 
thing as "personal character" due to the lack of self-representation, the traditional 
Chinese visual arts and design have never been short of the appeal of what we call 
ethos because of their grounding in making cultural connections and in delivering, 
or intimating, the "harmony of the whole." 
IV. Investigation 
In the previous section, I have discussed how ethos is delivered in traditional 
Chinese visual arts and design, with focus on visual characteristics that clearly 
distinguish between Chinese and Western design. Those visual characteristics also 
reflect, in my view, an ideological tradition that conceptualizes the self and related 
issues like individuality, personal character, etc., differently from the West. The 
question of ethos, by Western standards, is essentially the question of how to 
project one's self through design so as to achieve an individualized, or micro, appeal, 
but in Chinese culture it is the question of how to relate design to entities beyond 
one's self, such as nature, environment, and the Dao, so that one can achieve an 
appeal that has collective, or macro, connotations. 
Having said that, we might find it not that easy to draw such a distinction 
when comparing Eastern ethos with Western online. For one thing, digital 
expression has been shared across all cultures: Whether you are a Chinese or an 
160 
American, when it comes to designing an online text, more likely than not, you will 
resort to the same digital technique or the same databanks of icons to create visual 
messages. (Microsoft has dominated the Chinese market!) For another, the 
electronic technology has brought the Eastern and Western closer even in the 
rhetorical sense. I have used the term "bamboo hypertext" to describe classical 
Chinese rhetoric in that it shares many textual features commonly identified in 
modem electronic hypertext such as fluidity and collective authorship. We could also 
put it the other way around: i.e., Western hypertext resembles classical Chinese 
rhetoric. This is especially true when we look at the issue of ethos, as the apparent 
absence of the self, a crucial ingredient of Western ethos, due to the collective 
authorship involved in online text production, raises questions about the traditional 
(Western) way of identifying ethos in terms of personal character, individuality, etc. 
(Can we still treat ethos online as some kind of self-projection?) If we take a closer 
look at the organizational, governmental, and corporate Web sites in this country, 
we may be able to notice that ethos delivered on those sites is more of a collective 
kind than of an individual one because the visual messages presented there mostly 
serve to project the image of a whole organization, not a single individual. 
The hypertext phenomenon has posed challenges to the conventional 
approach to ethos, especially in the tradition of Plato's essentialism, which I think 
can be a topic for another paper, but for the purpose of this paper I will stay focused 
on exploring online ethos cross-culturally—through comparing and contrasting a 
selection of online visual works done by Eastern (mainly Chinese) and Western Web 
designers. We can assume that, even though the Internet has altered the 
presentation of ethos, and the self, the way designers deliver their ethos may still be 
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shaped by what would I call "cultural programming": i.e., the ethos presented 
online can still be categorized as "collective" or "individualistic/' depending on how 
the delivery of ethos is perceived in the cultural tradition of the designer. For 
instance, a Western designer may believe that an online design per se is a source of 
ethos, therefore choosing to use "fancy" graphics to make his or her design stand 
out; in this case, the ethos delivered should be considered to be "individualistic," as it 
points to a cultural tradition that separates design from its context or environment. 
It goes without saying then that if a Chinese designer decides to do the opposite for 
his or her design so as to achieve some moderation in terms of visual appeal, then 
the ethos generated as such may well indicate a "doing-less" mentality and 
therefore can be categorized as "collective." It is likely that a designer may not be 
aware of such a difference, but because culture shapes one's communicative 
behavior, we can reasonably expect that it also leaves its imprints on the way 
designers present their ethos online, wittingly or unwittingly. 
So, in the following, I will discuss those "imprints of culture" using the 
methods and sample selection criteria similar to those used by Wang Qiuye in her 
cross-cultural study of graphics (554-5). Again, I would like to point out, what is 
being discussed here is not meant to provide "scientific evidence" but rather to 
serve as an initiation into further discussions on the subject. The section will be 
divided into five parts: 1. defining limits of authorship; 2. methods and sample 
selection criteria; 3. description of samples; 4 analysis and comparison; and 5. 
discussion. I'm adding the "defining limits" to suggest that online authorship ought 
to be categorized differently from conventional authorship. 
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1. Defining limits of authorship 
Ethos online, like ethos offline, is created to induce trustworthiness (or, at least, 
appearance of such quality) on the part of the author(s). The word "authorship" can 
be immediately problematic if we follow the traditional definition of ethos proposed 
by Aristotle, who sees ethos as something dependent on "the personal character of 
the speaker" (BH153). This is because, in most cases, the online authorship remains 
unidentifiable, and the "personal character," which is built on authorship (or 
speaker-ship), is thus rendered insignificant. I don't mean to say that there is no such 
thing as authorship, but we may have to rethink of its traditional defining role in 
terms of ethos, especially when dealing with online designs or texts. Take for 
example the homepage of the English Department at Iowa State University 
(http:/ / www.engl.iastate.edu/): From the reader's point of view, what matters is 
the ethos of the department delivered through the design of the Web page, not the 
personal character of the designer(s), even though the latter may have a lot of say in 
shaping the image of the former. (The fact that the designer(s) remains anonymous 
on the English Department^s home page may well indicate an appreciation of the 
insignificance of conventional authorship online.) Thus, what I mean by "author(s)" 
is in most cases a collective authorship, pointing to an organizational or communal 
entity (English Department, Iowa State University, city of Ames, etc.,) that a Web 
designer is working for/ Likewise, what I mean by "ethos" here is mostly the ethos 
of an organization or community as represented online, not something to be 
confined within the limits of conventional authorship. 
* At least we can say that collective authorship is true of most of Web designs. 
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2. Methods and sample selection criteria 
What I will do for analysis is, basically, to compare samples selected from both 
Western and Eastern (mostly Chinese) Web sites. Though my intention is to point 
out the differences, I will keep myself open to possibilities of finding some 
commonalities. It is likely, as I have said earlier, that the Internet has altered the 
presentation of ethos, and the self, bringing the West and the East seemingly 
"closer" to each other. Two kinds of criteria were used to select samples: One is 
rather subjective, based on what I see as typical of Western or Eastern ethos online; 
the other is meant to be relatively objective (?) using some common basis for 
analysis and comparison (e.g., selecting samples from Coca Cola's Chinese and 
American Web sites). I have to admit that the criteria set (of both kinds) and the 
comparison based on them can be very biased, more of a personal opinion rather 
than of a scientific observation, but I take comfort in acknowledging that a rhetorical 
study (of ethos) may never be able to rise to the status of scientific certainty. 
3. Description of samples* 
Using the first kind of criteria, I have chosen the following pages from Western Web 
sites: Red Lobster (sample 1), Misty Slims (cigarettes) (sample 2), and Great Britain's 
Budweiser (sample 3). I have also selected three samples representing Chinese 
culture: one from the "Hong Kong Computer Society" (sample 4), one from the 
"World of Chinese Culture" (based in Taiwan) (sample 5), and one from the 
"Chinese Language Teachers Association" (based in North America) (sample 6). 
And using the second kind of criteria, I have selected one home page from "Yahoo! 
Finance" on its North American site and one from its Hong Kong site (samples 7 &: 
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8). In addition, I have selected pages from three different Coca-Cola sites: American, 
Japanese, and Chinese (samples 9,10, & 11). 
Perhaps the best way to describe samples 1, 2, and 3 (from Western sites) is 
that they are glamorous, as all of them are designed with elaborate details of 
graphics. Sample 1, the home page of the restaurant chain Red Lobster, is featuring, 
overwhelmingly, a ready-to-serve jumbo lobster on a plate, presented vividly in 
both color and image. Right above the picture is the slogan of "Go Overboard!" 
implying customers' enthusiasm over the seafood served in Red Lobster. Sample 2 
is a page featuring a classy lady, with a man at her side (partly presented) lighting 
her Misty Slims cigarette. The picture appears very eye-catching, and the featured 
lady, elegantly dressed and postured, glaringly takes center stage in the picture. 
Sample 3 is Budweiser's home page in the U. K. Like samples 2 and 3, the design is 
very expressive, characterized by its lavish use of Budweiser color, red, and display 
of a larger-than-usual Budweiser bottle (left). The Americanism "Whassup?!" (seen 
in the upper right quarter of the page) also grabs viewers' eye. 
In contrast, the samples representing Chinese culture are mostly subdued 
and conservative in design, suggesting that the designers may lack the "urge to 
sell." Sample 4 comes from a Web site hosted by the Hong Kong Computer Society. 
The site is designed for users to search standard Chinese computer terms (in both 
simplified and traditional Chinese characters). The only "fancy" thing on this page is 
the display of "An Intelligent Database for Standard Chinese Computer 
Terminology" at the top with a picturesque background of the Great Wall and Hong 
Kong skyline. Towards the bottom are three lines of Chinese (in green color), which 
* For technical reasons, the description will focus on the main features of each sample. 
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says, "Computer Science and Technology Terms, Complied by the China Computer 
Society and Published by the National Committee on Standardization of Nature and 
Science Terms/"" And two organizational logos are seen to the left of those Chinese 
lines. 
Sample 5 is from the "World of Chinese Culture," a Web site hosted by the 
governmental administration in Taiwan. As part of an information project, the page 
tells of the upcoming Mid-Autumn Festival (October 1, 2001), with details on how to 
take joy in watching the "full moon" that night, how to make moon cakes, etc. 
There isn't much graphics on the page, except for a small and non-intrusive picture 
of moon cakes, embedded in the midst of lines of Chinese text. 
Sample 6 is the home page of the Chinese Language Teachers Association 
(CLTA) headquartered at Ohio State University. Though it is created in English (with 
the exception of the Chinese title), its "more-text-and-less-graphics" design 
characteristics and unidiomatic use of English may still point to a "Chinese hand" 
behind the design. Plus, the picture of bamboo leaves with much white space in the 
background is also distinctively Chinese. (The bamboo is an intellectual symbol in 
Chinese culture, worshiped among Daoist/ Confucian intellects for its lofty spirit 
within. A bamboo tree is growing straight upwards and never bent down, a quality 
much admired by those pursuing the moral rectitude of Daoism and Confucianism.) 
However, unlike the "moon cakes" picture in sample 5, the "bamboo leaves" seems 
to be given much more prominence visually. 
Readers may object to the selection of samples as described in the above. One 
obvious "drawback" of such a selection is that all the three Western samples were 
It is governmental organization in China. 
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chosen from commercial sites whereas the Chinese samples were not, which I must 
say might have affected the use of graphics and even the outcome of Web design. 
But the matter of truth (at least in my research) is that it is next to impossible to 
locate a Chinese commercial site that is comparable to Red Lobster, Misty Slims, or 
Budweiser Beer." So, to compensate for the above-mentioned "defect/' I chose a 
few samples based on the second kind of selection criteria. The samples, which are 
relatively comparable by some "research" standards, are described as follows. 
Samples 7 and 8 are both from "Yahoo! Finance," an Internet search site 
focusing exclusively on investment and finance. Sample 7 is in English (American 
edition) while sample 8 is in Chinese (Hong Kong edition). The two pages appear 
quite similar in their visual layout, but a closer look may reveal the fact that the 
American site is more colorful in design and more packed with links than the Hong 
Kong site, which has more white space between links. The "Market Overview," 
"Transfer Funds," and "Real-Time Package," each matched with an colored, iconic 
symbol, as seen on the upper part of the American site, are entirely missing on the 
Hong Kong site. What is also absent on the Hong Kong site is the financial briefing 
column under the "Market Summary," as well as the advertisement column (very 
colorful and elaborate) next to it, as seen on the American home page. The "Market 
Summery" of the Hong Kong site seems to have a "global" touch as it covers stock 
market indices not just from Hong Kong, but also from China, Taiwan, Japan, 
Britain, and the United States whereas the American "Yahoo! Finance" focuses 
purely on American market indices: Dow, Nasdaq, and S&P 500. 
" One reason is probably that Chinese restaurants, cigarette factories or beer companies don't have adequate 
resources in Web design or simply don't pay attention to it. 
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The only eye-catching thing on the Hong Kong site is the advertisement link 
(against the backdrop of dark blue) at the top of the page for selling moon cakes. 
The strategy used seems to be typical of the Chinese, as it is very indirect, saying 
nothing about moon cake sale itself. The advertisement link is decorated with 
pictures of a full moon, an elderly couple, a box of moon cakes, etc., but all these 
make sense only when the word "Mid-Autumn Festival: Time to Show Filial Duty to 
Your Parents" (printed in the fashion of calligraphy) sinks in. The implicit message 
is: "Go and buy the cakes for your parents so that you can fulfill your duty as 
children." I say it is indirect also because the ad cashes on the appeal of "filial duty" 
in Chinese society instead of using hard-sell tactics, as we often see in Western 
commercials. But from the (Western) rhetorical point of view, the advertisement 
doesn't relate very well to the host-site in terms of targeting its audience: the latter 
has a focused audience—those interested in investment and finance, whereas the 
"Moon Cake" ad's audience can be anyone. 
There is also an advertisement link on the American Web site of "Yahoo! 
Finance," on the same location and with the same background color as the Hong 
Kong site. It comes as no surprise that some hard-sell techniques are employed: the 
$100 give-away as a lure to entice people into opening a brokerage account^ is 
nothing short of the push characterizing the "Star" strategy frequently used in 
American direct-mail sales letters (see Bwsmess aW /Ummisfrafme ComrMMmcafzoM by 
Locker, Chapter 10). Rhetorically, the ad appears more relevant to its host site 
(when compared with the "Moon Cake" one in sample 8), as both are targeting a 
focused audience—those who are interested in investment and finance. 
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Samples 9,10, and 11 are all home pages selected from the same source: the 
Coca-Cola Company, but their cultural sites vary. Sample 9, of the American site, is 
probably in every way reminiscent of what has been described earlier of the 
"aggressive" nature of Web design in the West: heavy in graphics and heavy in 
colors. At the center of the page is the cool, thirst-quenching image of a Coke bottle 
(partly shown) with the brand name "Coca-Cola" printed in a calligraphic fashion 
right across the top of it. Below the bottle is a strip of pictures displaying a sports 
star (Lance Armstrong) smiling, couples overflowing with "Coca-Cola" joy, polar 
bear cubs relishing "Coca-Cola" pop, etc. These pictures seem to suggest a conscious 
effort to build up a positive, consumer-friendly image of the Coca-Cola Company. 
What appears noticeable about the design is that there is little white space left as the 
"Coca-Cola" red fills up the whole background. 
Sample 10, of the Japanese site, is quite unique in design, for two reasons. 
One is that it employs quite a lot of white space (light-colored background, to be 
exact). As we can see, more than two thirds of the site are literally graphic-free, 
forming a sharp contrast with the "red-full-ness" of the American Web page. The 
other is that the picture in the middle has been cartoonized, with arms and legs 
installed on a Coca-Cola vending machine to create a dramatic effect on the design. 
Japan is a culture with seemingly boundless affections for cartoons. Since the 1950's, 
many of world-famous cartoon characters have been created in Japan, including the 
most recent one, Pokéman, which has been a dominating character for years in the 
world's video-game market. So, the dramatic design of the Japanese Web page can 
be seen as an effort to cater to the "cartoon rage" in the host culture. 
For technical reasons, the $100 give-away by an online brokerage firm could not be printed on a hard copy, 
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It is worth mentioning that the "cartoon" machine carries a marketing 
message about a new green tea product (printed in Japanese together with the 
picture of a green tea can on the window of the machine). The message doesn't 
appear visually intrusive; its weight can only be appreciated from the content, and 
from the fact that it is the only item printed in Japanese (presumably, to reach a 
broader audience in Japan). 
Sample 11, of the (mainland) Chinese site, may strike readers as atypical of 
Chinese design, as it registers a strong emphasis in using graphics and colors. As we 
can see, the whole design appears quite elaborate, even to the extent of being 
visually "noisy." This is especially true when we look at the original online Web 
page that is being digitally equipped with sound and animation. All those blinking 
images—torch, alarm clock, dirigible, radar, etc., (each representing a link to the 
world of Coca Cola joy)—are constantly moving back and forth, or up and down, 
exposing an intense degree of digital manipulation in Web design. The Coca-Cola 
bottle, displayed in combination with pictures of super highway and super-high 
buildings (shown in various modem-looking shapes) seems to indicate the 
designers' intention to connect Coca-Cola with the world of modem technology. 
Notice that, at the bottom of the page, Coca-Cola is identified as the "herald of 
modem times" (in Chinese) with the English modifier "In" (not Out!) preceding it. 
While the Coca-Cola brand, together with the Coca-Cola bottle, has been given 
prominence in visual treatment, it is also meshed, as we can see, with items of 
design featuring things other than Coca-Cola (as described in the above). 
Noticeably, Coca-Cola does not stand by itself in the design. 
which shows only "WWW." 
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On the right side of the Chinese Web site, there is a column called "Public 
Information," which takes almost half of the site. Interestingly, it provides links to 
news and stories (mostly of foreign sources) that have no bearing on the Coca-Cola 
Company and its products. The reader can click on "Overseas Campuses/' 
"Highlights of Exotic Lands/' "Dangerous Lovers/' etc., to access all sorts of "public 
information" that ranges from genuine news items to sensational tabloids. Again, 
the column does not relate very well to the host page in terms of targeting its 
audience, as there is no guarantee that those interested in Coke will also be 
interested in stories like "Dangerous Lovers." 
4. Analysis and comparison 
Frankly, the immediate challenge I am facing when analyzing the above-listed 
online samples is how to directly apply what has been discussed in the previous 
section to the analysis. For example, how can we make a reasonable decision as to 
which online sample has a "sublime" quality and which one doesn't? I take solace in 
insisting that what I tried to accomplish was not to theorize about the visual sublime 
but rather to use it as a conceptual example to illustrate what distinguishes Western 
and Eastern ethos in visual arts and design: i.e., the question of whether ethos is to 
be delivered from within (by focusing on design itself) or from without (by relating 
design to context and environment). This, I think, can be analyzed. Similarly, there is 
no reliable way to show whether an online Web page has incorporated the Ym-
Ymzg, or f gMg-Sfzwz, principle in its design or not, but we can certainly tell through 
analysis whether it has built up its ethos by making cultural connections. Indeed, the 
reason I discussed Ym-Yang and was to prove a central point of the paper: 
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i.e., Chinese ethos lies in making cultural connections and is therefore a purely 
collective phenomenon, as opposed to Western ethos, which is highly individualistic. 
Based on what has been discussed about ethos in Chinese visual arts and 
design in the previous section, the following three aspects of design ideology will be 
the focus of analysis and comparison: 1) self-assertion versus self-effacement, 2) 
micro versus macro, and 3) doing-less versus doing-more. 
SeZf-asserfzoM or 
The term "self-assertion" might be a misnomer here because, as indicated earlier in 
the section, online authorship is, at least in most cases, a collective authorship 
representing an organization or community. This would mean that the kind of 
ethos, to be presented on behalf of an individual self imbued with appeals of 
"personality" and "character," has largely become a non-issue in cyberspace. 
However, I do not mean to suggest that there is no such thing as online ethos 
(which would make this paper impossible): As long as issues of credibility or 
trustworthiness link with rhetorical persuasion, how to project ethos will always 
remain a matter of concern for the presenters, whether online or offline. Nor do I 
want to say that the unconventionality of online authorship has necessarily 
transformed the way online designers/ writers approach ethos or its delivery, at 
least for now. 
While the traditional Western definition of ethos in the strict sense of self-
representation may not apply well online, Western Web designers may still find 
themselves, albeit unwittingly oftentimes, under the influence of such a tradition. 
For example, they may apply digital devices to deliberately enhance the visual 
"glamour" of Web design so as to assert, in Buchanan's words, its "existence" or 
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"attitudes/' So, what I mean by "self-assertion" in the analysis that follows refers to 
the assertion of design items objectified through the hands of online designers. I use 
the word "self" as a modifier because the assertion of design can still be attributed to 
the traditional understanding of ethos as self-representation, based on which 
designers can ignore relationships between design and its context and environment, 
as if design items could contain some sort of "self" within. 
Using the Web samples described earlier in the section, we might be able to 
identify, with relative ease, the "self-assertion" tendency on the Western sites, 
where the heavy application of graphics appears to be the norm. Generally 
speaking, using graphics in design is seen as attempting to "maximize the impact of 
communication through the combined or disjointed means of the written message, 
the sign, or the image" (Moles 122). Due to its potential to make design objects 
visually appealing, graphic design may also be considered an effective way to 
maximize the impact of visual ethos (which is part of a communication after all). This 
appears to be especially true with online design objects, where the delivery of ethos 
may depend more on the visual appeals of graphics used. 
It is hard to tell whether the designers of those Western sites have made a 
conscious effort to "maximize" the impact of online ethos, but judging from the 
effusive use of graphics in constructing "cool" images of commercial products (e.g., 
the mouth-watering red lobster, the thirst-quenching Budweiser, the classy "Misty 
Slims" lady, and the joyful Coca-Cola), it seems reasonable to suggest that the 
Aristotelian ethos can still be identified. For example, the presentation of those 
friendly business corporations, with the help of color, icons, images, etc., is 
reminiscent of Aristotle's "good sense" and "good will" (BH 161), to be crafted 
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through the skillful use of language (or graphics in the case of online design). We 
can assume that self-assertion, as implied in the Aristotelian approach to ethos, is 
also brought into play when designers are using graphics to maximize the visual 
impact of their online design. 
One simple reason for designers to apply graphics is that design objects 
would thus look good, hence the potential to deliver ethos. However, a heavy 
reliance on graphics could signal an obsession with the technical manipulation of 
ethos as though "looking good" (i.e., ethos) is all about "designing good." As 
mentioned earlier, I'd rather think of such an approach in design as "isolated" or 
"focused" in that designers direct too much of their attention to asserting a single 
design item without regarding its relations with context and environment or simply 
with other items. Probably a better way to appreciate the "isolated" or "focused" 
design approach on those Western sites is to contrast them (see samples 1, 2, 3, and 
9) with the Chinese sites, where the use of graphics tends to be moderate. As we can 
see, some of the Chinese Web pages are quite dull-looking because of the 
"insufficient" use of graphics (see samples 5 and 6). In sample 6, we do have a 
bamboo picture, but its design is rather symbolic, short of graphic details that more 
often than not bombard a Western design. I would use the phrase "self-effacement" 
to describe Chinese Web design in the sense that its "low-profile" approach (i.e., 
using less graphics and glamour) does not assert too much of its own. Yes, the 
bamboo does have its charm, but we won't be as much overwhelmed by it as we 
are by the picture of Red Lobster, "Misty Slims" Lady, Budweiser, or Coca-Cola. 
The attempt to use visually overwhelming pictures or images can be seen as 
indicative of a "focused" or "high-profile" design approach, but it may also point to 
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an individualistic sentiment associated with the design ideology of the West: i.e., 
delivering distinction to individual design items. One such example would be that of 
"Misty Slims" Lady (sample 3), featured with glamour and distinction. We may even 
sense a deliberate play of ethos in the design, where a female smoker is presented to 
incarnate elegance, charm, beauty, and seemingly high social status. But, as we can 
see, ethos created as such is also of an individual kind, as it is built up on the image 
of a female individual (actress?), and on the distinction (at least visually) brought 
along with such an image. 
Other Western Web sites, like the ones we have seen in samples 1, 3, and 9, 
do not have the individual glamour of "Misty Slims" Lady to personify their ethos, 
but we can still sense an individualistic sentiment underlying design and delivery of 
ethos on these sites. For example, the aggressive visual projection of lobster (food), 
Budweiser beer, or Coca-Cola could be taken to signify an urge to individualize 
design items by bringing visual distinction to them. In contrast, the Chinese sites, 
because of the self-effacement design ideology of their designers, do not emphasize 
the need to individualize design items; rather, they show a degree of moderation in 
treating individual items. One such example would be the "World of Chinese 
Culture" (sample 5), hosted by the Taiwan administration. Visually speaking, the 
whole site is much less assertive if judged by Western standards. But perhaps even 
more telling is the "moon-cake" picture, whose "shyness" in design points to what 
is NOT at work: the idea of individualization. This is because the picture is treated as 
part of the whole: an aggressive treatment could disrupt its visual harmony or 
coordination with the rest of the page. (We probably can imagine what a Western 
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Web designer would do with the picture: to enlarge its size, and to use various 
visual "tricks" to dramatize the moon-cakes.) 
The marketing of a new green-tea product on the Japanese Coca-Cola site is 
also very telling (Sample 10). Rather than have the can of Maro Cha^ stand out 
visually, the designers choose to bury it, inconspicuously, within the window of that 
cartoon-like vending machine. The presentation of Maro Cha as such may be 
considered visually ineffective by Western Web designers, who might prefer to 
"individualize" the design by, for example, magnifying the Maro Cha can out of 
proportion (perhaps with a high-sounding slogan like "Maro Cha: Secret to Slim 
Health" to accompany it). But I would rather argue that the way Maro Cha is 
presented may just reflect the Eastern tradition of "self-effacement" in design 
ideology: i.e., it is being treated as "part of the whole" in relation to the Coca-Cola 
family (of products)^, instead of something that takes the spotlight to itself. 
Speaking of ethos, we might sense the difference here: The Eastern designer would 
show a design item (e.g., Maro Cha) to be credible by making it fit into, or 
associated with, an object that already carries ethos (e.g., the brand of Coca-Cola as 
it appears on the cartoon machine) whereas a Western designer would show a 
design item to be credible by making the design look good, impressive, and, above 
all, visually outstanding in itself. 
Sample 11, of the Chinese Coca-Cola site, could be seen as an example of 
Western invasion of Chinese design because of the apparent bent on using heavy 
graphics, color and other sorts of digital expressions. However, I wouldn't say it is 
totally out of tune with the self-effacement design tradition in Chinese culture. While 
" Product name of the green tea. 
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the Coca-Cola bottle and sign have been given much of visual attention, they don't 
appear, in my view, so aloof as to give the impression that they stand as isolated 
design items. For one thing, they have been woven into a collage of icons featuring 
themes more than Coca-Cola. For another, the Public Information column on the 
right side of the page has offered a visual balance for the site so that the Coca-Cola 
bottle and sign won't take all of the highlights. The balance could be dismissed by a 
Western designer as lack of focus in design, but I would argue that it probably has 
more to do with the idea of "contextualization" in Chinese design, which I will 
discuss in detail next. 
Micro or macro? 
In her cross-cultural comparison of the use of graphics in scientific and technical 
communication, Wang Qiuye observes that American manuals are "direct and 
focused" (559) with close integration between "visuals and texts" (556), whereas 
"the Chinese visuals are not so well connected with the texts to which they 
correspond" (ibid.). The poor visual-verbal integration in Chinese manuals, explains 
Wang, may result from the holistic communication style in Chinese culture, in which 
context "is always an important part of understanding and communication" (558). It 
is probably hard to explain why a manual with poor visual-verbal integration can be 
holistic, whereas one with close visual-verbal integration can not. The answer, as 
Wang implies, may exist in the fact that Chinese manuals tend to include contextual 
elements that are not directly related to a task performance, whereas American 
manuals tend to concentrate on the technical details of a performance, which 
Maro Cha is produced by the Japanese Coca-Cola Company. 
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demands close integration between the verbal and visual, yet ignores the context in 
which a task is to be performed. 
The close integration in manual design as observed by Wang indicates the 
goal-oriented style of communication that prevails in Western culture (ibid.), but it 
also reveals what I perceive to be an individualistic (as opposed to holistic) sentiment 
that dominates the ideology of Western design: i.e., to work on design within its 
closed parameters without addressing the broad question of how to relate design to 
its context and environment. I would call such "focused" design "micro" to 
differentiate from the "context-oriented," or "macro" design. Based on the 
descriptions of those Web samples, it is possible for us to identify a micro trend on 
the Western sites as opposed to a macro one on the Eastern sites. 
The Western samples may well be labeled as "micro" simply because of the 
underlying tendency in individualizing design items, but I also use the term to 
mean, specifically, the kind of design that does not connect design items to their 
context, or something that does directly relate to design thematically (e.g., content 
or purpose). As readers may have seen, all of the Western Web sites can be 
considered "content-specific," with technical details well coordinated to the subject 
of design. In other words, there has been a close integration between design and 
content "to show the logical relationships among all elements that appear on the 
page" (Farkas and Farkas 241). For example, on the American Coca-Cola site 
(sample 9), everything in design, from the use of color (the Coca-Cola red) to the 
display of polar bear cubs, coheres logically with the "joy" of Coca-Cola. The jumbo 
lobster, which takes center stage on Red Lobster's home page (sample 1), is 
designed to highlight the appetizing effects of seafood served in the restaurant, and 
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the picture itself also integrates closely with the slogan of "Go Overboard/' which 
implies what Red Lobster has to offer: superior food quality, utmost customer 
satisfaction, etc. 
The integration seen between design and content on the Western Web sites is 
an indication of a "direct and focused" approach at work, suggesting that designers' 
decisions are directed towards design mainly at the micro level, such as concern 
over how to correspond to the theme(s) of a design project. As a result, Red 
Lobster's Web site is now all about Red Lobster (restaurant chain and its seafood), 
and Coca-Cola's Web site is all about Coca-Cola or things that carry a "Coca-Cola" 
theme. What is more, because of design decisions being leveled at micro details, 
Western Web sites can exhibit a disconnection from the cultural context of their 
target audience. Take for example Budweiser's U.K. site (sample 3), where the 
Americanism "Whassup?!," along with die message printed below, is incorporated 
well with the theme of the site, as it is meant to lure curious Web surfers to click into 
the fun world of "Bud." However, this is also where we can sense a cultural 
disconnect: Will the Brits, who usually relish wry humor and polished usage of 
language, buy into an American lingo "Whassup"? The fine print at the bottom of 
the screen, which says "U.S .residents under 21 years old should not enter the site," 
may expose as well a lack of connection with the host country, whose residents are 
mostly non-U.S. and are allowed to drink at age 16. 
The "macro" disjunction, as seen on Budweiser's U.K. Web page, will 
certainly be less of an issue on Chinese Web sites, where designers tend to show 
more concern over how to incorporate their design items into the context of host 
culture or society. However, such a broad approach could result in a "micro" 
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disjunction in design, causing a Web site to be thematically digressive or, to use 
Wang's words, "loose and inaccurate" (557) in terms of correspondence between 
design and the subject of design. Take for example the Chinese Coca-Cola Web site, 
which is overlaid with links in the Public Information column that virtually hane no 
bearing on Coca-Cola. Apparently, the goal of helping "express the theme of the 
website," as proposed by Farkas and Farkas for American Web designers (241), was 
never to be accomplished. But the design can still be credited with meaningfulness if 
critics appreciate the emphasis put on contextualization in Chinese design: i.e., to 
approach design macrocosmically, through integration with cultural context. 
As far as I know, the Public Info column tells of what is currently in vogue in 
(mainland) China, especially among the younger population: sex (Dangerous 
Lovers), studying abroad (Overseas Campuses), travel (Highlights of Exotic Lands), 
etc. Despite the fact that it may prove thematically irrelevant to the Coca-Cola 
Company and its products, the column may well play a role in connecting the Web 
site with the "IN" trends in today's Chinese society. Interestingly, we may also 
sense an attempt on the part of designers to turn Coca-Cola, a drinking product, 
into one of those "IN's," in that Coke is now presented as something to be 
associated with modem technologies (see sample and description), which the 
Chinese leadership is more than enthusiastic to embrace in the new millennium for 
the ambitions of industrializing the country. 
The Moon-Cake ad on Hong Kong "Yahoo! Finance" also illustrates, in my 
view, the notion of contextualization in Eastern design. While the ad may not 
integrate well, in content or theme, with the host page, which is dedicated to money 
and investment, it does demonstrate a sense of connection with Hong Kong's 
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cultural environment where the Confucian tradition of "filial piety" is still being 
observed among the Chinese as the norm of family life. From the strict rhetorical 
point of view, the ad could be declared a design failure because there is no 
guarantee that those interested in buying stocks would be equally interested in 
buying moon-cakes. (It would make more sense to place the ad on a Web site 
covering food items.) But one could argue that the design fails only at the micro 
level, for not corresponding with the "finance" theme of the host site; on the macro 
level, it fares quite well, for linking ordinary moon-cakes to the possible fulfillment 
of one's "filial duty" and creating an extraordinary cultural appeal in host society. 
One could argue further that there is equally no guarantee that those who feel their 
filial piety inspired, whether stock junkies or Web surfers, would decide against 
ordering moon-cakes for their parents. 
Whether the Moon-Cake ad is effective or not in targeting its audience, I 
would leave the answer to the readers. My point is that it incorporates a design 
tradition (perhaps unwittingly on the part of designers) that is macroscopically 
attuned to the host site's cultural context, as opposed to a tradition that is driven 
microscopically by design's inner coherence (e.g., close integration between host 
sites and ads published on them, as seen on the American "Yahoo! Finance" site). 
Again, we probably can imagine what a typical Western Web designer would do 
with the Moon-Cake ad. Because of the micro concern in design, he or she may well 
end up focusing, exclusively, on the graphic details of those moon-cakes so as to 
induce an "mouthwatering" effect on online consumers. There is no doubt that an 
ad like this will have its own charm or ethos, especially if it is well designed. 
However, ethos of this sort is a "micro" ethos, based on devotion to details of a 
181 
design. And, as we may recall, Eastern ethos, on the other hand, is created at the 
macro level, with allusion made to sources of inspirations from outside of a design, 
as seen in the example of an online moon-cake ad in Hong Kong that draws on 
Confucius' "filial piety," a culturally popular theme in the host society, to build up its 
appeal. 
The home page of the Hong Kong Computer Society (HKCS) (sample 4) 
could be another example to illustrate how an Eastern ethos is delivered through 
macro designing. The Great Wall and the skyline of Hong Kong City, designed as a 
background scene at the top, could well indicate an attempt to contextualize the 
HKCS in design by showing its cultural standing and geographical location. More 
significantly, the Chinese line, "Computer Science and Technology Terms, Complied 
by China Computer Society and Published by National Committee on 
Standardization of Nature and Science Terminologies" (printed at the bottom), could 
reveal a deliberate attempt to create ethos for the HKCS, for what is really at stake 
is the credibility of the computer science and technology terms provided online by 
the host. 
In Hong-Kong, and also in China, terminologies in computer science and 
technology have posed a persistent challenge to researchers and professionals in the 
field due to the confusion caused by new technical terms as a result of rapid 
advancement of computer science and technology. But reducing such confusion by 
imposing some sort of standardization could be equally challenging, because not 
everyone has the "mandate" to do that. For two reasons at least, the HKCS does 
not avail itself of that "mandate." First, the HKCS is a local professional 
organization; its status does not carry enough credibility to standardize technical 
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terminologies on its own terms. Second, the Chinese spoken in Hong Kong 
differentiates significantly from mainstream Chinese,^ which could make it even 
less credible for the HKCS to impose standardization on its own. Nevertheless, 
those searching the HKCS's Web site for "standard" terms in computer science and 
technology may not feel the credibility of the site at issue here because of the 
legitimacy the HKCS can claim under the "auspices" of two most prestigious, and 
also authoritative, professional institutions on the subject in China: the China 
Computer Society (CCS) and the National Committee on Standardization of Nature 
and Science Terminologies (NCSNST).^ One might argue the credibility, or ethos, of 
the Hong Kong Computer Society goes beyond the design of a Web site, but at least 
we can see that its designers know how to incorporate in design sources of ethos 
from outside: namely, an institutionalized endorsement from the CCS and the 
NCSNST.i? 
The example of the Hong Kong Computer Society's site helps affirm the 
argument I made earlier about an important feature of Chinese rhetoric: i.e., the 
rhetor secures his or her persuasive power by invoking the socially or culturally 
established authority. For the purpose of this analysis, it points out, once again, how 
ethos can be created online: i.e., the designer chooses to present the credible not by 
tending to micro details of design but by showing off macro affiliation with sources 
of appeal from outside of Web design. The aforementioned Chinese line (i.e., 
Hong Kong people predominantly speak Cantonese, a dialect that for the most part doesn't have equivalents 
in written Chinese. 
In China, professional organizations at the national level are generally considered very prestigious, partly 
because they are government-run or -sponsored and partly because they are also first-rate research institutes 
"elite" intellectuals are affiliated with, like the National Science Academy and the National Social Science 
Academy (both administered under the Central Government). 
In my paper, "Corporate Image as Collective Ethos," I have argued to the effect that ethos is essentially an 
institutionalized discourse formation. 
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"Computer Science and Technology Terms, Compiled by China Computer Society 
and Published by National Committee on Standardization of Nature and Science 
Terminologies") is nothing dramatic visually, especially from the point of those 
indulging in heavy graphics, but because of the linkage it signifies between the host 
and big names like the CCS and the NCSNST, it may turn out to be the most 
significant piece of design in delivering ethos. 
Domg-more or domg-kss? 
In Section IE of this paper, I have discussed rather in length two different design 
mentalities, pointing out that Western visual designers, because of the drive to 
express themselves in full, tend to do more with design objects than their Eastern 
counterparts, who are more concerned about letting nature, environment, and the 
ultimate Dao unveil themselves and therefore tend to do less with design. At the 
center of such differentiation lies the perception of ethos: Western ethos is equated 
with self-projection or self-representation, therefore the need to do more to assert 
design objects and, through them, one's self; Eastern ethos, on the other hand, 
downplays personal show-off, emphasizing instead the necessity to do less to 
abstain from "man-made" elaboration in design. 
In online design, the "doing-more" mentality could result in, for example, 
complex combinations of content types (i.e., text, graphics, animation, video, and 
audio), heavy use of color, and frequent display of sleek icons and images, as we 
have often seen on Western, especially American, Web sites. Needless to say, the 
"doing-less" mentality leads to the opposite: simple combinations of content types, 
light use of color, and infrequent display of icons and images (which are in general 
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visually moderate), as has been observed on Chinese and other Eastern countries' 
Web sites. 
Admittedly, two factors could dictate the outcome of a design in terms of 
doing-more or -less. One is that Internet technology varies across countries. Since 
the Western world has been the (technological) leader in online design, it is likely 
that Western designers may end up doing more with their design objects simply 
because of easy access to advancements in Internet technology. The other is that an 
online designer, whether Western or Eastern, may not be aware of the "doing-
more/ doing-less" differentiation at all, which would mean that what has been 
created in a Web design could have been the function of personal whims, rather 
than the result of cultural mandates. 
I have no desire to deny the impact that technological advancements and 
individual propensities can exert on the outcome of Web design. However, it is 
equally, if not more, important to recognize that designers make their decisions 
within the constraints of a design tradition, a point already iterated in my earlier 
discussion about the Western/Eastern distinction between self-assertion and Eastern 
self-effacement, or between micro and macro design approach. In a way, the 
analysis that follows, about the "doing-more/ doing-less" distinction between the 
West and East, can be taken as a repeat of what has already been discussed, but only 
from a different angle. I think readers may be aware of the connections: Because of 
the urge to assert their design, designers feel compelled to do more with their Web 
pages so as to materialize that assertion; because of the concern about inner 
coherence, designers may have to do more with their online projects to work out 
the micro details of design. Likewise, the tradition of projecting ethos on the basis of 
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self-effacement would make it desirable for designers to do less so as to avoid 
individual spotlights, and the practice of drawing on collective appeals in one's 
culture would also discourage designers to do more so that their designs will mesh 
well into the cultural framework. 
At this juncture it is probably necessary to bring in, once again, Edward Hall's 
famous "low- and high-context" theory, which could help conceptualize, further, 
how the "doing-more/-less" mentality plays out in visual, as well as in Web, design 
in different cultures. In low-context cultures, such as North America, communication 
is "vested in the explicit code" (BgyoW Cuftwre 91), to the extent that it can stand 
clear of its context. But doing so would necessarily entail "elaborated" codes (92) in 
communication, therefore compelling communicators to do more to make their 
messages clear. In high-context cultures, like Eastern Asia, communication comes 
together with context, with "very little" in the "coded, explicit, transmitted part of 
the message" (91). Understandably, communicators, such as visual designers, would 
thus feel themselves "restricted" (92) in communication, but it would also mean that 
they don't have to do as much as their "low-context" counterparts do to make their 
messages clear.^ I have mentioned earlier that the high-context communication 
style embraces a holistic approach (i.e., involving context) that can be termed 
"macro," whereas the low-context communication style adopts a rather direct and 
focused approach that can be called "micro." So, Hall's "context" theory helps to 
explain how micro design relates to the doing-more mentality and micro design, or 
how macro design relates to the doing-more mentality. In the following, I would 
According to Scoilon and Scolion, communications always imply ambiguity: No matter how hard one tries, a 
message can never be clear and explicit (see their Wgrcw/fwraZ Cofwnwnzcano/i, pp. 5-11). So, it seems to make 
sense to do less to let people draw inferences from the context. 
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like to address the doing-more/-less question by focusing on these two aspects of 
online design: use of graphics and use of white space. 
Graphic design^ can maximize the impact of a message, but it also means 
that more design efforts have to be made by designers, for the conceivable reason 
that screen graphics demand more creativity than ordinary words or text. From 
those selected samples, we probably can see a fairly clear distinction between 
Western and Eastern Web design in terms of the amount of graphics involved. The 
Western samples generally incorporate more visuals (e.g., icons, images, pictures, 
etc.,) presumably for the purpose of enhancing the message as well as the appeal of 
design, as seen in the Web pages of Red Lobster, Misty Slims, Budweiser, and Coca-
Cola (samples 1,2, 3, and 9), whereas Eastern pages (with the exception of the 
Chinese Coca-Cola Web site) tend to be visually subdued, with less graphics applied, 
as seen on the home pages of the Hong-Kong Computer Society, World of Chinese 
Culture (in Taiwan), and Chinese Language Teachers Association (in U. S.) (samples 
4,5, and 6). What is more, we can also see a sharp distinction between Western and 
Eastern design in terms of details involved. 
As discussed earlier, attention to details could signal a "micro" approach in 
design, but with Hall's "context" theory in mind, we might say, as well, that it points 
to "the explicit code" governing design decisions in "low-context" culture. The 
display of a chilled, larger than usual "Bud" bottle, as seen in sample 3, would be a 
good example to illustrate the degree of explicitness in Western Web design, where 
^ Strictly speaking, online graphic design also includes decisions about the "appearance of words on the screen," 
whether it is body text or display text, according to Farkas and Farkas (248). Decisions made as to typeface and 
typesize selections, treatment of words (colored, bold, underlined, italicized, etc.), cases of characters (upper or 
low), etc., are all considered "an aspect of graphic design" (ibid.). But I use the term graphics to mean, 
specifically, visual elements of design as distinguished from ordinary words or text: for example, various iconic 
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fine details of graphics, like those on that "Bud" picture, would often leave no room 
for imagination, as if all one has to offer must be made clear up-front so that 
viewers could be spared a second guess. Not surprisingly, we may find the opposite 
to be true with designs in "high-context" culture, where lack of details is very often 
indicative of the implicit style of design and communication. Take for example the 
"bamboo" picture featured on the Web site of the Chinese Language Teachers 
Association (CLTA) (sample 6). For one thing, the bamboo does not have the vivid 
visual details as we have normally seen on Western Web sites: the whole picture is 
rather simple in design, with bamboo leaves drawn symbolically in the shape of 
brush strokes. For another, it does not tell explicitly of what it has to "offer": the 
message is rather tacit in the sense that viewers have to know of the bamboo's 
symbolic associations in Chinese culture before figuring out why it found its way 
there. (The bamboo serves as a cultural symbol of moral rectitude.) Because of this 
implicitness in a design message, Chinese designers, we may infer, do not have to 
go an extra mile to pile up graphics to elaborate on the details of a design. As seen in 
the example of that bamboo picture, a few strokes of ink would be sufficient to 
convey a message. In contrast, their Western counterparts may have a different 
story to tell: the demand for explicit design messages, coupled with hard-sell tactics 
to create an enticing grip upon viewers, would make it all the more imperative for 
them to refrain from using simple or less expressive graphics on their works. It 
would be hard to imagine that Budweiser's U.K. Web page can be designed 
otherwise (in terms of design philosophy) if its message is all about what exactly 
Budweiser can offer or sell. (Can we think of an implicit way to project Bud's 
expressions we have seen on the Web. Indeed, Farkas and Farkas also draw such a distinction when they speak 
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refreshing image?) In other words, Western Web designers are compelled to do 
more for the sake of pushing through their design messages. 
We probably can see the difference here in terms of how online ethos is 
delivered. The ethos of Budweise/s U.K. page, which is driven by a doing-more 
mentality and created in accordance drawing on "elaborated" codes (through a 
display of expressive graphics), is more of a direct type of appeal, built on explicit 
visual details that can exert a strong, immediate, "eye-grabbing" effect on the 
viewer. The appeal of that "chilled" Bud beer, we can see, comes from none other 
than the use of high graphics. Needless to say, the appeal, or ethos, of the CLTA's 
home page is more of an indirect type, in the sense that it has less to do with design, 
particularly, the use of high graphics, than with symbolic allusions, elicited through 
the bamboo, to culturally appealing moral qualities. This indirect way to deliver 
ethos can definitely relieve Chinese designers of the burden of relying on the visual 
dimension of a Web design to create an appeal, which may also explain why they 
can afford to do less.. 
The fact that Budweiser's U.K. site is serving a commercial purpose while the 
CLTA's is targeting an academic audience could declare incomparable the samples 
selected from these two sites, therefore rendering invalid the distinction I have 
attempted to draw—between high graphics/explicit or iconic expression in Western 
design and low graphics/implicit or symbolic expression in Eastern design/" For 
this reason, I took a look at a few more sites that might be more comparable to a 
about how to integrate graphics with text (88). 
While recognizing that the function of a Web site can shape the amount and intensity of graphics used, I also 
believe that patterns of design can be traced, at least in part, to the cultural framework. Besides, my intent is to 
discuss what is perceived to be a general trend in online graphic design (doing-more or doing-less), rather than to 
present some clear-cut evidence for scientific demonstration. 
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demanding reader, such as Pepsi-Cola's American (http://www.pepsi.com) and 
Chinese sites (http:/ / www.pepsi-cola.co.cn) and the car-maker Honda's American 
(http:/ / www.honda.com) and Japanese sites (http: / / www.honda.co.jp). And what I 
found seems to reinforce the point that has been made. For example, Pepsi-Cola's 
USA home page is much more "iconic" in design, packed with visuals ranging from 
the photo of a pop star to graphic images of Pepsi-Cola products. The Chinese site, 
on the other hand, is rather "humble" in using graphics. Except for the Pepsi logo 
and one single picture of a Pepsi-Cola can, the whole Web page relies mainly on 
using Chinese characters to appeal to its audience. 
The contrast between Honda's two Web sites is even more dramatic. The 
American home page is featuring, side by side, a sleek Civic Hybrid car and an 
oversized "HONDA" sign displayed against a burgundy background, whereas the 
Japanese page was designed plainly, without resorting to high graphics, like the 
above-mentioned car and sign, to "dazzle" its viewers. There is no way to tell who 
was behind the designings for Honda's two different Web sites, but it appears clear 
that designers have adapted their designs to the different communication styles in 
host cultures. The "posh" image of a Honda Civic Hybrid calls to mind hard-sell 
tactics commonly practiced in North-American business communications, as it is 
intended to visualize the physical appeals of the car for the purpose of tempting 
potential buyers. Such a direct, explicit style of communication may work well in a 
society with a short attention span and an enduring fascination with visually flashy 
materials, but it may not achieve its purpose in Japan, where the communication 
style is predominantly tacit and indirect, hence the preference for plain-looking 
design on the Web. 
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The "doing-more/-less" distinction between Western and Eastern Web 
design is also reflected in designers' decisions as to how to deal with white space 
(blank areas) on Web pages. As has been discussed in the earlier section, Chinese 
visual artists and designers tend to take more liberty with white space because of 
the belief that "less is more/' whereas their Western counterparts would go the 
other way around, for fear of not expressing themselves in full. While the line may 
not be that clearly cut on the Web, some distinction in terms of allocating white 
space can still be discerned from the samples I have selected. The Western Web 
pages, readers may have already noticed, are, overall, more crowded with design 
items, which, together with effusive use of vibrant colors and expressive graphics, 
can produce a "screen-ful" look to a viewer's eye. The Eastern pages, to the 
contrary, appear to have utilized more of white space, which, in combination with 
low graphics and light color schemes, can leave a visual impression that is "laid-
back" and, of course, less "screen-ful." 
The home page of Coca-Cola's American site may serve to exemplify the 
Western "screenfulness," notably for the fact that there is virtually no space left 
"unoccupied" on the screen (sample 9). The full-page design, mainly featuring the 
classic Coca-Cola trademark, the gushing image of Coke, and several Coca-Cola 
"joy" scenes, all of them against the background of Coca-Cola red, is a good 
indication of the doing-more mentality at work. It also reveals, in my view, a 
conscious maneuvering by designers to build up ethos for the host site, as the 
"screenful" design could be translated, subliminally, into saying: "Hey, we've got a 
lot for you!" By comparison the CLTA's home page may strike a different tone, 
apparently for its lavish use of white space (sample 6). As I pointed out earlier in 
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Section EI, including a large chunk of white space in design could be detrimental to 
one's ethos, if judged by Western standards (not in the absolute sense, of course). 
This is because it yields an impression that designers did not put enough into their 
work. And, if we compare the CLTA's with Coca-Cola's American site, it is not hard 
to decide (at least at first glance) which site is "thin" and which is "full." However, I 
wouldn't thus conclude that the CLTA's site suffers a shortage of ethos. The reason 
is that white space has been frequently utilized in Eastern cultures for the purpose of 
energizing design by bringing out a flowing zone for Qz. 
On the CLTA's home page, such a flowing zone, we may see, was created 
mostly to the right side of that symbolic bamboo. The enormous chunk of white 
space could be dismissed as wasteful by Western designers, but its value may be 
appreciated by the fact that the space has provided plenty of room for Qz to flow, 
therefore creating a sense of vividness for the bamboo, which is, so to speak, the 
center piece of design on the CLTA's site. We probably can imagine what would 
happen if the white space surrounding the bamboo picture were filled "full": The 
flowing zone of Qz could be blocked, and the picture could thus be stripped of its 
liveliness. 
Using Western design language, we might just say that the visual impact of 
the bamboo could be diminished, because smaller white space minimizes the effect 
of figure-ground contrast, through which the bamboo tree can be visually brought 
to "life" (i.e., vividness or liveliness). But let me make myself clear here: I'm not 
attempting to say that the use of white space in design can be explained in terms of 
"Qz" or "figure-ground contrast," but rather that the "doing-more / -less" mentality 
can determine how much of white space will be incorporated into Web design. In 
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Western cultures, the "doing-more" mentality would translate into making design 
items objects of "full expression." Designers would therefore do everything they 
can (for example, using high graphics) to visualize that "full expression." Because of 
this mentality, white space could be thought of as irrelevant to design items and 
subsequently treated as mere "blank areas." But in Chinese and other Eastern 
cultures, doing less could mean "more," and white space can thus be lavishly 
incorporated into design (as a flowing zone for Qz) so as to enliven the appeal of 
design items, as seen in the example of that bamboo tree on the CLTA's site. 
The home page of Coca-Cola's Japanese site (sample 10) is also worthy of 
analysis, simply for the reason that the enormous white space surrounding that 
Coca-Cola "cartoon" machine cannot escape anybody's attention. Again we may 
sense the cultural difference: For Western online viewers (and designers alike), if 
they look at the Coke machine as a design item isolated from the white space 
surrounding it, then clearly more needs to be done to fill that design "vacuum," but 
for Eastern viewers (and designers alike) who can appreciate white space as part of 
design, the enormity of that "vacuum" around the Coke machine would make all 
the more sense. As we can see, the "cartoon" machine, equipped with arms and 
legs, needs quite a bit of space to move around in order to be "alive." 
(Psychologically, viewers could feel the need.) If its designers shrank the white space 
by filling in more design items there, it might make the screen look full to an 
Western eye, but in my (Eastern) view it could end up sacrificing the "Qz" of the 
Web page and rendering the whole page less energetic. 
Finally, Td like to make a brief comment on the samples (7 and 8) selected 
from two rather "comparable" Web sites: American "Yahoo! Finance" and Hong 
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Kong "Yahoo! Finance." The two sites are quite similar in their visual layout, 
probably due to the fact that they both carry the same "task mission" as a 
finance/investment information provider and are run by the same Internet 
company. However, we may notice this difference: The American site is packed with 
information links and other visual items like icons or online ads, in contrast with the 
Hong Kong site, which is, visually, marked by wide margins of white space. One 
explanation could be that Chinese characters take less space compared with an 
alphabetic language like English, but I think the "doing-more/-less" distinction also 
plays its part. For example, under that same heading, "Investing," the American site 
has thirty-six links, while the Hong Kong site has only twenty-two. Overall, the 
American site has more visually "flashy" devices in comparison with its Hong Kong 
counterpart. 
Again, there is no way to tell who was behind all of the designs on "Yahoo! 
Finance," but we can assume that some cultural adjustment has been made for 
targeting audiences more effectively. To the American viewer, Yahoo! Finance's 
credibility (or ethos) rests in part upon how much information it can provide; 
therefore, more links and less white space would be a better choice. But in Hong 
Kong, a similar design decision may not work well; rather, adapting to a "doing-
less" mentality by incorporating more of white space into Web design can probably 
better meet the viewer's (visual) expectations. I will have to stretch myself to argue 
that "Qz" flows on the site of Hong Kong "Yahoo! Finance," but at least we can say 
that its wider white space enables users to move around and access information 
with more ease, therefore ensuring better online interactions. In that sense, doing 
less can definitely be translated into doing more. 
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5. Discussion 
In what has been a rather lengthy analysis (and comparison) of samples selected 
from a variety of Web sites, I have addressed three major distinctions between 
Western and Eastern online design in regard to ethos: i.e./ self-assertion versus self-
effacement, micro versus macro, and doing-more versus doing-less. They in turn 
are mirroring broader differences between the West and East in visual arts and 
design as well as in rhetoric. While acknowledging the possibility that those online 
distinctions could have been caused by factors other than culture, such as Internet 
technology, commercial purpose, and designers' personal background, I was more 
interested in showing how, for example, a difference in using graphics can be 
attributed to the difference in projecting ethos, the perception of which, I must say, 
is culturally "ordained." 
Whether the connections I have been trying to show make sense, it must be 
for the readers of this paper to decide. For my part, I just wish to say it again: What 
was presented is by no means meant to be conclusive; IT1 remain content to see the 
paper as an initiation into further research, and discussion, on the topic of online 
ethos, especially its cross-cultural perspective. On the other hand, I also wish to say 
that culture does play a tangible role in structuring the way Web designers present 
their works, including how they are going to deliver ethos for and through their 
works. For instance, the reason Western designers are likely to use a plethora of 
digital expressions to enhance the glamour of their design may well be that they like 
to assert the "existence" or "attitudes" of their work, as implied in the Western 
approach to ethos as some sort of self-assertion. But such an approach may also 
relate to the individualistic understanding of the self in Western culture, as opposed 
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to Eastern culture, where individualism and the self have been traditionally 
downplayed^ and, consequently, the projection of ethos is characterized by skills of 
(Web) design that reflect on the relationships of design items to objects or beings 
(usually) present on a larger scale (e.g., context, authority, etc.,). 
There is probably no need to recite everything that has already been said, but 
instead I'd like to use this opportunity to broach a few additional thoughts I had in 
my attempt to compare and analyze Western and Eastern online ethos. To begin 
with, I wish that I didn't give the impression that Eastern online design is culturally 
oriented while Western is not, which is simply not true. Postmodern critics, like 
Barthes, would argue that a text (including online), no matter where it is created, has 
to "procee[d] from several cultures" (54), and that authorship is at best "a historical 
construct" (Tuman 64). This would mean that all of the Western samples selected for 
comparison and analysis in this paper are—just like their Eastern 
counterparts—"macro" in essence, culturally defined and even culturally designed. 
Indeed, we can clearly identify traces of cultural or macro design in some of those 
Western samples. In sample 2 (Misty Slims' home page), for example, the American 
pop-culture has left its unambiguous marks of celebrity-worship and sex-obsession, 
which is illustrated through the charm and elegance of a female beauty. In sample 9 
(the U.S. Coca-Cola), we can feel the imprints of American consumerism on a Web 
design in a rather subtle manner: A consumer product (Coke) is now projected as an 
equivalent to the joy of life. If celebrity, sex, or consumerism has anything to do 
with cultural appeals, these (Western) Web pages, then, clearly exhibit an approach 
to ethos that has to be interpreted in a language beyond individualistic terms. 
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What is more, after the September 11th events, the theme of patriotism has 
surged dramatically on many of U. S. corporations' Web sites, where the star-
spangled flag has almost become the norm of design, as seen, for example, on 
MBNA America's^ home page (http:/ / www.mbna.com). The patriotic boom in 
corporate Web design may point to the possibility that business corporations are 
trying to take advantage of the public mood, but it may also reveal, I would think, a 
"macro" move on the part of designers to identify with the sentiment of the nation 
after September 11th and therefore to promote the ethos of host sites. Or, at least it 
suggests that designers are making conscious efforts to connect with society in their 
works of design. 
The apparent "macro" design as seen on those Western Web sites would 
have weakened what I have been trying to establish, the distinctions between 
Western and Eastern (mainly Chinese) online ethos, but I would like to point out 
what seems to me to be reasonable explanations. One is that it is still appropriate to 
say that designers follow their own (culturally structured) design tradition in 
making design decisions, albeit relatively (which is to say that we cannot draw a 
clean-cut line between the West and East). If Hall's "context" theory holds merit, we 
certainly have the reason to believe that a Western online designer would 
incorporate less of cultural context in design in comparison with his/her Eastern 
counterpart. And, if the Western perception of ethos is individualistic at the core, it 
certainly makes sense to expect that a Western designer would project ethos quite 
differently than an Eastern counterpart by, for example, making an online design 
more visually intense. 
One of the largest banking corporations in America. 
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The other is that the "macro" phenomenon observed on Western Web 
designs actually strengthens, though rather ironically, the argument I have made 
about the problematic aspects of Western ethos, which is defined as some sort of 
self-representation. At least, I should say that Buchanan's formulation of ethos in 
visual design does not apply well in his own (Western) culture. I have argued in the 
paper "Ethos in Classical Chinese Rhetoric" that ethos is essentially an invocation of 
cultural forces, with which rhetors not only identify themselves but also, through 
such identification, secure persuasion. I have also argued in my other paper 
"Corporate Image as Collective Ethos" that ethos is a shared social character, using 
building corporate images in Western society as an example to illustrate why it has 
to be approached from a social and cultural perspective. So, it is not inconceivable 
that the collective (social and cultural) aspect of ethos has found its way online, into 
the design of Western sites. 
On the other hand, it is important to understand that the individualistic 
approach to visual ethos, such as formulated by Buchanan and other design 
critics/practitioners, is deeply rooted in a rhetorical tradition that sees ethos as a 
strategy of persuasion based upon the play of a rhetor's personal character. It also 
reflects, in my view, cultural entrenchment in an ideology that "assumes individual 
selves as the presuppositions, logically and biologically, of the social process or 
order within which they interact" (Mead 222).^ Thus, it may come as no surprise 
that Western Web designers would generally adhere in design to the "self-
assertion/ micro/doing-more" line to build online ethos despite the fact that they 
^ To be fair, George Mead also points out that the social theory of the self has been existing in the West as 
opposed to the individualistic. However, until the rise of postmodernism, the former had never been a leading 
voice in the tradition of Western ideology. 
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also try to incorporate culture and other elements of "macro" design into their 
works. 
If Western sites have registered features of design that can be categorized as 
"macro," it is also true that Eastern sites have shown signs of Web design that can 
be described as "micro," "self-asserting, " or "doing-more," as seen, for example, on 
the site of Chinese Coca-Cola (samplell), where the heavy use of colors, graphics, 
etc., has rendered the design almost indistinguishable from its Western 
counterparts. When doing my research, I have also become increasingly aware of 
visually intensive Web designs in countries such as Japan, Korea, and China. Indeed, 
it would be quite a stretch to draw a "cultural distinction" between, say, the design 
of C/zma Dazh/^ (www.chinadaily.co.cn) and that of TTze New York Tzmes 
(www.nytimes.com), especially in their visual layout and use of graphics. 
It would be quite presumptuous to categorize the design of Cfzzwz DazZy or 
other Eastern Web sites as "Westernized," just as there is no reason to declare the 
home pages of MBNA America and other U.S. corporations as "Eastemized" simply 
because of the presence of certain "micro" or "macro" design characteristics in 
them. But it would be of interest to notice that Cyber space can serve as the locus 
where cultures converge rather than diverge, as evidenced by the fact that some of 
the samples analyzed have demonstrated features of design that crosscut cultural 
boundaries. I would use the term "Cyber hybrids" to describe Web designs that are 
culturally indistinctive, as a result of efforts made by designers to cross the line of 
their own tradition and incorporate elements of design from other cultures into 
their works. 
^ A government-run English newspaper in China. 
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But hybridism in Cyber space might be more than a testament to cultural 
convergence: It could signal, using Fredric Jameson's words, "the disappearance of 
certain relationships to history and the past" (Stephanson 5), which could be 
translated to mean that culture, or cultural tradition, is playing a lesser role in 
informing or shaping design decisions a designer makes. I pointed out this 
likelihood earlier when suggesting that the Internet has brought the Eastern and 
Western closer to each other, in the sense that Web designers, whether Eastern or 
Western, will possibly resort to the same digital technique or the same databanks of 
icons to create their visual messages. Jameson predicted a text of postmodernism 
characterized by "the production of discontinuous sentences without any larger 
unifying forces" (Aid.), which has yet to be proven in print space, but in Cyber space 
we might have already witnessed the proliferation of texts or designs that appear 
"discontinuous" and, to a large extent, culturally incohesive, as shown in the 
aforementioned Web "hybrids" ((i.e., sites that are culturally crosscutting in their 
design features). 
I'm not saying the disappearance of "larger unifying forces" that govern 
conventional text production and design will necessarily point to the emergence of 
"one-world culture"^ on the Net, but if s important to know that the Internet has its 
own uniqueness that exceeds cultural boundaries, just as communication and 
information technologies can transcend cultural constraints and be utilized both in 
the West and East. For critics like Moulthrop, cyberspace is impregnated with 
"possibilities for cultural change" (316). To me, the space may also represent a 
1 borrowed the term from Ashok Malhotra, who portrays "globalization as an all-encompassing concept of 
moving towards the creation of a one-world culture/civilization where the world economy will have a crucial 
place but will be only one among many other significant factors." 
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disconnect with the "dictates" of culture because of the unique mode evolved for 
online text production and design. Perhaps I'm just speaking of the same thing with 
different wordings. The point I'm making is that it probably won't do much justice 
to analyze or critique online texts/designs using the "this culture versus that 
culture" model. And the Web "hybrids" that were just mentioned seem to prove 
that point. 
Jameson once had this to say about the postmodernist "metabooks" and 
"metatexts," which I think also sheds light on those Web "hybrids": 
that pure and random play of signifiers [...] no longer produces monumental 
works of the modernist type, but ceaselessly reshuffles the fragments of 
préexistent texts, the building blocks of older cultural and social production, 
in some new and heightened bricolage: metabooks which cannibalise other 
books, metatexts which collate bits of other texts. ("Reading"223) 
In a way, the description of "metabooks/metatexts" by Jameson mirrors what has 
been termed "Cyber hybridism." And like those "metabooks/ metatexts," Web 
designs deviating from designers' cultural tradition may well result from a 
reshuffling process, namely, from cannibalizing other designs and collating bits of 
Web pages from other sites. For that reason, these designs may rightly be called 
"metadesigns," following Jameson. But whether these "metadesigns" are 
portending cultural convergencess, or signifying the uniqueness of Web design that 
is more or less technologically determined, or pointing to a combination of both, we 
may need to see more discussions in the future to determine. At this point, it seems 
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reasonable to suggest that cultural distinctions are vague in such designs. And the 
trend seems to keep growing. 
The idea of "metadesigns" or Cyber hybridism may appear to undermine 
my earlier arguments about the distinctions between the West and East with regard 
to online ethos, but I tend to think otherwise, for two reasons. One is that we are 
still at the early phase of transformation. While some Web designs may have 
registered characteristics that are "meta" or culturally indistinguishable, a great 
majority of them are still falling into culturally identifiable categories. The other, 
probably more significant, is that the idea of "metadesigns" can actually strengthen 
the thesis of my dissertation, which has been arguing for ethos as a collective social 
phenomenon, because what is implied in "metadesigns," just as in "bamboo 
hypertext" of classical Chinese rhetoric, is "a world of multiple notions of 
authorship, based on multiple notions of texts" (Truman 64). (We can be certain that 
no individual authorship is capable of constructing a design on a "meta" scale.) We 
all know Western ethos has been intertwined with individual authorship, whether it 
has to do with good character, good will, or good sense, but the idea of 
"metadesigns," and its implied collective authorship, could force people to rethink of 
the role an individual can play in design and its association with ethos. 
V. Conclusion 
To summarize the paper, we can draw distinctions, albeit not dear-cut, between 
Western and Eastern online ethos by looking at the three issues inherent in the 
creation of a (Web) design: 1) whether the purpose of a design is for "self-assertion" 
or "self-effacement"; 2) whether the approach to design is "micro" or "macro"; and 
3) whether the attitude towards design is "doing-less" or "doing-more." But 
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underlying those differences is, fundamentally, the question of how to treat the 
individual self in relation to design. In Western society, the individual is believed to 
be an embodiment of ethos, and, therefore, very much has been put into design to 
visualize that embodiment. As Hall and Hall pointed out when speaking of Western 
architectural design, "Somehow we in the Western world cannot get away from the 
preoccupation with the individual" (fowrfk Dimension 8). In Chinese and other 
Eastern cultures, however, ethos is projected through an invocation of collectively 
celebrated entities, such as nature and the Dao. That is why great efforts have been 
initiated in design to objectify connections with such entities, instead of using design 
as a vehicle for self-representation. 
It appears conceivable then that self-assertion can lead to individual ethos, 
whereas self-effacement will contribute to collective ethos. But the projection of 
ethos as individual or collective is also dependent on the design approach (micro or 
macro?) and the mentality or attitude (doing less or doing more?) designers 
entertain towards their works. I have already discussed these questions rather in 
length in the paper. In what follows, I'd like to add a little more to the discussion by 
expanding on how Westerners and Easterners differ in their thinking patterns and in 
their takes on the function of rhetoric (including design rhetoric). 
The obsession with the individual self in Western design may derive, in a 
philosophical sense, from the habitual thinking patterns, the analytical, in the West 
that conceptualize the world as comprised of separate entities, in contrast with the 
holistic or "correlative" thinking patterns in the East that perceive reality in terms of 
continuity and process (Graham 63; Yang 3). According to A. C. Graham, all human 
thinking proceeds from correlative thinking because it is more 
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"spontaneous"—operative outside the "bounds of strict logic" and "exact 
formulation" (80), but because of the logocentric drive to "separate knowledge from 
opinion" Western society has put a premium on analytical thinking in an effort to 
secure the "complete independence" of knowledge (ibid.). We probably don't have 
to dwell on the epistemological differences between the West and East here, but it is 
important to see that the obsession with self-representation in Western design has 
its roots in a tradition that makes it epistemologically perceivable to have the self 
stand out separately as an individual entity from the rest of the world. Likewise, 
concern over the harmony of the whole in Eastern visual arts and design can also be 
traced to an epistemological tradition that does not separate the self from the rest of 
the world. 
I tend to think of analytical thinking as "micro thinking," in the sense that it 
perceives the world in separate terms without exhibiting much concern about the 
"whole picture." Apparently, the "micro" approach (much discussed in this paper) is 
the objectification of analytical thinking in design, characterized by the assumption 
that individual design items can be independent of their physical or cultural 
environments. 
My argument about the "micro" approach in Western design is nothing new. 
In a way, it just echoes a point made by Hall and Hall back in the seventies, when 
they were critiquing "some unstated assumptions" in the Western world 
"concerning the nature of man's [szc] relationship to his environment and the effect 
of culture on design" (7): 
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The most pervasive and important assumption, a cornerstone in the edifice of 
Western thought, is one that lies hidden from our consciousness and has to 
do with man's relationship to his environment. Quite simply the Western 
view is that human processes, particularly behavior, are independent of 
environmental controls and influence, (ibid.) 
While Hall and Hall did not use the word "analytical" or "micro" to describe the 
"Western view," we could clearly sense a critique of the analytical in their 
arguments, especially later when they talked about the "underlying assumption" in 
Western architecture that "a building is a single thing, something which has integrity 
and can be singled out from the rest of the physical setting" (8). What is suggested in 
their critique is that Western thinking conceptualizes the world in separates terms. 
But self-representation in Western design certainly goes beyond the issue of 
epistemological roots or thinking patterns. The fact that the individual self has been 
thought of as a "moral, metaphysical and, ultimately, theological category" in 
Western ideology since Plato (Baumlin xviii) suggests that there has existed an 
ontological grounding for treating design objects as individual creations—to be 
separated from the rest of the world. Put simply, self-representation in Western 
design is not just a function of analytical thinking, it is also a reflection of an 
ideological tradition that celebrates the self as an embodiment of "essence," as 
presupposed in the Platonic ethos. 
As discussed in the earlier part of the paper (see pp. 10-11), the essentialist self 
in Platonic ethos implies human agency, in that "soul knowledge," or truth, has to 
be discovered by the individual self—within its soul, of course—capable of such 
discovery. In other words, it is that mysterious agency (essence?) that motivates a 
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rhetor in Platonic fashion to seek, and speak of, truth, and therefore stand to present 
his ethos. Baumlin says, "A Platonic definition of gfbos [...] is premised on the moral 
and, ultimately, theological inseparability of the speaker-agent from the speech-act" 
(xiii). If truth (speech-act) is not to be separated from an individual (speaker-agent) 
in Platonic ethos, the reason may well be, among others, that the latter also serves 
as a carrier of agency to materialize that truth. The point Tm trying to make here is 
that understanding the essentialist self and agency in Platonic idealism may shed 
further light on why ethos in Western design and, more broadly, in Western 
rhetoric has long been characterized by a "doing-more" mentality: Presumably, a 
"doing-more" design/rhetoric can tell more about the designer/rhetor as a carrier 
of agency. 
The ideal of agency may help explain why "man is viewed as dominating all 
that is around him" in the Western world (Hall and Hall 8), but I think it is also 
responsible for the traditional definition of rhetoric as "art of persuasion" in the 
West. What had been presupposed, or taken for granted, in rhetorical persuasion is 
the power of human agency, imbued with which a rhetor can do anything (or to 
"use any means," to quote Aristotle) to influence (i.e., persuade) his audience. Even 
to this day, the notion of persuasive rhetoric as means to exercise agency and/ or to 
initiate social change is still advocated by some "anti-tradition," postmodernist 
critics, who see rhetoric as "praxis," and rhetoricians as agents of "social change" 
(e.g., Ellen Cushman 7-28). It must be pointed out that rhetoric for the purpose of 
exploration (or argument II, as some critics may call it)—not persuasion—has long 
been advertised in the West by some rhetorical theorists, like Protagoras in ancient 
Greece or Ehninger (101-110) in the 1970's. However, the idea of exploratory 
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rhetoric has never entered the mainstream thinking in the West, and throughout the 
history of rhetorical theory, persuasion has been considered, persistently, to be the 
defining function of rhetoric. 
Because of its stress on persuasion, Western rhetoric can be identified as a 
unilateral discourse action, in which the rhetor argues, single-handedly, from the 
beginning to the end trying to "achieve control and to be a force for change" 
(Matalene 790). In the words of Scollan and Scollan, Western rhetoric emphasizes 
"the means of winning one's point through skillful argument, short of, Aristotle 
says, the use of torture" (142). But no matter what Matalene, or the Scollans, has to 
say, rhetorical practice as such clearly demonstrates a "doing-more" mentality in 
that it is predicated on what the rhetor—carrier of agency—can do, whether in 
terms of controlling other people or winning an argument for one's own sake. 
Frankly, I would call such praxis (persuasive rhetoric) "one-way traffic."^ 
In contrast to the Western, Aristotelian definition, the rhetoric of Chinese and 
other Eastern cultures does not assume persuasion to be its defining function 
(Schabergt 30). In classical Chinese rhetoric, "a speech can be good even when it fails 
to convince" (#%U. It has been the consensus that rhetors of Eastern cultures are 
primarily concerned about "harmony" (Scollan and Scollan 142; Matalene 795) and 
"good order" (Schabergt 21) of society. As was discussed in the earlier part of the 
paper (see p. 11), classical Chinese rhetoric is essentially "agent-less," for two good 
^ One may argue that Plato's dialectic is not a one-way traffic, in that it is a rational dialogue conducted in a 
question-answer format eventually leading the participants to clear the path to truth of its obstacles. But as Brian 
Vickers' detailed analysis of the Gorgwu reveals (84-113), dialectic has been a "game" for Socrates, who uses it 
to trick other interlocutors into errors and then to silence them. That's why the Gorgiaj ends up with a lengthy 
monologue by Socrates, with other characters being silent aside. What I see as problematic about the so-called 
Platonic dialogue is that truth is invariably pre-set by Socrates even before the dialogue starts: it is not reached 
afterwards. In short, Plato's dialectic emphasizes what one person (in this case, a philosopher, not a rhetor) can 
do to influence others or simply to win. 
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reasons: (1) the practice of discourse is depersonalized for the sake of social 
harmony, and (2) the recognition of language's structuring impact upon human 
behavior has further denied rhetors' individuality (which can be interpreted as 
"exertion of agency") in discourse production. Now, I would like to add another 
reason: that is, classical Chinese rhetoric does not presuppose the involvement of 
agency, the drive for personal assertion (in the form of persuasion) in Western 
rhetorical practice. Indeed, the ideal of agency would be futile when everything 
under heaven is believed to take its own cause under the ultimate Dao. (Where is 
the need for persuasion?) The idea of "agent-less" rhetoric, I would also like to add, 
does not necessarily mean that a rhetor cannot speak or write on his or her own; 
rather, it suggests that the potential of a rhetoric is contingent upon "fitting man 
into nature or into society or both," to quote Hall and Hall (8). In the Eastern world, 
human processes (including rhetoric, visual arts and design, etc.,) are not considered 
to be "independent of environmental controls and influence." 
It seems more than obvious that an "agent-less" rhetoric would demand a 
rhetor to do less, not more, for doing more would risk meddling with what is 
already there in order (in nature and society), as implied in the concept of wwwa 
(doing-nothing) in Daoism. Carolyn Matalene has noticed, from her experience as a 
writing teacher in China, that Chinese writers have the habit of using "fixed phrases 
and common references" (796) in their writings, a practice that would be dismissed 
by her American colleagues as lack of originality. Matalene attributes the practice to 
the "staggering feats of memorization" required in the tradition of Chinese rhetoric 
(790), which I agree with wholeheartedly. But I believe what Matalene has observed 
can also be attributed to the deferring to collective ethos in Chinese rhetorical 
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practice: If Chinese writers love to use some "fixed phrases and common 
references/' it is more likely because they (i.e., those phrases and references) prove 
to be culturally appealing. What is more, the lack of originality in Chinese discourse 
practice, as perceived by Westerners, may well point to the working of a "doing-
less" mentality: i.e., Chinese writers do not go beyond what is already culturally 
established by exercising the so-called "agency," which is commonly expressed in 
the Western world in the form of independent thinking or, to borrow Matalene's 
words, "authentic voice" and "self-expression" (#%f.). 
By now, I hope my point has been made clear, that Western rhetoric 
presupposes agency whereas Eastern (especially Chinese) rhetoric doesn't, which 
has further resulted in different takes on the function of rhetoric in two cultures, 
with persuasion to be the primacy in the West, and harmony the priority in the East. 
And, by definition, a persuasive rhetoric would have to be a "doing-more" rhetoric 
because of its underlying assumption about human agency, about what rhetors can 
do to sway the crowd. Since harmony has been the primary concern for rhetors in 
the East, where there is not much assumption about human agency, it is 
understandable that rhetors would have to try to fit into the crowd by engaging in 
"doing-less" discourse practice. We may also see at this point that different takes on 
the function of rhetoric can be traced back to the cultural issue of how to treat the 
self, which was addressed rather in length in this paper, when differences between 
the West and East regarding visual arts and design were being discussed. For, if 
there is such a thing as agency, ^  then it has to be located somewhere within the self 
as some sort of human essence. This is to say that the presupposition of agency is, 
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ultimately, a presupposition of the self, and that the persuasive function of Western 
rhetoric, like the doing-more mentality, ought to be considered an attribute of self-
representation. 
In conclusion, I have discussed how Westerners and Easterners differ in their 
thinking patterns and in their takes on the function of rhetoric in an attempt to 
provide a broader perspective on two of the issues underlying the distinctions 
between Western and Eastern online ethos: i.e., the "micro versus macro" and the 
"doing-more versus doing-less." The fact that analytical thinking is privileged over 
holistic in Western society may explain, epistemologically, why Western (online) 
designers have the tendency to "micro-approach" design, as opposed to their 
Eastern counterparts who would do otherwise. Also, the "micro" approach makes 
sense in a cultural environment where the self is considered the center of the world. 
But in Eastern (typically Chinese) ontology the center of the world has been shifted 
to the Dao, presumably, the governing force of all beings; therefore, the "macro" 
approach, integration with society, nature, and, ultimately, the Dao, would seem 
more appropriate for designers to take. In the philosophical sense, persuasion, 
defined as the primary function of Western rhetoric, can be seen as a way to confirm 
the self, whereas harmony, believed to be the primary function of Eastern rhetoric, 
can be regarded as a way to suppress the self. In design, such a distinction translates 
into one between "doing-more" and "doing-less." 
By all accounts, agency has been a very controversial subject even among Western theorists, who have come 
up with numerous definitions as a result. 
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Figure: 3.1 
Appendix 1: Picture by William Blake 
Source: Fbzce owf q/"fAe q/^by R. Hone, Chandler Publishing 
Company, Inc., San Francisco, California, 1960 
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Figure: 3.2 
Appendix 2: Chinese dragon on a vase 
Source: The. C&mese f Af/ofqpA}» of Tïme awf CAowge by P. Rawson & L. Legeza, 
Thames and Hudson Ltd., London, 1973 
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Appendix 3: The Great Wall 
Source: C7»/wz 7PP7 by New Star Publishers, Beijing, 1997 
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Figure: 3.4 
Appendix 4: Mountain 
ridge in the semblance of 
dragon veins in a Chinese 
painting 
Source: Tao. CAimese 
CAange by P. Rawson & L. 
Legeza, Thames and Hudson 
Ltd., London, 1973 
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Figure: 3.5 
Appendix 5: 
Temple 
basking in 
serenity of 
nature 
Source: Too: 
CAwzese 
PAiZosqpAy 
CAawge by P. 
Rawson & L. 
Legeza, Thames 
and Hudson 
Ltd., London, 
1973 
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Figure: 3.6 
Appendix 6: Twisted and eroded rocks in a Chinese garden 
Source: Zzvwzg Daowf fFoy o/"by T. Mitchell & J. Wu, 
McGraw-Hill, New York, 1998 
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Figure: 3.7 
A 
A 
C%k^#0 
Appendix 7: 
Submerging one's 
self in nature's 
harmony 
Source: Zbo. 7%e 
CAiTKae fAf/of qpAy q/" 
Time oW CAamge by P. 
Rawson & L. Legeza, 
Thames and Hudson 
Ltd., London, 1973 
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Figure:3.8 
Appendix 8: Painting of mountains by an "awkward" hand 
Source: Too: CAmese PWosqp/zy CAawgg by P. Rawson & L. Legeza, 
Thames and Hudson Ltd., London, 1973 
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Figure: 3.9 
I 
Appendix 9: "Happy New Year" on a seal with a broken and uneven line 
around to counter artificiality 
Source: 1983 "Happy New Year" post card issued by Postal Service of China 
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"igure: 3.10 
Appendix 10: "Longevity," a favorite character in Chinese calligraphy, created 
with one single brush stroke, demonstrating the flow of gi, and rhythm and 
balance of 7m-Fang 
Source: The. CAinese fCTwrnge by P. Rawson & L. Legeza, 
Thames and Hudson Ltd., London, 1973 
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Figure: 3.11 
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Appendix 11 : One more exanq)le of Chinese calligraphy 
Source: Tao. 7%e CAmeae f AzWqpA); q^TKme aW CAa/zge by P. Rawson 
& L. Legeza, Thames and Hudson Ltd., London, 1973 
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Figure:3.12 
Appendix 12: 
"Mountain-water" 
landscape painting 
portraying the 
metaphysical 
harmony of fw%-
through 
images of mountains 
and waters 
complementing each 
other 
Source: Too: 7%e 
C%w«ase fqpAy q/" 
Tzme aW CAamge by P. 
Rawson & L. Legeza, 
Thames and Hudson 
Ltd., London, 1973 
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Figure 3.13 
li 
Appendix 13: White space used for sky and water in a Chinese picture 
Source: Ma F; Boo (Treasure House of Ma Yi's Pictures) by Ma Yi, reprinted 
by Rongbao Zhai, Beijing, 1982 
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Figure: 3.14 | iZflï i 
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Appendix 14 (A): Picture with little white space at top 
Source: Ma H (Treasure House of Ma Yi's Pictures) by Ma Yi, reprinted 
by Rongbao Zhai, Beijing, 1982 
228 
Figure 3.15 
& . - r 
Appendix 14 (B): Picture with plenty of white space at top to create a 
sense of openness 
Source: Ma 7% Zkzo (Treasure House of Ma Yi's Pictures) by Ma Yi, reprinted 
by Rongbao Zhai, Beijing, 1982 
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Figure: 3.16 
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Appendix 15: Direct-mail document from Sprint featuring lavish use of 
white space 
Source: 1999 Chinese New Year direct mail by Sprint 
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Appendix 16: Mug on the newsletter betraying an attempt to 611 up 
white space 
Source: Writing Center Newsletter, Iowa State University, fiall 1996 
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Web Samples (1-11) 
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Figure: 3.18 
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Web Sample 1: Homepage of Red Lobster 
Source: http://www.redlobster.com/home.asp (July 7,2001) 
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N#*» bon to paw*# «%«:# 
Web Sample 2: Introduction page of Misty Slims 
Source: http://mistyl20s.com/Mi8tyl20s/Index.shtml (March 25, 2001) 
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Figure: 3.20 
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Web Sample 3: Home page of Budweiser.co.uk 
Source: http://budweiser.co.uk/home.htm (March 25,2001) 
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Figure: 3.21 
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Web Sample 4: Home page of Hong Kong Computer Society 
Source: http://ccts.cs.cuhk.edu.hk/html/main.html (July 10,2001) 
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Web Sample 5: Web page from the World of Chinese Culture 
Source: http://edu.ocac.gov.tw/culturechinese/vodl4html/vodl4 (September. 11,2001) 
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Figure:3.23 
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Web Sample 6: Home page of the Chinese Language Teachers 
Source: http://clta.deall.ohio-state.edu/ (July 10, 2001) 
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Web Sample 7: Home page of Yahoo! Finance 
Source: http://quote.yahoo.com/ (September 20,2001) 
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Web Sample 8: Home page of Yahoo! Finance Hong Kong 
Source: http://hk.finance.yahoo.com/ (September 20,2001) 
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Figure: 3.26 
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Web Sample 9: Home page of Coca-Cola.com 
Source: http://www.cocacola.com/altemate.html (March 23,2001) 
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Figure: 3.27 
Copyright (c) 2001 Cocu-Cola (Japan) Company Limited 
Web Sample 10: Home page of Coca-Cola Japan 
Source: http://www.cocacola.co.jp/index4.html (March 23,2001) 
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Web Sample 11 : Home page of Coca-Cola China 
Source: http://www.coca-cola.com.cn/mdex2.jsp (March 23,2001) 
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CHAPTER 4 
CORPORATE IMAGE AS COLLECTIVE ETHOS: 
A POSTSTRUCTURALIST APPROACH' 
This paper discusses the idea ofpro/ecfzMg corporate image in terms q^cwZfwraZZy reguZated codes of 
appeals by using, mainZy, the ezampZes of ad campaigns 6y some U.S. Business companies in the post-
9/11 environment. The image of patriotism those companies are aspiring to suggests corporate 
imagery con be a shared sociaZ phenomenon, i.e., coZZectioe ethos, thws raising (fwgsfions a6owt the 
traditional approach to corporate imagery, which is summarized as "seZf-representation. " Thg way to 
buiZd up coZZectire ethos is through Bwr&e's "identi/zcation/' seen as both a strategy and goaZ of 
communication. The paper aZso proindes an cwerMezt; of rZzetoricaZ theon/ on using image as a 
presentation strategy to ezpZore the reason why it has Been treated in history as a way/or seZf-
pro/'ection, or representation of a "corporate seZf " 
Speaking of corporate image, we may need, first of all, to clarify the term "image/' 
which appears to have been, surprisingly enough, short of consistency in definition 
among corporate communication scholars and practitioners (Abratt, 1989; Davies, 
Chun, and da Silva, 2001). Very often the word "image" is used to mean "identity" 
or "reputation" or, in the more strict sense, to mean the internal perception of a 
company held by its employees (Kennedy, 1977). 
According to Davies, et al. (2001), "Imzgg is taken to mean the view of the 
company held by external stakeholders, especially that held by customers" (p. 113). 
Clearly, their definition contrasts with the "internal" view of a company, which they 
think ought to be labeled as "identity" (i.e., the perception of a company held by its 
* This chapter, originally an article, was formatted following the style prescribed by the publisher of Corpora# 
CofWMMfWcanofu; An WernaffOMaZ JowmaA 
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employees) following Albert and Whetten's (1985) notion of organizational identity. 
Interestingly/ Davies, et al. define "reputation" as a collective term "referring to all 
stakeholders' views of corporate reputation, including identity and image" (p. 114). 
For them, the question of measuring corporate reputation can boil down to the 
question of how to assess a company's identity and image (i.e., the internal and 
external perspectives). 
My purpose here is certainly not to join the crowd in redefining, or disputing 
the existing definitions of, "image," "identity," and "reputation," but for the sake of 
this paper, I feel it is necessary to come up with understanding from a rhetorical 
point of view, so that I can proceed with the topic of the paper: corporate image as 
collective ethos. 
The paper is divided into five sections besides the conclusion. Section (1), 
definition, is to provide understandings of image from a rhetorical point of view 
based on two crucial issues: audience and persuasion. Section (2), questions about 
the traditional approaches to corporate imagery, points out what has been 
traditionally missing in the creation of a corporate image: connecting with the 
audience/public. Section (3), insights from the 9/11 ads, argues, based on the rush 
on patriotism in today's corporate America, that corporate image is essentially a 
projection of what is perceived and expected by society and culture. Section (4), 
corporate image as collective ethos, argues that image making should be taken as an 
initiation into connecting with the public and society—free from the confines of a 
"corporate self"; it also points out theoretical possibilities for collective ethos using 
Burke's concept of "identification." And section (5), a poststructuralist approach, 
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explores the philosophical aspect of collective ethos drawing on Foucaulf s 
poststructuralism. 
DefiniHon 
Rhetoric, according to Aristotle/ is the art of observing means to persuade your 
audience (RWonc, 1.2,1355b26ff.). Defining "image" from a rhetorical standpoint 
would thus imply two elements: audience and persuasion. We all know that the 
image of a company hinges on its audience's perception, whether it is external 
customers or internal employees. That is, we have to have an audience when talking 
about a company's image. So, in the rest of this paper, when I discuss corporate 
image, it will be addressed with the general notion of audience in mind—without 
regard to the division between external and internal "stakeholders." 
Then, what is "image"? I will have to do the impossible to give a precise 
definition here, especially considering the fact that it has been used in the past to 
mean so many things by so many different authors, but we could reasonably assume 
that it has something to do with "presentation," with public perceptions or 
impressions produced as a result of such presentation (Selame and Selame, 1988). 
This is how the element of persuasion is brought into play as the idea of 
presentation, in the sense of creating or influencing public perceptions or 
impressions, implies that the presenter has to observe ways to persuade his or her 
audience to be receptive of a certain company image. 
Due to the influence of scientific positivism, many people would prefer the 
term "identity" than "image" for the reason that the former somehow suggests 
"what one really is" while the latter means "how one appears to other people" (zbzd., 
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p. 7). In other words, "identity" concerns facts whereas "image" is more or less 
about appearances and needs much more "upkeep" (z'W.). I would say a company 
should have both: identity and image. But, rhetorically, image making is probably 
more significant. This is because "identity" only tells who you are, but "image" tells 
how you appeal to other people. Public relationships, marketing, corporate 
advertising, etc., all have to do with image "upkeep." 
I think it is exactly because of this "upkeep" business that the notion of 
rhetoric has found its way into the image-making process for a company, which is to 
connect to the audience and to observe ways of persuasion to make the image it 
wishes to build up come across or, in Aristotle's words, "look right" (1356al-3) to 
that audience. 
After the September 11th events, many of U.S. business companies, big and 
small, have been capturing the theme of nationalism/patriotism to advertise their 
corporate images. The new "upkeep" phenomenon will be further explored later in 
this paper, but at this point I just wish to point out that it seems to make perfect 
"rhetorical" sense to advertise the company image that way. For one thing, those 
companies can effectively connect to an audience that is overflowing with patriotic 
sentiments; for another, using nationalism/patriotism to do image upkeep also 
proves to be most persuasive given the social environment after September 11th. 
Whether or not the word "reputation" should be treated as a collective term 
that includes "image" could be a topic for another paper. Here I would like to go 
with Fombrun (1996), who says that reputation is "partly a reflection of company's 
identity, partly a result of managers' efforts to persuade us of their excellence" (p. 
11). If "reputation" stems (partly) from persuasion, as suggested by Fombrun, then it 
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ought to be subsumed under "image/' not the other way round. Of course, 
reputation also contributes to the making of a corporate image, but still it should be 
considered a variable within the parameters of "image," like other variables, such as 
marketing strategies, product qualities and customer services, all of which can shape 
the outcome of image making. 
Questions About Traditional Approaches to Corporate Image 
Another word for "image" would be "ethos," a rhetorical term that has much 
broader connotations. Like "image," "ethos" also refers to presentation, specifically, 
to strategies used in making the presenter appear good or credible to his or her 
audience. The reason some big companies have spent millions of dollars searching 
for brand names and trademarks or designing company logos and product packages 
is because this will make them (or their products / services) appear good to the 
customers, creating positive images in the marketplace. In the words of the Selames, 
it is all about "adding 'face' to otherwise faceless corporations" (p. 92), but from the 
rhetorical point of view, one might just say, it is the application of ethos in 
marketing on the part of those companies. 
Strictly speaking, image is only part of ethos, which also includes such 
attributes as character, persona, voice, attitude, etc., according to Johnson (1984). In 
short, using any devices that can add to one's credibility in the eyes of an audience is 
considered to be exercising ethos in persuasion. Using image as a rhetorical device is 
reminiscent of Roman rhetorician Cicero's concept of ethos as character "painting" 
(Of Omton/, Book II, xliii)/ In order to convince his hearers, an orator must attain the 
"image" of a stage actor with "consummate charm," says Cicero (Of Onzfon/, Book I, 
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xxviii). But in this paper, I would like to treat "image" and "ethos" as 
interchangeable phrases, for the reason that they both relate to something called the 
self or the soul. 
In the history of Western communication theory, there have existed two 
conflicting versions about ethos centering around the issue of self, with Platonism 
on the one hand and pragmatism on the other. The Platonic ethos presupposes the 
existence of an eternal, static identity within an individual that can endure the 
vicissitudes of time and space (Baumlin, 1994, xvii-xviii). That is, there is some kind 
of essence deep within the individual self—the soul—that is not to be swayed by 
"gusts" of society. The essentialist self, or the soul, is crucial to Platonic ethos 
because it is an embodiment of soul knowledge (or absolute truth in today's 
language). In Platonic fashion, whoever possesses such knowledge would certainly 
be regarded as most truthful and, of course, most credible. So, projection of ethos is 
seen as a presentation of one's true self or character. 
The pragmatic ethos, proposed by Plato's student, Aristotle, emphasizes the 
role a presenter can play in constructing his or her self-image through skillful use of 
language. In contrast to Plato who insists that the speaker's character must be 
upright for its own sake, Aristotle seems to say that it is sufficient to win an 
audience simply by making "ourselves thought to be sensible and morally good" 
(1356a9-10). In other words, in Aristotelian fashion, ethos can be created, or 
recreated, by the presenter. Underlying this pragmatic notion of ethos is the concept 
of "a social self," as opposed to "a central self" (Lanham, 1976). The latter is the core 
of Platonic ethos. The social self, says Lanham, "conceives of reality as 
fundamentally dramatic, man as fundamentally a role player" (p. 4), which is to 
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suggest that the pragmatic approach to ethos, based on the concept of "social self/' 
has its philosophical grounds for "dramatic" manipulations by a presenter. 
However, as Baumlin (1994) points out, throughout the history of 
communication theory, the Platonic ethos appears to have had the upper hand over 
the pragmatic, due to the logocentric tradition in ideology that "embraces [...] the 
philosophical model of selfhood over the [...] rhetorical model" (xviii). He writes: 
Western culture, in other words, has largely identified itself with the tradition 
beginning with Plato and Isocrates and developed by Augustine, Aquinas, 
Descartes, Kant—all of whom treat the self as a moral, metaphysical, and, ultimately, 
theological category (rather than as a function or effect of verbal behavior). (Aid.) 
What is more, questions can be raised about the pragmatic approach to ethos, which 
is said to be "quintessentially a linguistic phenomenon" (z'W., xxiii), as it never gives 
up in its own categories the notion of selfhood—how to bring up the individual 
appeal of a presenter is still the central concern of the pragmatic ethos. If the Platonic 
ethos is the projection of self through philosophy (i.e., concerned about essence), 
then the Pragmatic, or Aristotelian, ethos is largely the projection of self through 
language (i.e., concerned about appearances). That is, discourse has now become an 
instrument in creating one's ethos or image. So, no matter how we look at the 
traditional definition of ethos, it has always been seen as "the appeal of speakers or 
writers to their own credibility and character" (Covino and Jolliffe, 1995, p. 52), be it 
the Platonic or the pragmatic. 
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It comes as no surprise then that two different versions of corporate imagery 
have existed in the literature of corporate communication. One version, says 
Marchand (1998), embraces a mode of business practice that "favored a 'stick-to-
business' attitude: a serious, 'masculine/ production-oriented, sense of 
independence"; the other version features a mode that "employed new, more 
'feminine/ practices, consciously catering to public opinion, adopting show-business 
techniques of display and publicity, and institutionalizing welfare and public 
relations programs" (p. 4). 
The first version can be traced back to the tradition of Platonic ethos as 
discussed earlier, in the sense that it seeks to define some sort of essence within 
corporations in order to create a "sense of independence" for them. The quests for a 
"corporate soul," as some may have called (Marchand, 1998; Kunde, 2000), indicate 
the historical impact on building a corporate image based on the notion of an 
independent corporate self. The second version of corporate imagery, which recalls 
the "dramatic" manipulations of a presenter's personal character as implied in the 
concept of social self, is similar to the pragmatic approach to ethos in 
communication theory. A good example would be Aake/s (1999) "malleable self," a 
concept she proposes for developing persuasive marketing strategies in expanding a 
corporation's image. 
While the pragmatic approach to corporate imagery has been on the rise ever 
since the early decades of the twentieth century (Marchand, 1998), the essentialist 
ideal about corporate image never yields its ground. Indeed, there is an indication 
that it (i.e., the essentialist version) has regained its popularity in recent years among 
many of the corporate communication scholars and practitioners who are tired of 
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"soulless" corporate image. One way to fix "corporate sou 11 mess" is, of course, "to 
project a distinct personality" (ibid., 8), which may explain why the word 
"personality" has been so frequently used in association with building corporate 
image or with assessment of image building (e.g., Kunde, 2000; Aaker, 1997; Davies, 
et al., 2001). 
Whether the approach to the creation of a corporate image is essentialist, in 
the sense of looking for some sort of "character" (Coffee and Jones, 1998) or "spirit" 
(Kunde, 2000) within a corporation, or pragmatic, in the sense of making "the 
appropriate outward gesture" (Marchand, 1998, p. 362), what I see as one 
problematic issue here is that an approach of this sort has invariably centered on the 
presenter/corporation, instead of the audience/public. 
For one thing, imagery to be created as such presupposes the notion of a 
corporate self, whether innate or socially constructed, which is indeed an expansion 
of an individual, personal self that was discussed earlier. Like what was said of the 
traditional ethos in communications, a corporate image, because of this notion of 
"corporate selfhood," is then, fundamentally, and also problematically, all about the 
"appeal" of corporations "to their own credibility and character," to borrow from 
Covino and Jolliffe (1995, p. 52). One might say that the pragmatic approach to 
corporate imagery is in a way "selfless" because it focuses on appearances, not on 
the substance of a "soul," but I would call this kind of image making as self-
representation in that it is still aimed at creating appeals about corporations, with a 
purpose to influence stakeholders. 
For another, an approach to corporate imagery focusing on the 
presenter/ corporation denies the fundamental role the audience/public plays in 
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constructing a corporate image. Again, one might say this is simply not true, as the 
role of the audience/ public in creating images has long been recognized in corporate 
communications: for example, the idea of formulating image building strategies 
based on the perception of stakeholders, etc., etc., but what I am trying to suggest 
here is not that the audience/public can impact the creation of a Company^ s image, 
which is undeniably true, but that the audience/public can directly determine the 
image projection of a company. To put it simply, a corporate image is created 
through, and out of, the audience/public. This is to demand that we must make a 
shift: from concentrating on building up the appeal of business corporations to 
identifying with the public to locate a corporate image. 
I will further my argument in the following section drawing on those image 
ad campaigns launched by some of the U.S. companies after September 11th. 
Insights from the 9/11 Ads 
As we all have noticed, after the September 11th events, many U.S. companies have 
been cashing in on the rage of patriotism to advertise their corporate images, either 
directly or indirectly. For example, in one of the TV commercials by Boeing, viewers 
have seen none of the company's state-of-the-art aircraft or rockets, but instead its 
salutation to the heroism of firefighters, police officers, relief workers, military 
soldiers, etc., accompanied by the Star-Spangled Banner anthem. The Tmze magazine 
included in its direct mail packages last fall a "new" and "unusual" gift for 
subscribers—a Liberty watch and U.S.A. Flag pin—as a "poignant reminder" of the 
nation's "patriotism" and "heroism" (Fig. 4.1). 
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Figure 4.1. Time's gift set for subscribers featuring the Star-Spangled Banner 
Even a small, unknown company in Maine, the Pinetree Garden Seeds, looks 
to show its patriotism by quoting a paragraph of a letter on its Web site from a 
German sympathizer, who is in "sad and helpless spirits".^ The paragraph serves as 
part of the introductory remark on Pinetree Garden Seeds' home page, but a closer 
reading reveals that it does not cohere thematically with the rest of the text, 
suggesting that it might just have been thrown in without being given much 
thought. This may also raise suspicion that some businesses have been engaging in 
exploiting the public mood. 
Indeed, some of those post-9 /11 ad campaigns are not without controversy at 
all. And perhaps the most controversial one is die recent "Helping the Victims' 
Families" TV ad campaign by Cantor Fitzgerald, a stock and bond trading firm, 
which used to be headquartered in the World Trade Center. The ad features the 
terrible scene of collapsing WTC towers and tales of company employees who 
survived the disaster describing the loss of their coworkers. At one point, the ad 
says, "We want to make sure that these families can go on, and thaf s why we are in 
T*#M handsomely designed act is a 
poignant reminder of our nation; 
patriotism and heroism. It': . 
and waiting to ship to you d,«i \ 
the moment vtc receive your I, 
paid gift subacriptioa. Don't ,. 
Supplk# we limited. Order your 
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business today." The commercial has been criticized for "crossing the line" and 
"exploiting the 9/11 tragedy.'"* 
While acknowledging the possibility that some businesses may have 
capitalized on the 9/11 events and the theme of patriotism/nationalism to make 
more money, I would also like to argue that the situation is not that simple, and that 
those "patriotic" ad campaigns should not be simply dismissed as "exploitative," as 
some may have suggested. The reason for me to make this argument is because the 
post-9/11 ads have provided fresh insights into how to build a corporate image (and 
a patriotic corporate image in this case): i.e., to identify with stakeholders or, more 
generally, with the audience/public. And the central purpose of this paper is to 
explore why such identification can translate into corporate imagery. 
But at this point I would like to point out two reasons for corporate image 
identification: One is that image making is very much constrained by what would be 
called "cultural scripts" (Colombo, Lisle, and Mano, 1997); the other is that a 
corporate image is essentially a projection of what is being expected by a society or 
community, not something that can be manipulated at will by the presenter. 
The notion of "cultural scripts" was proposed by Colombo, et al., following 
Kluckholm's "designs for living" (1960). It suggests that culture has created for us "a 
set of scripts" that specifies "many of our daily actions and activities and even many 
of our ideas and conversations" (Colombo, et al., 1997, p. 122). And extending from 
the notion, we may suggest further that people's perception of the world, including 
that of corporate imagery, has also been "culturally scripted," to borrow their 
words. In many ways, a corporation's image has already been preset, or embedded, 
in a culture where it is located. For instance, Cantor Fitzgerald's image today could 
255 
be quite different from that before September 11th. Today, it is a victim of terrorism, 
but before September 11th it could be any of those "greedy" Wall Street firms taking 
profits out of the stock markef s ups and downs. 
With "cultural scripts" in mind, it might be easier to see why a corporate 
image is essentially a projection of what is being expected by society. This is because 
the image making of a corporation has to confine itself within the spectrum of 
available codes of appeals in a particular social and cultural environment. We may, 
again, turn to Cantor Fitzgerald's controversial TV ad for insight. The idea of 
making more money ought to be perfectly legitimate (even in the moral sense) for a 
financial business like Cantor Fitzgerald, especially in a capitalist society, but it can 
strike a negative tone on its image projection, as some have already felt, given the 
cultural and political environment after September 11th. The reason is that 9/11 has 
catalyzed the change of codes of appeals in American society (at least for now): what 
was appealing before may turn out to be unacceptable now. So, in my view, the ad 
campaign could have been more effective if that "in business" line were dropped 
because it would make Cantor Fitzgerald's image more or less in line with the post-
9/llsocial climate. 
An advertisement anecdote cited by Weiss (1995), which tells how a Western 
airline company changed the theme of punctuality to hospitality for Arabic 
audiences to advertise its image, could be another example to illustrate the point 
that image making has to concur with codes of appeals that are culturally 
prescribed. In Arabic culture, punctuality does not have its usual appeal as it does in 
Western society. That is why an image campaign boasting of the airline's punctual 
services did not work. So, in a way, corporations have to build up their images in 
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terms of what their audience wants to see, not in terms of what they would like to 
foster about themselves. As Weiss points out, "Audience is the grounding reality" 
(p. 417). 
It goes without saying then that since September 11th, patriotism, 
nationalism, heroism, etc., have become dominant codes of appeals in American 
society. Logically, it makes perfect sense for us to see so many business corporations 
have rushed to cash in on these themes to have their images reflect on currently 
popular appeals. 
Corporate Image as Collective Ethos 
A more general way of describing American businesses cashing in on currently 
dominant codes of appeals would be what I have mentioned in the previous 
section—identification with the audience/public. Indeed, the strategy used by 
Boeing and other U.S. companies to appeal to the patriotic sentiment of the public in 
their image campaigns may rightly be called the strategy of "identification." That is, 
by invoking what the American public feels most strongly about at a historic 
moment, these companies are able to identify themselves with the pulse of the 
nation, therefore adding to their own ethos. 
The idea of identification as a key "aspect" of rhetoric and communication 
comes originally from Kenneth Burke (1950), who states, in his A KWonc of Motwes, 
that "identification ranges from the politician who, addressing an audience of 
farmers, says, 1 was a farm boy myself/ through the mysteries of social status, to the 
mystic's devout identification with the source of all being" (p. xiv). Interpreted 
narrowly, identification opens a shared ground (e.g., shared interests) between the 
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presenter and audience, thus enabling the presenter to "establish rapport between 
himself and his audience" (p. 46).^ Interpreted broadly, identification points to the 
necessity for acknowledging, and attaining, "an ontology of the social, an ontology 
of collective being," to quote Biesecker (1997, p. 40). In short, Burke's "identification" 
iterates a persuasive strategy in communication, but, more significantly, it also tells 
us of an important goal implied in human communication: achieving the sense of 
collectivism or coming-together-ness. 
When applied in projecting a corporation's image, the idea of identification 
would suggest that such projection should not be practiced, narrowly, as self-
representation, or representation of a corporate self; rather, it should be seen as an 
initiation into making connections with the audience and public and, further, with 
society and culture. Indeed, what has been discussed in the previous 
section—cultural scripts and social expectations and codes of appeals based on the 
two notions—would dictate that we must go beyond the idea of self-representation 
to the ontology of culturally and socially shared perceptions in order to create an 
effective, up-to-the-time corporate image. 
I do not wish to argue against using such assets as company history, 
reputation, brand name, product quality, etc., in launching an image campaign for a 
company, but my point is, it has to be incorporated with the aforementioned codes 
of appeals. For instance, Lockheed Martin certainly wouldn't advertise on its Web 
site the numerous fighter-jets and bombers it had manufactured and sold to the U.S. 
and other countries, which would be solid proof of its product quality, but instead 
we have seen it put in the spotlight "Airport Security," which Lockheed Martin was 
selected by government to help implement across the country (Fig. 2)/ Needless to 
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say, in doing so, Lockheed Martin has projected an image concurrent with the 
concerns of the American public. I would add that an image as such is, in essence, an 
image of identification. 
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Figure 4.2. Lockheed Martin's home page that highlights "Airport Security" 
In what follows, I will argue that corporate images made on the basis of 
identification, as seen in the post-9/11 ad campaigns by Boeing, Lockheed Martin, 
and many other corporations, can rightly be termed "collective ethos/' for two 
obvious reasons: One is that such imagery is shared imagery; the other is that such 
imagery represents less of corporations and more of the public. 
In Selame and Selame's (1988) 77# Compam/ Image, there is an interesting 
chapter in it with the title of "The product is the package [original emphasis), not the 
product" (pp. 133-156). The gist of that chapter is, the product does not necessarily 
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distinguish itself; rather, it is the package that counts. For example, all the ice-cream 
cones or electric bulbs would look the same no matter what company, big or small, 
known or unknown, produces them. So, it is the package, the appearance, that 
makes a difference, hence the need to create uniqueness in package design to 
materialize the distinction, as the authors advocate. 
To me, that chapter has raised many interesting questions, but the immediate 
one is: Since corporate image is also concerned about appearances (see earlier 
discussion about the pragmatic version of image), then do we have to create a 
unique image for a company to make it stand out? According to the Selames, the 
answer would be "yes." However, if we take a look at those post-9/11 ad 
campaigns, an opposite answer could also be brought up, as those all companies are 
now competing for the same image projection: patriotic/nationalistic. The 
phenomenon deserves further in-depth research in the future, but at this juncture I 
just wish to point out the obvious: that the patriotic / nationalistic image is a g/zoraf 
image, and that companies that are competing to be cast in such imagery are indeed 
striving to be the same! 
Shared corporate imagery could be seen as resulting from identification with 
the current of society on the part of presenters/ corporations. I use the term 
"collective ethos" to refer to it not just because it is "shared," but also because it 
points to the "ontology of the social" at work, an ontology that dictates, through 
codes of appeals, what is (or what is not) expected of a company in terms of its 
imagery. In other words, collective ethos imposes itself on us as a given, to be 
identified but not to be created or manipulated. The reason is simple: There is no 
such thing as fixed or essentialist that underpins the image of a corporation, to put it 
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from the poststructuralist point of view. Poststructuralism also denies the notion of 
self as understood in traditional Western ideology, which, I think, in a fundamental 
way rejects ethos or image as representation of an individual or corporate self. 
Interestingly, Selame and Selame's argument seems to support my 
poststructuralist view. If the package is more important than the product, then they 
are really trying to say that the image does not have substance, or at least substance 
does not matter in image making. To me, this is an equivalent of saying that a 
company's image does not have to be bound by a "soul" within to substantiate itself. 
I might go too far to advocate a "soulless" corporate image (so please don't interpret 
me literally!), but what I am driving at is the necessity to reach out and define 
corporate image in the eyes of the public, and through the scripts of culture. Again, I 
would term such image as "collective ethos," because it is less about a particular, 
individual corporate self, more about a general, collective social Self. 
A Poststructuralist Approach 
There is probably no way to delineate a unified theory of poststructuralism because 
of the wide variety of perspectives having been attributed to this key theoretical 
movement behind what we call "postmodernism." However, we can be certain 
about two positions that poststructuralists, most notably Foucault, have been taking: 
the first is that poststructuralism rejects such concepts as subject, self, ego, 
individual, and agency, which have served as underpinnings of traditional Western 
ideology; the second, and related to the first, is that it stresses the role language 
plays in creating knowledge, power, and even reality and truth, all of which are now 
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taken as a function of discourse—institutionalized practices of representation that 
dictate what we can present and how we present it. 
The rejection of subject self, etc., by poststructuralism, would take away the 
philosophical basis from the notion of ethos as self-representation. The Panopticon, 
as is discussed extensively in Foucaulf s (1975) Dzscipfme aW Pwmsk, may be 
interpreted as a metaphor referring to the "disciplinary mechanisms" (p. 209) of 
society that subject us rather than let us be subject. Put differently, we are who we 
are, not because of a determinate selfhood within, but because of the panoptic 
society without that keeps us under constant surveillance and discipline, structuring 
the way we present ourselves to others. Thus, from the poststructuralist point of 
view, ethos is just a reflection of such panoptic subjection, rather than a 
representation of an individual self, which is central to the traditional thinking of 
ethos. 
The panoptic nature of corporate image can be illustrated by the fact that it 
(corporate image) is fluid, shifting, and always subject to the current of a 
social/cultural environment. Take for example Philip Morris, which in recent years 
has been trying to shift its image from a cigarette maker to a consumer-goods 
manufacturer with emphasis in the food business. (It has been reported that Philip 
Morris even planned to change the company name to "Altria" to better reflect its 
business position as a "global package-goods company."^) The campaign launched 
by Philip Morris to change its corporate image would, in my view, serve to attest to 
the "discipline" of our society, where cigarette smoking is no longer considered 
"cool." 
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The environment-friendly face that some of the energy companies have 
attempted to put on also bears testimony to the "panoptic machine" (p. 217): British 
Petroleum's corporate color (green), Exxon Mobil's "Save the Tiger" ad campaign, 
and Williams' dedication to bringing "exploration, production, and conservation" 
within "harmony,"^ all can be seen as "disciplined" responses to the demands of an 
increasingly environment-conscious public. Little doubt the principle of panopticism 
applies to the aforementioned Cantor Fitzgerald as well. The reason its recent ad 
campaign has caused so much controversy is because it is out of character with a 
socio-political environment after September 11th, where, for obvious reasons, 
patriotism/nationalism has been reinstalled into society's disciplinary mechanism. 
If language is so central to poststructuralism, it is because it constitutes the 
world that we know and understand. I take Foucault and other poststructuralists to 
mean that language should not be taken as a medium that only reflects what is being 
(re)presented; rather, it is integrated with what is (re)presented to us through the 
constraints of its signification such as those of metaphors and categories. In other 
words, the signifier is also the signified. What is suggested here is that language or 
text speaks itself—without the participation of author or subject, which, 
poststructuralists would argue, is a function of discourse. Foucault (1972) makes this 
dear in Tke ArcbaeoZogy of KnowWgg, where he states, "discourse is not the 
majestically unfolding of a thinking, knowing, and speaking subject, but, on the 
contrary, a totality, in which the dispersion of the subject and his discontinuity with 
himself may be determined" (p. 55). 
When it comes to the matter of making corporate images, we probably don't 
have to dwell, literally, on the question whether or not the author / presenter is 
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"dead/' Rather, the focus should be on how to conceive corporate imagery as a 
"discourse formation" (p. 107) based upon the playing of signifiers. Philip Morris' 
plan to change its company name to Altria would be a good example to show how 
variation of signifiers could impact a company's image, despite the fact that the 
company itself will be the same. In the case of Boeing and other U.S. companies, the 
flag, the anthem, and the pictures of firefighters, relief workers, police officers, etc., 
as shown in their TV commercials, can all be treated as discourse signifiers, which 
translate into an image of patriotism given the cultural setting in America after 
September 11th. 
Readers may have noticed that Foucault prefers to use the term discourse to 
distinguish from language as a linguistic system of representation. For Foucault, 
discourse is "a practice" (p. 46), "an event"* (p. 229) characterized by "its ponderous, 
awesome materiality" (p. 216). One of the major contributions made by Foucault 
towards discourse theory is the emphasis he places in understanding language 
practice as institutionalized: i.e., discourse formations are made possible only when 
brought "under the positive conditions of a complex group of relations [that are] 
established between institutions, economic and social processes, behavioral patterns, 
systems of norms, techniques, types of classification, modes of characterization" (p. 
45). This is to say that practices of signification—from discourse production in 
general to corporate image making in particular—are essentially disciplined, and 
subject to the panoptic control of social institutions.^ 
It becomes clear, once again, that the projection of corporate images lies in 
identification because like any kind of discourse formation it has to go through a 
process of institutionalization (i.e., identifying with institutionally controlled and 
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regulated modes of signification) in order to be "approved" by a panoptic society. 
Perhaps we can rephrase it: If corporate image and the way of presenting it, which is 
by definition a discourse practice, are institutionalized, historically and culturally, 
then the only thing the presenter can do is to identify: i.e., to find out under the grip 
of society and institutions what can be presented and how it can be presented. 
Conclusion 
This paper is not meant to be a treatise on poststructuralism, nor is it intended to 
discuss the philosophical question as to whether there is such a thing as "self" or 
"no-self." Rather, the focus of this paper is to explore corporate image from a 
social/cultural perspective, which could also be approached from the point of view 
of poststructuralism. While I did not apply the word "poststructuralism" 
throughout the paper, many statements were actually implied in the postmodernist 
theory, such as those about collective ethos, cultural scripts, social expectations, and 
codes of image appeals, etc. 
The purpose of the paper is to initiate further discussion on the social and 
cultural nature of corporate image, especially in the light of the post-9/11 
environment, where we have seen the rush to patriotism/nationalism in corporate 
America. The phenomenon can be seen as a good indication of culture and society's 
structuring impact on constructing corporate images. It also points to the need to 
understand them as collective ethos. Instead of begging to be different or unique, 
which dominates the conventional way of building up a company's image, we have 
now witnessed a sweeping change in the tactics adopted by those American 
companies, which are now striving to share similar imagery. The change reveals a 
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cultural mandate on selecting new codes of appeals, but more importantly it also 
signals a realization that image projection on the part of corporations has to go 
beyond self-representation, towards the ideal of identification with society and 
culture. For this reason, it is important to reject the traditional notions of self and 
corporate self and their extended concepts such as "soul," "personality," 
"substance/' etc. 
Admittedly, there are also some questions that I cannot answer at this point. 
For instance, if all the corporations share the same imagery, which is very likely 
unrealistic, what would happen to stakeholders' preferences then? Also, if collective 
identification determines the outcome of image projection, what should a company 
do with those traditional variables like product quality and company history? 
Perhaps a certain degree of balance has to be maintained between the collective 
social side and individual business side of corporations. I would certainly like to see 
more research and discussion on the questions. At this point, however, I remain 
content with the argument that corporations must project their images as collective 
ethos, which seems to have had less attention in the past. 
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http://www.adage.com/. September 20, 2002. 
8. See company's home page at http://www.williams.com/. September 20, 2002. 
9. Foucault (1971) also says discourses can be treated as "ensembles of discursive events." See TTzg 
ArcAago/ogy of AvwwWge & fAg Dùcowrrg on language (p. 231). 
10. One can make an argument that social institutions are also relying on discourses or discourse formations to 
assert their power and authority. Foucault (1976) implies this when he says, in 7%g HMfofy of S&cwo/ify, "It is 
in discourse that power and knowledge are joined together" (p. 100). However, since the central topic of this 
paper is not about Foucault's poststructuralism, I'd rather not discuss further how discourses and social 
institutions are mutually defining. 
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